Vol. 33, no. 3: Full Issue by International Law & Policy, Denver Journal
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 33 
Number 2 Spring Article 7 
April 2020 
Vol. 33, no. 3: Full Issue 
Denver Journal International Law & Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
33 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 






V of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 33 NUMBER 2 Spring-2005
-TABLE OF CoNTENTS
ARTICLES
THE CODE NAPoieO9A BURIED BUT RULING
IN LATIN AMERICA .......................... M. C. Mirow 179
HuMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY LAWS IN INDIA:
COMBATING TERRORISM WHILE
PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES ............. C. Raj Kumar 195
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME: SPHERES OF
INFLUENCE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CHRIsTIANITY AD ISLAM ....... Daveed Gartenstein-Ross 223
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO TERRORISM:
A CoMPARATwE STUDY OF THE
UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND INDIA.. Arunabha Bhoumik 285
LAUGH, AND THE WHOLE WORLD.. . SCOWLS
AT You?: A DEFENSE OF THE
UNITED STATES' FAIR USE EXCEPTION
FOR PARODY UNDER TRIPs .............. John C. Knapp 347

THE CODE NAPOLt ON: BURIED BUT RULING IN LATIN
AMERICA
M. C. MIROW*
"The Liberator President is highly aware of the wisdom with which the Code
Napoleon was drafted."'
When lawyers from different countries meet, they are likely to exchange
almost phatic pleasantries about legal practice and their legal systems. Latin
American lawyers visiting the United States invariably respond to inquiries about
these matters with the observation that their system is based on the Napoleonic
Code. This statement, of course, does not mean the same thing to a U.S. lawyer as
it does to any European lawyer. It is an assertion of historically and culturally
rooted equality or even superiority to the Anglo-American common law system.
This short-hand reference to the French Civil Code of 1804 is a gross over-
simplification, but one that continues today. Indeed, noted comparative lawyers
and legal historians are partly to blame for such statements. In the United States,
because our introductory law school literature tends to perpetuate it,
2 lawyers are
apt to believe this characterization of Latin American law. Echoing the great
European comparativists, general Latin American literature also continues this
description.3 It is a convenient short-hand comment, but unsoundly inaccurate. To
say that Latin American law is centered on the Code Napolon is similar to saying
that United States law is based on Blackstone's Commentaries and that Belgian
law is based on Justinian's Digest. There is some truth and some falsity to these
statements and this study proposes to explore the historical and present-day
significance of the Code in Latin America, particularly the Spanish-speaking
countries.
. Associate Professor of Law and founding faculty member, Florida International University College of
Law, Miami, Florida. B.A., Boston University; J.D., Cornell University; Ph.D. (law), Cambridge
University; Ph.D. (law), Leiden University. The author gratefully acknowledges a Provost's Office/FRI
Foundation research award and an FlU College of Law research grant which funded this study. Jorge
Esquirol, GermAn Morales, and Ediberto Romdn provided many helpful comments. A French version
of this study will appear in LE CODE CIVIL, 1804-2004, ENTRE 1us COMMUNE ET DROIT PRIVE
EuROPtEN (A.A. Wijffels, ed., 2005).
1. Letter from Josd D. Espinosa, General Secretary to Bolivar, to Josd Manuel Restrepo, Minister
of the Interior (May 13, 1829) (in Manuel Prez Vila, El C6digo Napole6n en la Gran Colombia, una
iniciativa trascendental del Libertador, 19 REVISTA DE LA SOCIEDAD BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA
819, 823 (1960)). For Bolivar and the Code Napokon, see generally M.C. Mirow, The Power of
Codification in Latin America: Sim6n Bolivar and the Code Napoldon, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83
(2000).
2. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 58 (2d ed. 1985).
3. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 1997 UTAH L. REV. 425,
432 (1997).
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In 1909, Frederic William Maitland, one of England's great historians,
cogently observed that, within the common law system, "[t]he forms of action we
have buried, but they still rule us from their graves." 4 The forms of action,
procedurally embodied in the common law writs commencing legal proceedings,
provided the taxonomy of Anglo-American common law for over 700 years.
Maitland's annunciation of their death is known to virtually every student of the
history of Anglo-American law; it is perhaps as familiar as "honeste vivere,
alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere" is to those in the civil law tradition.
Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, Maitland rhetorically lamented
the dismantling of the procedural writ system that defined substantive areas of law
and maintained a clear distinction between law and equity in the common law
system. This change occurred in England through piecemeal legislation in the
nineteenth century and especially through the sweeping procedural reforms of the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 and the Judicature Act of 1873. 5 Despite the
removal of procedural difference and of particular labels for private law remedies,
the substantive distinctions left in the common law by the forms of action were
lasting and continue today. Thus, Maitland was quite correct to note the paradox:
the forms of action had been buried, but they continued and continue to rule the
common law.
Maitland's observation, published at the beginning of the twentieth century,
noted fundamental changes in the common law that came about in the nineteenth
century. Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, looking back at the
changes of the twentieth century, one may make a similar observation concerning
the place of the Code in Latin America. Thus, today this author paraphrases for
Latin America: "The Code Napolon we have buried, but it still rules us from its
grave."1
Just as the buried forms of action continue to structure and define Anglo-
American law, so too does the buried Code continue to rule Latin-American law.
This study will first briefly situate the Code in the development of Latin American
private law. After establishing the primary importance of the Code in the
development of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Latin American law, this
study will then explore the present-day aspects both burying the Code and
permitting it to reign in Latin America's legal development and culture. Even in
the formative years of national Latin American law, the Code was not a monolithic
concept or text removed from interpretation, and it carried assumptions about legal
structure and method with it from the beginning. The paradox of its burial and rule
are not purely a modem phenomenon. Nonetheless, the sharp clarity of this dual
place of the Code in recent times is notable, and this study explores its
4. F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 2 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker, eds., 1936).
5. See id. at 7-8, 81. For the United States, I have argued that this pivotal moment occurred later
than many would expect, in the mid-twentieth century. See M.C. Mirow, Legal History in the Law
School Curriculum, in LEGAL EDUCATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 187 (Donald B. King ed.,
1999).
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manifestation.
I. THE CODE NAPOLEON IN INDEPENDENCE AND EARLY REPUBLIC LATIN AMERICA
The fundamental influence of the Code Napolion on Latin America's legal
development is unquestionable and clearly evident from contemporary sources.
Indeed, Latin American scholars have produced a fine body of work on the
codification of private law. These works underscore the importance of the Code in
the process of creating new national law for the new republics.
6
After independence, the new republics of Latin America sought to create new
law. The first wave of constructing new law occurred at the constitutional level,
with countries immediately drafting constitutions in order to replace colonial rule
with national structures. Drafters of these documents were often informed by the
political writings of European Enlightenment philosophers, the liberal Spanish
Constitution of Cadiz (1812), and the Constitution of the United States of
America.7 Legal reform in the creation of new republics was not limited to the
constitutional level; private law too needed to be recast to reflect the needs of these
new countries.
Rewriting and reforming private law was important for several reasons. First,
some aspects of private law were clearly inconsistent with the new forms of
republican government. Nobility, slavery, special jurisdictions, and legal
disabilities of illegitimates, as well as the private law institutions linked to these
areas of law, had to be removed.8 Second, a unique body of private law was an
important step in creating national identity and consolidating state power in new
governments. 9 Indeed, many new constitutions made direct references to legal
reform, specifically codification. Third, the legacy of colonial private law was a
complicated and unwieldy mass of repetitive and conflicting sources. This conflict
6. See, e.g., CODIFICACI6N Y DESCODIFICACI6N EN HISPANOAMtRICA: LA SUERTE DE LOS
DERECHOS CASTELLANO Y PORTUGUtS EN EL NUEVO MUNDO DURANTE LOS SIGLOS XIX Y XX (Bernardo
Bravo Lira & Sergio Concha Mkrquez de la Plata eds., vol. 1, 1998); ALEJANDRO GUZMAN BRITO,
ANDRtS BELLO CODIFICADOR: HISTORIA DE LA FUACI6N Y CODIFICACI06 DEL DERECHO CIVIL EN
CHILE. (vols. I and 2, 1982); ALEJANDRO GUZMAN, HISTORIA DE LA CODIFICACION CIVIL IN
IBEROAMERICA (2000); CARLOS AUGUSTO RAMOS NOREZ, EL C6DIGO NAPOLE6NICO Y SU RECEPCI6N
EN AMtRICA LATINA (1997); VICTOR TAU ANZOATEGUI, LA CODIFICACI6N EN LA ARGENTINA (1810-
1870): MENTALIDAD SOCIAL E IDEAS JURfDICAS (1977).
7. See KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A
CASE BOOK 43-44 (1975).
8. See MARIA DEL REFUGIO GONZALEZ, ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO CIVIL EN
MtXICO DURANTE EL SIGLO XIX 44 (1981); JOSt LUIS SOBERANES FERNANDEZ, HISTORIA DEL
DERECHO MEXICANO 115-63 (6th ed. 1998).
9. See IVAN JAKSI(t, ANDR-s BELLO: SCHOLARSHIP AND NATION-BUILDING IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY LATIN AMERICA 156-81 (2001); J. VANDERLINDEN, LE CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE
OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIE AU XIXE SItCLE: ESSAI DE DEFINITION 223-25, 243 (1967); CSABA VARGA,
CODIFICATION AS A SOCIO-HISTORICAL PHENOMENON 334 (Sfndor Eszenyi et al. trans., 1991).
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led to desires for simple codes of applicable law.10 Fourth, commerce, property,
and the legal system demanded sources and rules that would ease their operations
and establish their place in the new republics.1
Despite these forces pushing for the reform of private law in the new
republics, true, effective, and lasting change was often delayed for decades. Most
countries in Latin America continued to refer to the private law as it existed on the
eve of independence, as modified by piecemeal rules enacted or decreed
intermittently after independence. This delay was mostly the result of the political
instability Latin American countries faced after independence. Civil wars and civil
strife reflected deep political differences in segments of the population of many
countries. Liberal and conservative notions of politics and society faced off
against each other, complicated by considerations of what form-federal or
centralized-governments should take.
In addition to the lack of politically stable governments, the treasuries of the
new countries were impoverished and resources for legal reform were scarce.
Government or self-appointed individuals and committees undertaking the task of
legal reform often moved forward without assurances of financial benefit.
The legal talent necessary for reform was also scarce. Able judges, lawyers,
and legislators were occupied with the immediate tasks of getting new
governments to run smoothly, rather than retreating to the drafting room to
consider various possible code sections for new national codes. Even finding the
right books to begin work on new private law could present insurmountable
difficulties. Early republic legal education was in the European ius commune
tradition, and with academic inertia and familiarity with current materials, there
was little pressure from professors to reform private law. As the cradle of
government, law schools were subject to political forces and governmental
supervision. For example, the introduction of the works of Jeremy Bentham into
the classroom met with governmental prohibition more than once.12
Legal reform and codification could also be hindered by those holding vested
interests in the present system. Thus, holders of large properties feared that new
legislation might undo their carefully constructed arrangements, and the Church
feared the secularizing influences of legal reform on its jurisdiction and property.
In this environment, early attempts at codification for the most part failed to
make lasting and important changes in the sources of private law. Some countries
did draft and pass civil codes in the 1820s and 1830s. For example, the Haitian
Civil Code of 1825 is a nearly exact copy of the Code Napolon.'3 Similarly, the
Civil Code of Oaxaca (Mexico) of 1827-1829 appears to have been taken almost
entirely from the Code.1 4 Nonetheless, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century
10. See Mirow, supra note 1, at 90-94.
11. See JEREMY ADELMAN, REPUBLIC OF CAPITAL: BUENOS AIRES AND THE LEGAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD 1-15 (1999).
12. See Mirow, supra note 1, at 99-100.
13. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 191.
14. See id. at 198.
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that conditions had improved so that codification of private law could be attained
with greater success. When conditions were better, individuals and committees
took up the call to provide codes of private law for the new republics.
Successful codifications of private law were often exercises in comparative
legislation. At the core of these exercises were the Code Napolkon and the
European commentary sources that quickly grew around the main text. This
however does not mean that Latin American countries merely translated and
borrowed the Code, article by article. Rather, the Code Napolion provided the
structure and measure of the enterprise. The substantive rules adopted often varied
from the French provisions, and in drafting and explaining such provisions,
individuals noted the divergence from the French Code. Even at this early national
stage of Latin American law the Code, as text, was being buried as it was adopted,
adapted, translated, and placed in new codes. European scholars also noted the
successes and failures from their point of view of these new codes. For example,
Ratil Guerin de la Grasserie criticized the Peruvian Civil Code of 1852 for its
systematic inexactitude and deficient classification, and Angel Osorio, President of
Madrid's Colegio de Abogados and Real Academia de Jurisprudencia commented
on reforms of Argentina's civil code.1
5
Apart from the intrinsic appeal of the Code and its widespread acceptance
within world legal circles, its Frenchness made it particularly attractive to Latin
Americans in this crucial period of Latin American codification, during the second
half of the nineteenth century. French culture ruled Latin American culture and the
dlite of Latin America were a Francophone dlite. Despite Latin American
admiration of Anglo-American economic and political successes, ruling classes of
Latin America intellectually aligned themselves with the French intelligentsia and
saw French progress somehow more in tune with Latin American cultural and
societal aspirations. This allegiance was true despite French military action in
Mexico in 1838 to collect debts and France's occasional blockades of the River
Plate in the first part of the nineteenth century.' 6 The French installation of
Maximilian and Carlota in the 1860s in Mexico further complicated the place of
France in the nineteenth-century Latin American mind. 7
With this environment in mind, we may consider the work of Andrds Bello as
a brief example of the Latin American codification of civil law. Bello drafted
perhaps the most influential code in the development of Latin American private
law, the Chilean Civil Code of 1855.18 For the law of contracts and obligations,
Bello expressly stated that he followed the law of the French Code, and this
author's own research indicates Bello followed the Code Napolon in other areas
15. See Carlos Rodriguez Pastor, Vida, pasirn y muerte de las codificaciones, in LIBRO
HOMENAJE A ULISES MONTOYA MANFREDI 611, 613 (1989).
16. See THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 358-61 (5th ed.
2000).
17. See MICHAEL C. MEYER ET AL., THE COURSE OF MEXICAN HISTORY 374-86 (6th ed. 1999).
18. See, e.g., GUZMkN BRrrO, supra note 6; JAKSIt(, supra note 9, at 156-81; M.C. Mirow,
Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andris Bello 's Use of the Code Napolion in Drafting the
Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA L. REv. 291 (2001).
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of his code as well. Nonetheless, in style, Bello found the Code too brief, and
opted for greater specificity and illustrative language in his code. '9 Indeed, in
pressing for codification in Chile, Bello translated and published works of Portalis
concerning codification in France.20 French commentary sources were essential in
Bello's project as well. Alejandro Guzmdn writes, "Entre los autores extranjeros,
lievaron su preferencia los franceses Devincourt, Rogron y sobre todo Pothier en
sus diversos Traites; tambi6n emple6 a Merlin, Favard de l'Anglade, Portalis y
Maleville... Troplong, Duvergier, Toullier, Delangle y Duranton." 21 Bello's code
is an important example because it was adopted widely in the region and served as
a model for the civil codes of other Latin American countries.
Bello was, of course, not alone in looking to the Code Napoldon as a
fundamental source for national codification in Latin America during the mid-
nineteenth century. The French Civil Code was an important source for other
influential codes in Latin America, such as Teixeira de Freitas's Brazilian Code,
Esboqo do C6digo Civil, from the 1860s and Dalmacio V6lez Sarsfield's Argentine
Civil Code from the same period.22 French commentary sources continued into the
first part of the twentieth century as interpretive tools and as guides for domestic
treatises on civil law.
23
From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, the French
Code and its commentary sources provided many of the core concepts and
methodologies of private law in Latin America. In a collection of reported oral
histories of well-known Venezuelan legal practitioners conducted in the late 1970s,
lawyers recall their studies in the 1920s and 1930s and note the use of the
following as texts for legal study during the period: Ortolin, Petit, Pradier Foder6,
Planiol y Ripert, Demolombe, Aubry y Rau, Baudry Lacantinerie, Colin, and
Capitant.24 The sources used by Luis Felipe Urbaneja in the course of his studies,
practice, and teaching also illustrate this reliance. As a law student at the
Universidad Central de Venezuela from 1926 to 1934, Urbaneja recalled: "We
learned by the textbook, which I estimate gave us no less than 80 percent of our
knowledge. The texts were almost always in French or Italian, languages that we
had leamed to read in our bachillerato, above all French.,
25
The central place of the Code Napolgon in Latin American private law has
been noted by many. The regional importance of secondary sources commenting
on the Code is less well documented, but nonetheless, equally established. Thus,
the Code and its method of structuring the law were a primary influence on the
development of Latin American private law. This study, however, does not seek to
19. See Mirow, supra note 18, at 302.
20. See Portalis, Lejislaci6n: Discurso preliminar del proyecto de c6digo civil de Francia, El
Araucano, Aug. 17, 1833, at 2.
21. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 243.
22. See id. at 296-301, 334-36.
23. See ANZOATEGUI, supra note 6, at 113.
24. See ROGELIO PtREZ PERDOMO, LOS ABOGADOS EN VENEZUELA: ESTUDIO DE UNA ELITE
INTELECTUAL Y POLITICA, 1780-1980, 359, 377, 389 (1981).
25. Id. at 376.
VOL. 33:2
BURIED BUT RULING IN LATIN AMERICA
reexamine proof of the influence of the Code Napolon on national codifications
and on subsequent legal developments. Rather, given the importance in Latin
America of the Code and other French sources from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-
twentieth centuries, this study now addresses the factors weakening the impact of
the Code and those factors keeping its force alive.
II. THE CODE NAPOLAON BURIED
In the past few decades Latin American private law has undergone substantial
independent changes that have served to bury the Code in the region. Some forces
driving these changes are common to many other civil law countries where the
limits of national codification are facing demands from expanding subject matters,
decodification, and globalization.26 Other forces driving these changes have been
unique to the region. International political and economic forces realigning Latin
American interests, economies, and thought in the twentieth century have directly
affected the development of private law in the region. Although the United States
has been an actor in several of these developments, its influence should not be
given too great an emphasis in seeking the reasons why the Code has become
buried. Nonetheless, because the United States' influence preceded many of the
other influential factors, it is treated first in this study.
Perhaps the most important political factor was World War H. This war
created political, economic, and intellectual shifts in Latin America's relationship
with other countries of the world. While the direction of European law in general
was altered by the war, it was altered even more so from Latin America's
standpoint as communication between European and Latin American countries was
substantially curtailed. The war interrupted trade between Europe and Latin
America, and the influences that came with the status of trading partner waned for
Europe. Even though French influences on Latin American culture and thought
continued strongly into the first part of the twentieth century, they competed with
and were displaced by a growing U.S. cultural presence that had begun to enter
Latin America even before World War H. In the first half of the twentieth century,
the United States' national security concerns prompted it to assert its policies and
influence with greater strength in the region. By 1945, Germany and Italy had lost
all credibility in Latin America, and England and France were too weak from the
war to carry on meaningful foreign influence in the region. The United States thus
became the main foreign influence in Latin America.27 With hemispheric interests
in mind shortly after World War II, the Treaty of Rio led to the Organization of
American States (OAS).
Latin America's legal world reflected these broad political, cultural, and
intellectual shifts. In light of the OAS, some U.S. law schools began to offer
programs for Latin American law students and lawyers to foster greater
understanding and economic ties between the two legal communities. For
example, in 1947, major U.S. corporations sponsored the Inter-American Law
Institute at New York University. This support provided fellowships for
26. See MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 151-58.
27. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 16, at 367-68.
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"outstanding young lawyers from the countries to the south to spend an academic
year in the United States to study the Anglo-American legal system."2 By the
time Venezuelan law student Urbaneja became a professor, teaching civil law from
1939 to 1950, he regarded his contributions as spearheading a movement away
from the rhetorical tradition of the French commentators toward the use of
practical cases "in the style of the North American method created at Harvard by
Langdell.,, 29 This comment is illustrative of a regional shift in mentality about
foreign influences in Latin American legal education, and thus in Latin American
law generally. This shift from European to U.S. influence lessened the importance
of the Code Napoleon in Latin America.
Perhaps equally as important as World War II, the Cold War established U.S.
interest in influencing legal change in Latin America. U.S. policy makers saw
economic and social development as the tool to inoculate the region from
international Communism. Development was linked to law and legal systems, and
U.S. law professors advanced the Law and Development Movement in many
countries of Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. This well-meaning
exercise in sharing expertise focused on changing methods of legal instruction,
remodeling the lawyer into social engineer and problem solver, and instilling rule
skepticism along the lines of American legal realism.3) For instance, in the
classroom the movement sought to replace the model of part-time eloquent and
distinguished professors lecturing on code provisions with a model of interactive,
"Socratic," and clinical experiences for students. The reasons for this movement's
failure are varied, and in some instances it ushered in a backlash to more
traditional methods and expectations in legal education. For example, one dean of
a Colombian law school who had embraced such changes was "replaced by an
older French trained attorney" who cast off the newer trends. 3' For the most part,
however, this movement did effect some changes that shifted Latin American law
farther away from European methods and the Code Napoleon. These changes
included advancing sociological critiques of legal formalism, instilling a more self-
reflective approach to legal education in the region, and fostering numerous
interpersonal connections between Latin American and U.S. educators that would
create long-standing academic relationships.32  Hence, with the Law and
Development Movement we find another factor serving to bury the Code
Napolon.
The United States' attempts to influence Latin American legal change did not
stop with the Law and Development Movement. Indeed, after a brief respite and
period of regrouping, U.S. legal academics-many supported by the same
28. PHANOR J. EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN
LAW xi (1950).
29. See PERDOMO, supra note 24, at 379.
30. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA 4 (1980).
31. DENNIS 0. LYNCH, LEGAL ROLES IN COLOMBIA 116 (1981).
32. See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV.
41 (2003).
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organizations behind the Law and Development Movement-advanced a program
best described as the Rule of Law Movement. In recent decades, U.S. lawyers and
professors have mostly advised governments on institutional changes that would
better their administration of justice. Initiatives have included: studying the
judiciary and court systems and making recommendations for increasing their
independence; improving the training of government lawyers, judges, and other
personnel; increasing the efficiency and transparency of legal proceedings; and
making changes in legal education.33 This academic and practical emphasis on
institutional and procedural aspects of law, rather than the content of its
substantive provisions, has also served to lessen the importance of the Code and its
method.
In addition to, and concurrent with, the prominence of United States models
and influences, international investment in Latin America and the globalization of
legal practice have led to sidestepping domestic law and national legal systems.
One aspect of globalization has been to reduce the importance of individual
nations. A result of the diminution of the importance of individual states is a
diminution in the importance of their domestic codes, including the civil codes of
each country. Thus, in a legal world without borders, codes that indirectly support
the autonomy of nation-states are less important.34 With regional agreements on
international economic law and related matters, such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, and the
Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"), Latin American domestic law has
become subjected to international norms and ideas that diminish the importance of
domestic law in these areas of law, though the effect has been slight in the realm of
private law.
35
The effect is not limited to trade and related matters. In recent decades,
international lawyers have put forth various consensus views of how transactions
related to business and property ought to be conducted, structured, and
documented. Some have argued that globalization really means North
"Americanization," as Wall Street and Washington lawyers further the legal
hegemony of the United States throughout the world.36 Business and property
related transactions typically provide governing rules by contract or choice of law
provisions. Thus, in such transactions, domestic law becomes increasingly
irrelevant. If domestic law becomes increasingly irrelevant, the underpinnings of
domestic law, e.g. the code, become less important. Consequently, the
globalization of business law serves to bury the Code.
33. Alfredo Fuentes-Hernndez, Globalization and Legal Education in Latin America: Issues for
Law and Development in the 21st Century, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 39, 43-47, 51-59 (2002).
Funding for such initiatives has also come from the World Bank. Joseph R. Thome, Heading South but
Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 691, 697.
34. CARLos AUGUSTO RAMOS NI1JEZ, CODIFICACION, TECNOLOGIA Y POSTMODERNIDAD: LA
MUERTE DE UN PARADIGMA 56-68 (2000).
35. H. Patrick Glenn, Harmony of Laws in the Americas, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 223,
230-31 (2003).
36. Ugo Mattei, The Issue of European Civil Codification and Legal Scholarship: Biases,
Strategies and Developments, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 883, 888 (1998).
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As another product of globalization, Latin America has rapidly adopted
systems of alternative dispute resolution, particularly in resolving private law
disputes. Thus, traditional tribunals can be avoided by the use of mediation and
arbitration. Where such methods of dispute resolution are employed, decision
makers may turn to various substantive rules of decision, including rules
contractually agreed to by the parties and rules from other legal systems. They
may also decide disputes without recourse to any particular legal rule. Thus, with
the use of alternative dispute resolution, the importance of national code provisions
and their application dwindles.
Factors burying the Code have not been exclusively external, such as those
resulting from U.S. or international pressure. Many factors are either indigenous
developments or internal changes commonly found in other civil law systems.
Addressed next, these factors include the development of a strong and reliable
body of indigenous commentary literature, the growth of case law as a source of
law, various aspects of decodification, and the phenomenon known as
"recodification."
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, lawyers and legal academics in
many Latin American countries have provided highly specialized commentary
sources on their own national codes. These works have, in effect, replaced the
more standard, yet often more general, French and other European works
commenting on the civil law. While these Latin American works may continue to
cite occasionally the European masters of the Code, they rely much more on
national and even other Latin American treatise writers for authority. For example,
a recent text on testamentary succession from Colombia included references to
Baudry-Lacantinerie, Demolombe, and Planiol y Ripert. Nonetheless, these
references are dwarfed by references to the works of Chileans Claro Solar (1945)
and Somarriva Undurraga (1961), and of Colombian Carrizosa Pardo (196 1).
37
Indeed, treatises produced in countries of the region with leading legal publishers
such as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico are often used as authoritative texts in other
countries, and these have replaced older translations of French and other European
commentaries.
39
The growth of case law, precedent, and even the doctrine of stare decisis have
also served to bury the Code. Cases, as both interpretational tools and sources of
law, have gained ground in areas once ruled exclusively by civil code provisions.
39
A common example in Latin America, and perhaps in the entire civil law world, is
the growth of tort law.40  As cases expand and explain code provisions, the
autonomy of the code as sole source of substantive law is eroded.
37. See ROBERTO SUAREZ FRANCO, DERECHO DE SUCESiONES 451-54 (2d ed. 1996).
38. See Alejandro M. Garro, Unification and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America, 40
AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 612 (1992).
39. See RAMOS NCI3EZ, supra note 34, at 86; Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on
Codification and Case Law in the Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 667-70 (1998).
40. See generally Jonathan A. Miller, Products Liability in Argentina, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 611
(1985); Natalia M. Bartels & M. Stuart Madden, A Comparative Analysis of United States and
Colombian Tort Law: Duty, Breach, and Damages, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 59 (2001).
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Cases as sources of law have also gained significant ground through the
growth of constitutional law in Latin America. The Code is yielding its primacy in
the area of constitutional law. Thus, as in Europe, the constitutionalization of
Latin American law has created a methodological shift for lawyers and judges in
Latin America.4 ' Constitutional law is judicial interpretations of constitutional
provisions, often by constitutional courts. Constitutional law is, therefore, case
law, which in this context has led to the development of notions of precedent and
stare decisis.
Along with the heightened attention constitutions have recently received, the
allied areas of effective courts, human rights, and individual rights have also
garnered significant academic attention.42 Constitutional law, particularly the
procedural devices that many Latin American countries are offering their citizens
to enable them to challenge actions on constitutional grounds, has served to
increase the power of judges and reduce the formalism often instilled in judges by
traditional civil law training.43 With the growth of constitutionally based actions,
many judges, not just the judges of constitutional courts, are deciding the
constitutionality of state, and even private, actions. With such actions, judges
make constitutional law to apply to their cases. Cases, whether as newly
introduced tools of interpretation for traditional areas of civil law or as new
products of constitutional law, are burying the Code in Latin America.
Another development related to the sources of law and incorporating the idea
of decodification follows from the increasing number of sources generally, and
even the growing number of codes. 44  The idea behind this process of
decodification is that the traditional structure of the Napoleonic Codes no longer
serves as a useful organizational device because of the complexity and volume of
new legislation.45 As the number of areas requiring legislative action increases,
these new topics often do not find their home within the structures of the civil
code, or even the traditional codes. For example, Latin American law experienced
the beginning of this decodification process with labor law, agrarian reform,
mining law, and family law. Legislation affecting these areas was just too large
and complex to be incorporated into existing codes and resulted in the creation of
41. See NATALINO IRTI, LA EDAD DE LA DESCODIFICACION 63-65, 93-106 (Jos6 Maria Bosch ed.,
L. Rojo Ajuria trans., 1992) (originally titled L'ETA DELLA DECODIFICAZIONE, 1979).
42. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Premature Predictions of Multiculturalism?, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1470 (2002) (reviewing DONNA LEE VAN CoT-I, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE
POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA(2000)).
43. See Bernardino Bravo Lira, Estudios de derecho y cultura de abogados en Chile 1758-1998:
tras la huella ius commune, la codificaci6n y la descodificaci6n en el Nuevo Mundo, 20 REvISTA DE
ESTUDIOS HiST6RICO-JURiDICOs 85 (1998); Luis Diez-Picazo y Ponce de Leon, Codificaci6n,
descodificacidn y recodificacidn, 45 ANuARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 473, 480-81 (1992).
44. See generally id.; Maria Luisa Murillo, The Evolution of Codification in the Civil Law Legal
Systems: Towards Decodification and Recodification, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 163 (2001); see
also IRTI, supra note 41 (defining the terms "decodification" and "microsystems"); Miguel Acosta
Romero, Elfendmeno de la descodificaci6n en el derecho civil, REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO, July -
Aug. 1989, at 611; Alejandro Guzmfin B., Codificacidn, descodificaci6n y recodificaci6n del derecho
civil chileno, 90 REVISTA DE DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA Y GACETA DE LOS TRIBUNALES 39 (1993).
45. See Diez-Picazo, supra note 43, at 478-79.
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new, separate codes. Additionally, new areas of law, such as laws for minors,
environmental law, corporate compliance, securities regulation, and the insurance
industry, require very detailed rules and administrative procedures established
under "legislative microsystems." With the appearance of these new codes and
microsystems, the importance of the code structure diminishes.46
In addition to multiple sources of law leading to decodification, some have
also viewed the introduction of new technologies as contributing to the process.
For instance, tying the book, the nation state, and the code together as coworkers in
modernity, Ramos Naflez argues that the CD-ROM, the Internet, globalization, and
a new non-code based ius commune symbiotically lead to the beginning of a
postmodern era, destroying a past paradigm of Latin American law.47 This shift is
probably not unique to Latin America, but may also be observed throughout the
civil law world.
While decodification has been a common shift in all systems based on codes,
Latin American law has also been subject to legislation and microsystems that are
products of their particular populations. Legislation and institutions established to
protect and promote native populations are being advanced and enacted in almost
every country of the region.48 Because many of these developments are guided by
international models and organizations, such legal pluralism in Latin American
countries lessens the importance of the traditional single codified law.49 Thus, in
addition to the common elements of decodification found in most civil law
systems, legislation directed at the indigenous populations of Latin America has
helped to bury the Code in the region.
In summary, various legal ch anges have served to remove the Code from
importance in the course of Latin American private law. The Code had a high
place in Latin American law of the nineteenth century. It provided a guiding
structure for legal thought, development, institutions, and education. Nonetheless,
its taxonomic power has decreased and more areas of law are found outside the
application of its provisions. The passage of time and numerous elements have
served to reduce the importance of the Code, particularly in the past fifty years.
Some of these elements came from early outside influences such as the United
States, although these may not be of primary importance. Some of these elements
have been specific to Latin America, while others have been changes shared by
civil law jurisdictions generally, and still others are the product of global economic
change. Each of the changes described above has served in some way to bury the
Code.
46. See RAMOS NOIEZ, supra note 34, at 26, 50.
47. See id. at 31-91.
48. See Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARv. HUM. RTS J. 57, 74-89 (1999).
49. See Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Globalization Process of Human Rights in Latin America
Versus Economic, Social and Cultural Diversity, 25 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 156, 173-79 (1997); John A.
Mills, Legal Constructions of Cultural Identity in Latin America: An Argument Against Defining
"Indigenous Peoples ", 8 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 49 (2002).
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III. THE CODE NAPOLAON RULES
Despite the forces working to bury the Code, it rules from its grave. When
forced to give one-sentence descriptions of their legal systems, Latin American
lawyers will still assuredly assert that theirs is based on the Code Napolon. The
Code rules as a symbol and unifying structure of the law. The Code represents a
paradigm of law, a mentaliti, and a talisman. Indeed, it is not so much the
particular French Civil Code of 1804 that continues to rule, but rather what the
Code Napoleon stands for and what the Code's progeny is in terms of substantive
law and legal method in the region. In broad terms the Code stands for the virtues
of codification: rationality, progress, pedagogy, and utopia. ° The Code is
emblematic of principles of law and justice within the positivist legal tradition.
The paradigmatic function of the Code has its roots in history, and its authoritative
quality and nostalgic call continue today in Latin America and the world. George
P. Fletcher has recently grouped the Code with the U.S. Constitution and the
German Civil Code of 1900 as one of the "three nearly sacred books in Western
law."51 The intervening modifications by translation, by early drafters, and by
subsequent legislators and executive decrees are inconsequential to one describing
the nature of Latin American private law. After nearly two centuries of
autochthonous legal change and modification, the French Code rules. Its authority
reaches across these changes and modifications. It is, indeed, a powerful text.
In many ways, the Code continues to serve a taxonomic function as the
intellectual superstructure upon which all legal thought is built. Its structure
continues to rule the structure of the law, just as the forms of action continue to
rule (often silently) the common law. As Fletcher observes, "The code is supreme
not in its language, not in the hierarchy of the legal system, but in the framework
of thought that guides the mind of the French jurist.' 52 Similarly, Pierre Legrand
has observed, "[a] civil code is the grammar of the law.' '53 For Latin America,
Alejandro Garro has noted that the Code "provided Iberoamerica with a legal
glossary followed by Andres Bello in his Chilean Civil Code, Velez Sarsfield in
his Argentine Civil Code, and by the drafters of the Spanish Civil Code."54 Thus,
on this taxonomic level, it is a grammar, a glossary, a mentalit that continues
today.
The substance and structure of the code have also dictated certain forms of
institutions that have become established in the region. As a result, the nature of
the code and its subject matter has dictated a certain place for the judiciary and the
nature of tribunals, not only by substantive area, but also in approach to judicial
decision-making.Y Thus, the role and function of courts in Latin America were
50. See Diez-Picazo, supra note 43, at 474-78.
51. George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Western Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001).
52. Id. at 12.
53. Pierre Legrand, Strange Power of Words: Codification Situated, 9 TuL. EUR. Civ. L.F. 1, 4
(1994).
54. Alejandro M. Garro, On Some Practical Implications of the Diversity of Legal Cultures for
Lawyering the Americas, 64 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 461, 469 (1995).
55. See JEAN-LOUIS HALPtRIN, HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVI FRANI;AIS DEPUIS 1804 52-56 (1st ed.
2005
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
established in a period before the burial of the Code, and these courts and their
methods of deciding cases continue today in Latin America.
Similarly, the structure of legal education continues for the most part in the
continental, French tradition. Indeed, in many countries of the region the Code
defines the structure of the curriculum. Just as the forms of action still distantly
define the contours of the first-year curriculum in the United States, so too does the
Code establish borders between some of the required courses of Latin American
law schools. Courses may be entitled "personas," "bienes," "obligaciones" and
"succesiones" following code divisions, and students carry their versions of the
code with them to class. The method of education continues in the tradition of the
Code with the bulk of instruction based on lectures about code provisions. The
language used is precise and erudite, and law lectures are a particular genre with
their own style, vocabulary, and delivery. The performance aspects of teaching
follow European lines, and student participation is for the most part limited to
note-taking and admiration. In the classroom, the Code rules.
In the Latin American legal mind, the Code stands for and perpetuates
continuity with Enlightenment Europe and orderly, liberal, powerful states. The
Code, particularly through its important European commentators, provides cultural
and linguistic links between Latin America and Europe that will continue
throughout this century. Latin Americans, when challenged by Anglo-American
lawyers, invoke the Code as a basis for their legal system, asserting legal, cultural,
and political superiority. It is an assertion of Latin American continuity with a
great European tradition. The Code paradoxically stands for both "antiquity
greater than the common law," because its roots are in Roman law, and "modernity
and rationality," because it is product of nineteenth-century France. Mention of
the Code ties Latin America to its own and to Europe's ius commune. To invoke
the Code is to invoke Europe, and to invoke Europe is to chart certain aspirations
of Latin America in political and economic terms. As Jorge Esquirol has pointed
out, "Latin American societies are not European, only their jurists pretend to be.
The notion of Europeanness is rather a political aspiration. Its goal is assimilating
illiberal Latin America to the culture of European democracy. '56 Similarly, to
invoke the Code Napolon is to affirm the Europeanness of Latin American law
and thus to elevate the cultural and political position of Latin America in the
western world view.
By linking Latin American law with Europe, Latin American lawyers not only
include their countries in the European tradition, but also exclude their countries
from the legal, cultural, political, and economic realm of the United States. By
embracing European law, Latin American lawyers construct barriers to the United
States. Facile references to the Code become a short-hand method of establishing
"otherness" from the legal system and the perceived hegemony of the United
States. References to the French Code may even imply linguistic ties of the
Romance languages which similarly serve to include Europe and to exclude the
1996).
56. Esquirol, supra note 3, at 470.
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United States. Just as the process of codification is political, so too is the
continued appeal of a code. Thus, as a political symbol, the Code rules from its
grave.
Related to the code's Europeanness is its general place in history in the
popular and legal mind. Beyond authority through the ages and authority through
reason, the Code also rules through nostalgia. The assertion that Latin American
law is based on the Code Napoleon recalls a pre-war, European-aligned past. The
days when Latin American law was governed by the Code and its methodology
were, in nostalgic terms, simpler days for the law and for the people. The very
mention of the Code imports thoughts of the days of the great national codifiers
and commentators, of days before present problems and complexities. The Code,
as text, has also been seen as an important method of conveying the content of the
law beyond classroom and courtroom to laypeople. The notion, in theory if not in
practice, that the provisions of the Code should be non-technical and available for
lay understanding is another important way the Code continues its reign.
57
Even on the level of substantive rules, the inverse of decodification, with its
new codes and microsystems, can be observed. This process is labeled
"recodification." Some legal areas that for social or economic reasons were
seperated from the core of the civil code have now returned, either as new
provisions within the ambit of the code or because these areas of law have been
removed from the extensive legislation they once demanded under prior
governmental policies. 58 This is particularly true where Socialist legislation has
been erased as part of capitalist reforms. Thus, employment contracts may return
to the jurisdiction of the civil code as a contract for services and residential leases
for urban housing may return to the civil code as just another kind of lease.
Nonetheless, some have noted that the idea of recodification is artificial. Once
legal rules have been established in systems outside the code, the return of these
subject matters to the civil code does not reinvigorate the code. This is particularly
true in areas of the law once governed exclusively by the code, but now subject to
administrative oversight and institutions.5 9
While the forces of globalism have for the most part served to bury the Code,
the effects of internationalization on private law have served to keep the Code
ruling in the mind of Latin American lawyers. Those involved in codifying private
international law on a national level have seen this process as an outgrowth of the
civil code.60 On the European level, in the movement towards a European Civil
Code, Ugo Mattei identified one group of contributors as representing a "highly
homogeneous European legal academic elite" who seek to steer the project with
57. See ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW:
CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA 272 (1980).
58. See generally Murillo, supra note 44.
59. RAMOS NORIEZ, supra note 34, at 82-85.
60. See Paul Lagarde, Sur la non-codification du droit international privo franvais, 25 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 45 (1998) (describing the mid-twentieth centwy attempts); Frangois Rigaux,
Codification of Private International Law: Pros and Cons, 60 LA. L. REV. 1321 (2000).
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Roman law reins. 61 Indeed, those advancing the European Code project seem to
press for individual national civil code methodologies and structures.62 Similarly,
Latin American countries are represented in the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (ten of UNIDROIT's 58 member countries are from the
region), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (six of
UNCITRAL's 36 member countries are from the region), and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (eight of 64 member countries).63
Regional developments in private international law are somewhat more limited
when compared to the efforts of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL and the Hague
Conference, but the focus of these undertakings often follows the traditional Code
method of larger projects. 64 The basis for the construction of private international
law is one that shares much with the tradition of nineteenth-century codification on
the domestic level. Thus, assumptions about both method and substance in the
creation of private international law are based in the code and comparative
legislation. In private international law, the Code continues to rule.
Numerous factors in Latin America have served both to bury the Code and to
keep it ruling in the minds of lawyers and in the life of the law. The contemporary
existence of these factors has led to a tension that will continue into the twenty-
first century in the region. Writing about Peru in 2000, Ramos Nifiez stated:
The death of codes, however, has not yet come. Perhaps the end is near. A
paradigm so interior to the conscience of lawyers does not pass away only once,
but during a long historical process. According to Kuhn, there are
circumstances, although rare, in which two paradigms can coexist peacefully.
Surely, we find ourselves in that rare conjuncture at which the code is not
resigned itself to oblivion.
65
The paradox of two paradigms continues. In practice, the Code has been buried; in
institutions, structures, and mentalit, the Code rules. Indeed, we have buried the
Code Napolon, but it still rules us from its grave.
61. Mattei, supra note 36, at 885-86, 894-98.
62. Pierre Legrand, Codification and the Politics of Exclusion: A Challenge for Comparativists,
31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 799 (1998); see Mattei, supra note 36, at 894-98.
63. Fuentes-Hernndez, supra note 33, at 50-51; see also Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Member States, at http://www.hcch.e-vision.nllindex-en.php?act=states. Listing
(last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
64. See Garro, supra note 38; Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of
Legal Obstacles under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 164-66 (1995); see also
Consejo Permantente de la Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, Comisi6n de Asuntos Juridicos y
Politicos, Conferencias Especializadas Interamericanas sobre Derecho Internacional Privado: Informe
y conclusiones, at http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/SPANISH/HIST_ 03/CP11200S04.doc (Apr. 17,
2003).
65. RAMOS NufREZ, supra note 34, at 91.
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HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS
IN INDIA: COMBATING TERRORISM WHILE PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES
C. RAJ KUMAR*
"Liberty is itself the gift of the law and may by the law [be]forfeited or abridged. ,'
"[Tihe principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and liberty without the
authority of law was not the gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary [corollary] of
the concept relating to sanctity of life and liberty; it existed and was in force before
the coming into force of the Constitution. " 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C.,3 and the
December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament4 have intensified the debate
regarding the necessity of formulating national security laws in India and the laws'
potentially serious impact on human rights and civil liberties.5 The strengthening
of national security laws6 worldwide is apparently pursued with the objective of
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1. Jabalpur v. Shukla, 1976 1 S.C.R. 172 (Ray, C.J.).
2. Id. (Khanna, J., dissenting).
3. For an interesting read on the impact of these acts on human rights, see Philip B. Heymann,
Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 440
(2002).
4. For more information on the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, see Embassy of India,
Recent Events, Terrorist Attack on the Parliament of India, at
http://www.indianembassy.org/new/parliamentdec_13_01 .htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
5. For a critical perspective on responses to terrorism, see Martha Crenshaw, Unintended
Consequences: How Democracies Respond to Terrorism, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 153 (1997).
See also, Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment and War, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1217
(2002) (discussing past acts of terror and the United States' response to them).
6. For an excellent understanding of the Anti-terrorism laws in the U.S., see Joshua D. Zelman,
Recent Developments in International Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislation - Part One: An Overview, 11 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183 (2001); see also Joshua D. Zelman, Recent Developments in International
Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislation - Part Two: The Impact and Consequences, I I J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
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combating terrorism7 and other forms of internal and external threats to the States
and the societies in which people live. 'In response to these developments, the
Indian government passed a new anti-terrorism law, which in this author's view,
was draconian and unnecessary. The Indian government promulgated this law
notwithstanding substantial public opinion against its passage. In fact, the National
Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) critiqued the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) 8 when it was still a bill. After a unanimous
decision that "there is no need for the enactment of a law based on the Draft
Prevention of Terrorism Bill [of] 2000," the NHRC recommended the bill not be
passed.9 While the constitutional validity of POTA was upheld by the Supreme
Court of India in a later decision, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government led by the Congress party that came to power in India in May 2004
after the elections repealed POTA by way of a Presidential Ordinance on 21
September 2004.10 However, the fact that some of the provisions of POTA came
by way of a new avatar in the amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act (UAPA) has once again brought to the focus how governments tend to tinker
with human rights when responding to terrorism or in the name of preserving
national security."
Human rights and national security are at times perceived to be at odds with
one another. 12 When government officials speak about national security, their
arguments rest primarily upon the premise that protecting human rights and civil
liberties is at times subservient to protecting national security. In India, the
government has passed stringent laws protecting national security and combating
terrorist threats, but these same laws cannot pass the test of human rights scrutiny.
During the last five decades since independence, India has made significant efforts
to strengthen the legal, constitutional, and institutional framework to protect,
promote and institutionalize human rights. Since the 1980s, the Indian judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court of India, 13 has supported these efforts through
numerous judgments limiting the powers of government-including police and
other enforcement machinery-while simultaneously expanding the notions of
POL'Y 421 (2002).
7. For an international relations perspective on terrorism, see Shashi Tharoor, September 11,
2002: Understanding and Defeating Terrorism, One Year Later, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9
(2003).
8. For further reading on the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), see L.K. THAKUR,
ESSENTIALS OF POTA AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS (2002).
9. Id. at 257-62 (discussing NHRC's opinion on POTA while still a bill).
10. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 2004 9 S.C.C. 580; A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 456.
11. V.Venkatesan, POTA Reinvented, FRONTLINE, Oct. 23, 2004, available at
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2l22/stories/2004110500481 1000.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
12. For a very interesting perspective on drawing the balance between the combat against
terrorism while protecting human rights, see Emanuel Gross, Democracy's Struggle against Terrorism:
The Powers of Military Commanders to Decide upon the Demolition of Houses, the Imposition of
Curfews, Blockades, Encirclements and the Declaration of an Area as a closed Military Area, 30 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 165 (2000).
13. For further reading on the Supreme Court of India, see SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE -
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (B.N. KIRPAL et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
KIRPAL].
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freedom and liberty. These limitations were justified by invoking a broad and
purposive interpretation of Fundamental Rights, which are enshrined in Chapter III
of the Constitution of India.1
4
The international human rights framework, conventions or treaties to which
India was a signatory or ratifying party, also justified the limitations on
governmental powers. However, the contemporary reality of Indian executive
governance demonstrates the weaknesses and inadequacies of the treaties and
conventions. As a result, police, military and para-military forces continue to
violate human rights. This problem underscores the need to develop a culture
amongst law enforcement officials that respects human rights as a sine qua non for
the preservation of the rule of law. Passing certain laws under the guise of
protecting national security in India offers an occasion to examine the human
rights understanding in a constitutional sense. These laws granted significant
powers to the Indian executive, thus providing greater opportunity for abuse and
violation of fundamental rights.
This article addresses the issue of Indian national security law operation and
the efforts to combat terrorism while protecting human rights as follows:
First, it provides an overview of the historical background of national security
and human rights issues in India within the context of the Constituent Assembly
debates;
Second, it explains the legal and constitutional framework of national security
legislation in India and the limitations on governmental exercise of power as
provided in the Indian Constitution. It also analyzes certain national security cases
decided by the Indian judiciary. Further, it considers how the balance between
protecting national security and promoting human rights has been achieved;
Third, it explains the legal framework of the anti-terrorism laws in India with
particular reference to the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) and
examines its critical implications from a human rights standpoint. It also discussed
the decision of the Supreme Court of India in upholding the constitutional validity
of POTA, while underlining the need for checks and balances in enforcing anti-
terrorism laws. However, the forming of a Congress-led government in India has
resulted in POTA being repealed. This is a significant positive development as far
as resistance of the human rights movement is concerned to ensure that civil
liberties are not compromised in the fight against terrorism and the need for
protecting national security. However, fears are expressed as to how strengthening
of other criminal law legislation can potentially have the same effect of POTA.
Fourth, it evaluates the human rights consequences of emergency provisions
under the Indian Constitution with the intent to examine their present status of
jurisprudence. It also critically examines certain decisions of the Supreme Court of
India which have resulted in the development of habeas corpus law.
Fifth, it examines the human rights framework and its impact on preventive
14. For an excellent reading to understand the working of the Indian constitution, see GRANVILLE
AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION - THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2000).
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detention laws in India;
Sixth, it provides an overview of international developments that have
attempted to balance counter-terrorist and national security interests with the
protection and promotion of human rights;
Seventh, by differentiating between national security and human security, it
provides a way forward and proposes that national security strategies should take
into consideration the relevance of human rights and development. The goal of
protecting human security will supplement the existing strategies for protecting
national security, but human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot be
compromised in the pursuit of state security policies. Rather, it is argued that the
processes of protecting human rights should result in citizen empowerment-the
foundation upon which human security will be achieved. In this regard, it is useful
to refer to the recent report of the U.N. Secretary General, In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, in which there has been
an attempt to link some of the issues relating to security to development and
human rights. 5 But operationalization of these linkages will require a holistic
understanding of human security and its acceptances by states followed by a
paradigmatic shift in their approach toward fighting terrorism and preserving
national security. This can only result in the rhetoric of the U.N. Secretary
General's Report becoming a reality.
Eighth, the Indian experience in balancing national security concerns with
human rights commitments is examined in order to provide certain guidelines for
other countries. While most countries have already developed, or are in the process
of developing, their own national security legislation, the Indian experience is
useful to understand the importance of democratic institutions; an independent
judiciary, a free press, and a vibrant civil society to protect and promote human
rights and civil liberties from the adverse effects of draconian legislation intended
to protect citizens from real and perceived threats to national security; and
Finally, the article argues that it is natural for citizens worldwide, including
citizens in India, to feel threatened under certain "terrorized" circumstances, but
that any State or territory's response to terrorism or other national security threats
needs to be fashioned within the domestic and international human rights
framework. Understanding that the rule of law cannot be protected by the rule of
force supports this argument; hence, India and other countries of the world ought
to ensure that in their zeal to combat terrorism and to create a secure environment,
they should not pass laws, rules, and regulations that violate constitutional ideals,
political culture and other domestic and international human rights commitments.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES
During the struggle for independence, leaders of India's national freedom
movement resisted the British implementation of "national security" laws; these
15. Report of the U.N. Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, New York, USA, March 2005,
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm (last visited May 2, 2005) [hereinafter Larger Freedom].
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laws were intended to create political dissent within Indian society. For example,
the British passed several "preventive detention" laws which continue to exist
today. The British defended preventive detention on grounds of extreme threats to
public order and national security, even though there were numerous cases in
which they were applied arbitrarily. 16 The government-authorized practice of
preventive detention in India had been in vogue since the passage of the East India
Company Act of 1784. This Act provided for the "detention of any person who
was suspected of participating in any correspondence or activities prejudicial or
dangerous to the peace and safety of British possessions and settlements in
India."'
17
During British rule in India, preventive detention was authorized by the
Defence of India Acts of 1915 and 1939, the Government of India Act of 1919, the
Rowlatt Act of 1919, and the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1925.'1
These laws had provisions enabling the State to detain a person for six months
without informing the detainee of the grounds of detention. These laws were
subject to enormous abuse in the hands of colonial rulers. They provided very few
safeguards while granting discretionary powers to government officials. Because
the leaders of the freedom movement were themselves victims of these draconian
laws intended to protect "national security", they personally understood the need to
ensure that guaranteed constitutional and fundamental rights would protect
individuals from government excesses after independence. Granville Austin rightly
points out that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles enshrined in the
Constitution of India had their deep roots in the struggle for independence and
were "included in the Constitution in the hope and expectation that one day the
tree of true liberty would bloom in India."'
19
The drafters of the Constitution of India 2° intended to include a chapter on
rights within the constitutional framework from the beginning. The Constituent
Assembly members, themselves key participants in the freedom struggle, were
mindful of problems that would arise when "rights" were left to the discretion of
the government. The British were not keen on including rights during their rule,
and Dicey defended this view by arguing that enunciation of rights in a
Constitution "gives of itself but slight security that the right [had] more than a
nominal existence." 21 This argument was not appealing to the Constituent
Assembly and the members embarked on the task of drafting provisions relating to
Fundamental Rights. Assembly members understood that rights would empower
the masses of the nascent Indian democracy. The Fundamental Rights Sub-
16. See generally SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, GOVERNMENT
DECIDES TO PLAY JUDGE AND JURY 98 (2001) (critically examining the Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance of 2001) [hereinafter SAHRDC].
17. Id. at 98.
18. Id. at 99.
19. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 50 (1966).
20. For further reading, see V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Mahendra P. Singh ed., 10th
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter SHUKLA).
21. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 58 n.29 (citing A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 207
(1961)).
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Committee (FRSC) worked on the rights chapter with a fairly high degree of
consensus, apart from a disagreement surrounding the highly contested issue as to
what extent personal liberty should be infringed in order to secure government
stability and public peace.22
The rights included in the Constitution were meant to be fundamental and
enforceable by the courts through writ jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when it came to
limiting these rights and debating their non-absoluteness, opinion was varied. The
real issue was identifying acceptable ways to limit the basic freedoms of speech,
assembly, association, and movement-the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the
Constitution. It was in this context that the Constituent Assembly had to face the
question of personal freedom versus national security.23 On March 25, 1947, the
FRSC drafted the "right to freedom" provisions of the Constitution and voted to
qualify each with the proviso that the exercise of these rights is subject to "public
order and morality." 24 As far as freedom of assembly, the Assembly attached the
restrictive proviso of the Irish Constitution. 25 The horrible communal violence that
occurred in India during the time of the debates undoubtedly had a profound
impact upon the nature and shape of the constitutional provisions. On April 14,
1947, the FRSC inserted into the 'rights-of-freedom' introduction clause a phrase
making the rights subject to suspension in emergency; for example, a threat to
26national or provincial government security constituted an emergency. 6 During the
deliberations of late 1947 and 1948, the Drafting Committee made the rights of
free speech, assembly, association, and movement subject to public order,
morality, health, decency, and public interest. In the case of free speech, an
utterance would not have to undermine the authority of the state or be seditious or
slanderous in order for the emergency exception to apply.
27
During the debate on the Draft Constitution, speakers attacked the proviso
regarding public order and morality in response to the great momentum providing
for expanded freedom and liberty with minimal limitation.28 Granville Austin,
commenting on the situation, said: "Thakur Das Bhargava led the final assault,
moving an amendment that would put a 'soul' back in Article 13 by inserting the
word 'reasonable' before 'restrictions' in the various provisos. '29 That amendment
was a great victory for individuals who had resisted certain notions of security that
compromised liberty. The insertion of the reasonableness limitation on the Article
19 restrictions (Article 13 of the Draft Constitution) of the Constitution of India is
22. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 63.
23. Id. at 69.
24. Id.
25. See generally id. n.78 (referring to the minutes of a March 17, 1947 meeting, at which the
Prasad papers, File 1-F/47, were discussed). Article 40(6) (i) of the Irish Constitution allows the
prevention or control of meetings deemed a danger or a nuisance to the general public or in the vicinity
of the Parliament buildings. Id.
26. Id. at 70-71.
27. Id. at 73 n.92 (referring to Article 13 of the Draft Constitution).
28. Id. at 73.
29. Id. at 73-74.
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similar to the Due Process clause in the American Constitution.30 This limitation
was significant as Indian judges would now have the power to judicially review
whether the restrictions were reasonable and if found to be unreasonable, could
declare them unconstitutional. The Assembly added the "reasonable" qualification
to the freedom of speech guarantee one year later when the first amendment to the
Constitution provided that the right to freedom of speech should not prevent, inter
alia, "the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right by the said sub-clause in the interests of the
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, [and] public order....'
III. THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS
IN INDIA
Over twelve sections, Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) delineates
"[offenses] against the State and the Army." These sections broadly comprise the
offenses of: (1) waging, attempting or conspiring to wage war against the
Government of India (IPC sections 121, 121A, 122, and 123); (2) assaulting the
President of India (or Governor of a State) with an intent to compel or restrain the
exercise of any lawful authority (IPC section 124); (3) waging war against a State
at peace with the Government of India (IPC sections 125); (4) permitting or aiding
the escape of a state prisoner or a prisoner of war (IPC sections 128, 129, 130); and
inciting others to rebel against the State (IPC section 124A).32 While the above
sections of the Indian Penal Code are intended to protect national security in one
form or another, there is little controversy surrounding these sections, except the
one on sedition. The word "sedition" under IPC section 124A describes an
individual's activities, whether they are words, deeds or writings, which are
intended to disturb the peace and tranquility of the state, and to encourage others to
subvert the government established by law.
33
Section 124A of the IPC: Sedition - Whoever by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts
to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection
towards the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which
may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.
Explanation 1 - The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all
feelings of enmity.
Explanation 2 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of
the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without
exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not
constitute an offence under this section.
30. Id. at 74.
31. Id.
32. K.D. GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 635-44 (3d ed. 1999).
33. Id. at 635 n.1 (citing RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF CRIMES 415-22 (23d ed. 1991)).
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Explanation 3 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative
or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite
hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this
section.34
A textual reading of the sedition section demonstrates that the law is intended
to punish the acts or attempts of a person who "brings into hatred or contempt" or
creates "disaffection" towards the Government established by law in India.
Arguably, such acts could affect national security and should be met with stringent
punishment. It is important to differentiate this kind of threat to national security
from terrorism, which is discussed later. The three explanations to section 124A
corroborate the kind of "hatred or contempt" or "disaffection" that the law is
intending to prohibit. The sedition law was subject to constitutional scrutiny under
the Constitution of India's freedom of speech and expression guarantees. Article
19 of the Constitution guarantees Indian citizens six fundamental freedoms: (1)
freedom of speech and expression; (2) freedom of assembly; (3) freedom of
association; (4) freedom of movement; (5) freedom of residence and settlement;
and (6) freedom of profession, occupation, trade, or business.35
None of these freedoms are absolute, and each is specifically restricted by
clauses two through six of Article 19, but including the word "reasonable" in
Article 19(2) has operated as a useful check to ensure that Parliament does not
impose unreasonable restrictions on citizens' freedoms. Otherwise, the judiciary
may declare those restrictions unconstitutional.36 Clauses two through six of
Article 19 enumerate the reasonable restrictions the State can impose upon
citizens' freedoms. These restrictions include: the interests of the general public,
the security of the State, public order, decency, or morality and other reasons as
listed in those sub-clauses. There could be valid justifications for including
reasonable restrictions on citizens' freedoms, because individual liberty may
occasionally have to give way to attain society's general welfare. 37 However,
because judicial independence is generally maintained in India, courts interpret the
freedom restrictions, and the restrictions' meaning and scope have been elaborated
over the years.
In order to highlight the need for balance between individual liberties and
social interests, it is useful to refer to the words of Justice Das: "[S]ocial interest in
individual liberty may well have to be subordinated to other greater social
interests.,,38 The constitutional analysis of Article 19's protected freedoms requires
any restriction thereof to be reasonable and designated in the Constitution.
39
34. Id. at 636.
35. See generally SHUKLA, supra note 20.
36. Id. at 101.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 100 n.10 (citing Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27).
39. Id. at 102.
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Reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression can be imposed in
the interests of the security of the State. The wording "security of the state" is
subject to numerous interpretations; thus, judicial interpretation of these words is
important, lest the ambiguity can provide a source for abusing the Constitution. In
Thappar v. State of Madras,4 ° the Supreme Court of India clearly noted that
"security of state" does not refer to ordinary breaches of public order, because they
do not involve any danger to the State itself. The Constitution (First Amendment)
Act of 1951 followed this rule, as preservation of public order became one of the
grounds for imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression.4'
It needs to be noted that the word "sedition" does not appear anywhere in the
Indian Constitution, even though it is an offense against the state as specified in
the IPC. Democratic societies provide a means for the people to express their
displeasure toward a particular policy or general administration of the government
through non-violent methods. A democratic fabric in any free society, including
India, exists because of this principle. While the word "sedition" would have had a
different meaning a century ago, contemporary notions of freedom and liberty give
people enough flexibility to exercise their democratic dissent, and even
displeasure, in numerous ways. It is in this context that a law prohibiting certain
forms of speech would inevitably be subject to constitutional scrutiny. The
contemporary understanding of sedition in India includes all those practices,
whether by word, deed, or writing, that are calculated to disturb the tranquility of
the State and lead ignorant persons to subvert the government.42 Thus, the
offense's crucial elements happen to be inciting violence or creating public
disorder.
The right to freedom of speech and expression includes protection for
severely criticizing existing government structures, policies, and administrative
systems, as well as protection for suggesting and proposing the development of a
new system.43 In the landmark case Queen Empress v. Tilak,44 the Bombay High
Court held that inciting feelings of enmity against the government is sufficient for
a person to be held guilty under the sedition law. 4 However, in Niharendu v.
Emperor,46 the Federal Court interpreted section 124A more liberally and the
Chief Justice reasoned that: "[T]he acts or words complained of must either incite
disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or
tendency.''47 The court held that public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or
likelihood thereof, was the offense's core element. The decision was progressive
because it limited the sedition offense to acts inciting violence or some other form
40. Thappur v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.R. 594).
41. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 114.
42. Id. at 122 n.38 (citing R. v. Sullivan, (1968) 11 Cox Cases 55)).
43. Id. at 122 n.39 (citing Niharendu v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 F.C.R. 22, 26).
44. GAUR, supra note 32, at 639 n.4 (citing Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, I.L.R. 22
(Born.) 112).
45. Id. at 640 (referring to RATANLAL & DHIRAiLAL, THE LAW OF CRIMES 415-22 (23d ed.
1991)).
46. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 122 n.41 (citing Niharendu, A.I.R. 1942 F.C.R. 22).
47. Id.
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of disorder and not to all forms of dissent and critical remarks made against the
Government; consequently, the Privy Council rejected this liberal interpretation.
In Emperor v. Narayan,4 s the Privy Council overruled Niharendu and held
that the expression "excite disaffection" in section 124A did not include "excite
disorder"; thus, the reasoning adopted in Niharendu was an incorrect construction
of the particular section. 49 In Singh v. State of Bihar,50 the Supreme Court of India
questioned the constitutional validity of IPC section 124A as applied to freedom of
speech and expression. After a comprehensive review of sedition jurisprudence
and the implications of sedition law on the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of India confirmed the Niharendu
interpretation of section 124A, and held that it was not ultra vires the Constitution.
The court held that:
[A]ny acts within the meaning of [section] 124A which have the effect of
subverting the Government by bringing that Government into contempt or
hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would be within the penal statute
because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by law or enmity
to it imports the idea or tendency to public disorder by the use of actual violence
or incitement to violence.
5 1
Further, the court took note of the three explanations to section 124A and
said:
In other words, disloyalty to Government established by law is not the same
thing as commenting in strong terms upon the measures or acts of Government,
or its agencies, so as to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure the
cancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means, that is to
say, without exciting those feelings of enmity and disloyalty which imply
excitement to public disorder or the use of violence.
52
The court also observed that strong criticism of public measures would be
within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech and expression.53 Thus, the court helped shape the
law on sedition in India by holding that criticism against actions of the
Government, however harsh they may be, will not invite the attention of section
124A, unless also accompanied by incitement of public disorder or violence.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS IN INDIA AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Clearly, terrorism is a threat to national security; thus, laws formulated to
combat terrorism would also come under the purview of protecting the security of
the State. It is a right and duty of every State to take all steps within its means to
48. GAUR, supra note 32, at 641 n.7 (citing Narayan, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 82).
49. Id. at 641.
50. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 122 n.44 (citing Singh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955).
51. GAUR, supra note 32, at 642.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 642-43.
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protect its people and institutions from acts of terror. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to examine what constitutes terrorism. There are many definitions of "terrorism" in
both literature and law.54 One of them is as follows: "[T]errorism is narrowly
defined as the explicit and deliberate (as opposed to collateral) destruction or threat
of destruction of non-military, non-governmental personnel in the course of
political or other forms of warfare." '55 Terrorism is generally directed at innocent,
non-combatant individuals.56
In India, a number of factors have created a need for stringent national
security laws. Mr. K.P.S. Gill, Former Director General of Police of the State of
Punjab in India, has argued that: "[N]ational security legislation is not just a
definition of crimes or new patterns of criminal conduct and the prescription of
penalties. It relates to the entire system, institutional structures and processes that
are required to prevent and [penalize] such crimes, to preserve order, and secure
the sphere of governance., 57 On the urgent need for anti-terrorism laws in India,
Gill has observed that "a comprehensive set of counter-terrorism laws, as well as
laws to combat [organized] crime must be drafted and given a permanent place in
our statute books. 58 However, this argument rests on particular state perceptions
of threat, which are in turn primarily based upon law enforcement strategies, and
does not consider the causes of terrorism or related threats. It is narrow in its
approach because it focuses on only creating institutional and law enforcement
apparatuses in order to tackle terrorism and other national security concerns.
The main focus of the above argument is that: (1) the existing legal
framework is insufficient; and (2) more laws and more powers in these laws are
necessary for law enforcement officials to effectively combat terrorism and other
offenses relating to national security. It is ironic that there are consistent calls for
more laws to protect Indian national security, even though there is already a
plethora of laws in India addressing protection of national security, including
general crime prevention legislation.59 Domestic and international human rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and useful interventions by the Supreme
54. For an extensive discussion of the question as to what constitutes terrorism, see Emanuel
Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a Democracy to Defend
Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89 (2001).
55. Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 297, 297-98 (1987).
56. Id.
57. K.P.S. Gill, The Imperatives of National Security Legislation in India, at http://www.india-
seminar.com/2002/512/512%20k.p.s.%20gill.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
58. Id.
59. Examples of existing laws relevant to national security in India as referred to by the NHRC in
its opinion are the Indian Penal Code of 1860; the Arms Act of 1959; the Explosives Act; the Explosive
Substances Act; the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act of 1958; the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act of 1967; and the Suppression of Unlawful Activities against the Safety of Civil Aviation Act of
1982. THAKUR, supra note 8, at 258. Additionally, the Union of India enacted four at least four
Preventive Detention Acts currently in force: the National Security Act of 1980; the Prevention of
Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies Act of 1980; the Prevention of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1988; and the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
Smuggling Activities Act of 1974. Id.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Court of India, various High Courts, the National Human Rights Commission
(NHRC), and the State Human Rights Commissions have documented human
rights abuses committed by law enforcement officials.60 The human rights
violations committed by the state and its institutions have been brought to the
forefront by both the judiciary and the NHRC. These violations were redressed by
compensating the victims of crime and abuse, and in certain cases, by pursuing
disciplinary actions against errant officials.
However, both the central and state governments have not attempted to
comprehensively address the abuse of power issue, notwithstanding the fact that
abuse of power by law enforcement officials is rampant. According to the NHRC's
annual reports, deaths in police custody increased from 136 in 1996 to 188 in
1997, and from 188 in 1997 to 193 in 1998.61 In 1999, the NHRC reported that 183
people died while in police custody.62 From April to August 2002, 79 people died
in police custody, while 580 died in judicial custody.63 Even the news of these
deaths has not persuaded the Indian government to pause and evaluate the need for
another draconian law meant to combat terrorism; this lack of evaluation is
particularly surprising because the new law's predecessor was notorious for its
human rights violations. 64 The Government of India attempted to introduce the
Prevention of Terrorism Bill as drafted by the Law Commission of India even after
60. Fali S. Nariman, Why I Voted against POTA, HINDU, Mar. 24, 2002, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/03/24/stories/2002032402140800.htm (last visited May 2,
2005).
61. 1996-1997 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. § 3.24, available at
http://nhrc.nic.in/ar96_97.htm (last visited May 2, 2005); 1997-1998 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N
ANN. REP. § 3.8, available at http://nhrc.nic.in/ar97_98.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
62. 1998-1999 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. § 3.17, available at
http://www.nhrc.nic.in/ar98_99.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
63. 2000-2001 N'TAL HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. § 4.27, available at
http://www.nhrc.nic.in/documents/AR01-02e.pdf (last visited May 2, 2005). For the Supreme Court of
India's assessment of torture practice in India, see Justice A. S. Anand's opinion in Basu v. State of
West Bengal, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 416:
However, in spite of the constitutional and statutory provisions aimed at safeguarding the
personal liberty and life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths in police
custody had been a disturbing factor. Experience shows that [the] worst violations of
human rights take place during the course of investigation, when the police with a view to
secure evidence or confession often resorts to third degree methods including torture and
adopts techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the
deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning
newspapers, almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and
death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing. The
increasing incidence of torture and death in custody has assumed such alarming
proportions that it is affecting the creditability of the Rule of Law and the administration of
criminal justice system. The community rightly feels perturbed. Society's cry for justice
becomes louder.
Basu, 1997 1 S.C.C. 416.
64. Before the Union of India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA), the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987 (TADA) was in force; because it was not
renewed, TADA lapsed in May 1995. Nariman, supra note 60. Out of the 74,000 persons detained
under TADA between 1984 and 1994, only 1,000 were ultimately convicted. 1d.
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the NHRC stated: "[T]here was no need for enactment of the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill [of] 2000 or similar law and that the existing laws were sufficient to
deal with any eventuality, including terrorism." 65 The NHRC further observed:
"[T]he real need is to strengthen the machinery for implementation and
enforcement of the existing laws and further for this purpose, the working of the
criminal justice system requires to be strengthened." 66 This author fully agrees
with the NHRC's opinion of POTA. New and more stringent laws cannot remedy
the weaknesses of implementing existing laws. The greater the discretion provided
law enforcement officials, the higher the chances their discretion will be abused.
Before the Indian government passed the POTA, anti-terrorism legislation
known as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987
(TADA), existed in Indian statute books.67 An evaluation of TADA demonstrates
how the Indian executive can misuse stringent anti-terrorism laws. This misuse is
the case notwithstanding the fact that India has the constitutional safeguards
necessary to protect human rights as well as an independent judiciary, an
independent and forthright media-which, in India, is by and large politically
neutral-and a vibrant civil society. The problem with TADA, like other national
security laws, is that it gave exceptional powers to law enforcement officials,
which subsequently resulted in widespread torture, arbitrary detention, and
harassment of mostly innocent citizens.68 In fact, TADA became a tool for Indian
politicians to settle political scores against people considered to be dissenters or
members of groups that practiced different political ideologies. The South Asia
Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) has commented that: "[T]he
Government of India invoked TADA's special powers to target and [terrorize]
minorities, political opponents, union leaders, and other disempowered groups;
laws like TADA, as a consequence, undermine confidence in public security and
the rule of law. ' ' 69
SAHRDC's above critique was shared by the Supreme Court of India in one
of the most important decisions concerning TADA, where Justice Pandian warned:
"If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy., 70 In Kartar Singh 's
case, the Supreme Court examined TADA's provisions and its conformity with
constitutional safeguards. 7' Even though the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional validity of the Act, it struck down some provisions and imposed
additional safeguards necessary to ensure that the fundamental rights provisions of
the Constitution were duly protected. However, the United Nations Human Rights
65. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 13.
66. Id. at 13 n.4.
67. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, no. 28 (India), available at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/Tada.htm (last visited May
2, 2005); see also SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 13.
68. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 31-32. For further reading, see C. Raj Kumar, State Torture in
India: Strategies for Resistance and Reparation, 5 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 160 (2003).
69. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 32.
70. Id. at 34 n.22 (citing Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, 719-20).
71. Id.
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Committee (UNHRC) still found the safeguards provided under TADA
72
insufficient, notwithstanding the Supreme Court judgment. The UNHRC
welcomed the demise of TADA in 1995, while giving its final comments on
India's submission, and observed that legislation like TADA is inconsistent with
international human rights law.
The Supreme Court of India had accepted three petitions challenging the
constitutionality of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).73 The Peoples' Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and journalist and Member of Parliament, Mr. Kuldip
Nayar, jointly filed these petitions. The petitioners' main argument in this case was
that POTA lacked legislative competence and violated Articles 14, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of the Indian Constitution.74 The petitioners argued that POTA fell, in its pith
and substance, under Entry 1 of List-II (the States' List); that is, POTA falls under
"Public Order," upon which only the state governments, but not the central
government, is competent to legislate. 75 The petition also alleged that the Supreme
Court's decision in the Singh case was in error because it concluded that
Parliament was competent to enact TADA.76 The Supreme Court of India in
December 2003 upheld the constitutional validity of POTA and observed that,
"terrorism is affecting the security and sovereignty of the nation. It is not State-
specific but trans-national". 77 Discussing the competence of the law-making bodies
in India, the court while upholding this legislation held that Parliament and not the
state legislature are competent to enact such a law to counter terrorism. The court
further held that, "[i]t is a matter of policy. Once legislation is passed, the
Government has an obligation to exercise all available options to prevent terrorism
within the bounds of the Constitution.7 8 In an editorial published in one of India's
leading national dailies, it was noted that:
While upholding the constitutional validity of the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA), the Supreme Court has sanitized what is easily the most contentious
and loosely worded Section in this controversial piece of legislation. In doing
so, the Court has tempered the disappointment that might have arisen out of its
disinclination to review the provisions of this draconian law in a more
comprehensive manner. It has been clear for some time now that Section 21 of
POTA, which deals with offences relating to the support given to terrorist
organisations, is cast in a manner that virtually invites gross abuse. On a plain
reading, the Section makes no distinction between mere expressions of
72. Concluding Observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee: India, U.N.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug.
4, 1997).
73. V. Venkatesan, POTA under Challenge, FRONTLINE, Feb. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2003/stories/20030214004102600.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
74. Id.
75. Singh, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, 627-36.
76. Id. at 635.
77. Supreme Court Upholds POTA, Vaiko May Get Some Relief THE HINDU, Dec. 17, 2003,
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sympathy or verbal support for terrorist organisations and acting with the intent
of inviting support for them or their activities .... The Supreme Court's task
was to consider the constitutionality of this extraordinary legislation and not, as
it observed, to examine whether the country really needs it. And here lies the
rub. The Court's upholding of POTA does nothing to detract from the argument
that-for reasons moral, political and commonsensical-POTA must go."
79
The court has imposed certain additional safeguards on the executive in the
enforcement of POTA and, in particular, that section 21 of POTA will be applied
only in cases where there is a criminal intention to further or encourage terrorist
activity and not mere expressions of sympathy or verbal support for terrorist
organizations. But this author has not been persuaded by the court's observations
that the Parliament had explored the possibility of employing the existing laws to
tackle terrorism and came to a decision that they were not capable of effectively
dealing with the menace. Further, the court noted that Parliament had enacted
POTA after taking all aspects into account, but there are no sufficient facts to back
up this observation.
It is interesting to note that the opinion of the National Human Rights
Commission, and indeed the wider public opinion reflected in the civil society and
in the opinions expressed by the NGOs in India, was clearly against the passing of
POTA. While the POTA passed the test of constitutional validity as the Supreme
Court of India upheld it, it could not pass the test of democratic legitimacy in a
true sense. The new government that came to power in May 2004 promulgated an
ordinance, The Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance, 2004 to repeal POTA.
However, the repeal of POTA provides only a limited degree of comfort that
draconian legislation like POTA, at the end of the day cannot exist when it has in
the first place not gathered sufficient support of the people. Positive reactions to
the repeal of POTA by the new government was seriously overshadowed by the
fact that there have been provisions in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 Ordinance 2004 (UAPA), serving as amendments to the existing criminal law
legislation, the effect of which is to retain some of the draconian provisions of
POTA.80 These developments once again underline the fragility of the delicate
balance that is needed in protecting human rights and preserving national security.
The fact that national security laws have come into the statute books in India in a
different guise has reinforced the need for constant vigilance against their abuse.
The courts, the human rights commissions, the media, and civil society need to be
conscious of the fact that anti-terrorism legislation has been abused by the law
enforcement machinery in India in the past. The exercise of these powers under
the UAPA should also be put under human rights scrutiny.
79. POTA Reinterpreted, THE HINDU, Dec. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/18/stories/2003121800901000.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
80. Rajinder Sachar, Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) Repeal Ordinance - Myth and Reality,
in Human Rights in South Asia (specific focus India), South Asia Citizens Web (SACW), Oct. 7, 2004,
http://www.sacw.net/hrights/RSachar07102004.htmi (last visited May 2, 2005).
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V. HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION
8 1
In Chapter XVII, Articles 352 through 360,82 the Constitution of India
outlines the emergency powers vested in the Indian executive. These articles grant
specific powers under different types of emergency situations. In numerous cases,
the Supreme Court of India has discussed the impact of the Constitution's
emergency provisions on fundamental rights. In Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, the
court held that despite the issuance of a Proclamation of Emergency and
Presidential Order, a citizen could not be deprived of his right to move the
appropriate forum for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the detention was
ordered with mala fide intention.83 The question of the writ's suspension during an
Article 352 emergency period came up before the Supreme Court of India in
Jabalpur v Shukla. 4 In 1975, the President, on the Prime Minister's advice,
declared Emergency under Article 352 on the ground that internal disturbances
threatened the security of India. The President issued an order under Article 359 of
the Indian Constitution, which in turn suspended Articles 21, 22, and 14.85 Further,
Parliament amended the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 (MISA)
86
and granted the government the extraordinary power to detain a person without
trial. The legal issue was whether the writ of habeas corpus under Article 226
could be issued to release a detained person on the ground that his detention was
inconsistent with the provisions of MISA or was made with mala fide intention.
87
The Supreme Court held that the Presidential Order precluded standing for
any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus relief,
for any other writ or motion to enforce any right of personal liberty, and for any
81. For an excellent article on the issue of human rights protection in India during emergencies,
see Fali S. Nariman, Protection of Human Rights During Emergencies, INT'L COMM'N JURISTs REV.,
Dec. 1996.
82. As drafted, Article 352 enabled the President to make a declaration of grave emergency when
the security of India or any part thereof was threatened "by war or external aggression or internal
disturbance." INDIA CONSTIT. pt. XVIII, art. 352. Such declaration of emergency brought in its wake
an automatic suspension of Article 19-the rights to freedom of speech and the press, of forming
association, of movement, of property, of trade, business and profession-in Article 358. Id. pt. XVIII,
art. 358. The President was also empowered after declaring an emergency to suspend the right to move
Court for enforcement of any other Fundamental right in the Fundamental Rights Chapter. Venkatesan,
supra note 73.
83. Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 S.C.R. 932, 941.
84. Shukla, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 172, 174.
85. INDIA CONSTIT. pt. XVIII, art. 359. Part III of the Indian Constitution contemplates
fundamental rights. Id. pt. III. Specifically, Article 14 contemplates equality before the law, Id. pt. III,
art. 14; Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, Id. pt. III, art. 21; and Article 22 protects against
arrest and detention, Id. pt. III, art. 22. The Indian Constitution is available at
http://www.constitution.org/cons/lndia/pI8352.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
86. The MISA is no longer in the Indian statute books. In Mid-1977, after the Janata Party came
to power, it took more than a year to repeal MISA and delete it from the Ninth Schedule of the
Constitution of India. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 103. However, as soon as the Congress Party came
to power in the Centre in 1980, it passed the National Security Act of 1980. Id.
87. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 854.
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individual detained under the Act.88 The court gave constitutional legitimacy to
suspending the writ of habeas corpus during an emergency period based on
national security concerns. Singh has observed that Justice H.R. Khanna's lone
dissent brought the "rule of law" into focus as an underlying philosophy of the
Constitution, independent of Articles 21 and 359 and the judiciary's role in
upholding it.8 9 Justice Khanna's dissent took the view that even in the absence of
Article 21, the State has no power to deprive a person of his life and liberty
without the authority of law.90 According to him, this principle is the essential
postulate and basic assumption of the rule of law. The rule of law originated from
this concept and was intended to be the standard in balancing individual liberty
and public order; in his view, the independent judiciary was supposed to ensure
this concept. 91
The Supreme Court of India's decision in the Shukla case was entirely
overruled by the Forty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution and other judicial
decisions, and is no longer the law.92 The present law on this issue is that the
enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended in any situation, and the
court has further held that Article 21 binds the executive as well as the
legislature.93 This result effectively accepts Justice Khanna's dissent in the Shukla
case, where he held that suspending enforcement of Article 21 relieves the
legislature of Article 21's constraints but not the executive-which can never
deprive a person of his life or liberty without the authority of law.94 These
developments further reinforce the argument that it is not wise to entirely trust the
legislature, executive, or even the judiciary to protect the people's rights.
Protection of human rights during emergency situations, albeit a settled issue in
India, illustrates the problems the citizenry confronts in the process of enforcing
these rights. Significantly, the Government of India has attempted to strengthen
national security legislation through "anti-terrorism" laws, even during non-
emergency situations.
VI. BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGAINST PREVENTIVE
DETENTION LAWS IN INDIA
Clauses four through seven of Article 22 of the Constitution of India provide
for certain safeguards in connection with the use of preventive detention laws. The
term "preventive detention" has not been defined under Indian law, but the
expression originated in the language used by English Law Lords when delineating
the nature of detention under Regulation 14-B, the [Defense] of Realm Act of
88. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 103.
89. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 854.
90. Gopal Subramanium, Emergency Powers under the Indian Constitution, in KIRPAL, supra
note 13, at 134, 141-42.
91. Id.
92. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 855.
93. Id.
94. Shukla, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 172, 246; see also SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 855; Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.
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1914, which was passed after the First World War.9 5 To quote Lord Finlay in The
King v. Halliday: "The measure is not punitive[,] but precautionary." 96 The
objective of such laws is to take precautions so that suspected persons will not
commit an offense. Obviously, the executive determines: (1) the justification for
the detention; (2) the circumstances under which the suspicion arises; and (3) the
reasonable and probable causes of the impending act. The Constitution legalized
preventive detention because the Constitution's framers had foreseen that "there
may arise occasions in the life of the nation when the need to prevent citizens from
acting in ways which unlawfully subvert or disrupt the bases of an established
order may outweigh the claims of personal liberty."
97
However, codifying preventive detention laws within the Constitution has
continuously raised serious human rights dilemmas. Preventive detention was
always justified on grounds of national security. The Constituent Assembly of
India formulated provisions to allow for passage of preventive detention laws as an
integral part of the Constitution.98 Entry 9 of List I and Entry 3 of List III, in
conjunction with Article 246, conferred this power on Parliament and State
Legislatures. Deemed a necessary evil, the basic purpose in conferring the power
to pass such legislation was to protect the country's national security. However,
this power conferral was more than a half-century ago and significant
developments which seriously question the legal and human rights validity of these
provisions have occurred in international human rights law. The Indian legislature
included preventive detention provisions in all acts intended to protect national
security. Besides the National Security Act of 1980 (NSA), 99 the other central
legislations providing for preventive detention are: (1) the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act of 1974;I ° ° (2) the
Prevention of Black-Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential
Commodities Act of 1980;1° 1 (3) the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act of 1988;102 and (4) the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act of 1987, which lapsed in May 1995.103
95. SHUKLA, supra note 20, at 186.
96. 1917 A.C. 260, 269 (Finlay, L.C.). Halliday was appealed from the King's Bench, I K.B. 738
(1916), to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division.
97. Rajbhar v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 S.C.R. 63, 70; see also SHUKLA, supra note 20, at
187 n.32.
98. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 100.
99. The National Security Act, 1980, no. 65 (India), available at http://164.100.10.12/cgi/nph-
bwcgi/BASIS/indweb/all/secretr/SDW?M=l &W=actid='198065' (last visited May 2, 2005).
100. The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, no.
52 (India), available at http://www.geocities.com/indiancustoms/act/cofeposa.htm (last visited May 2,
2005).
101. The Prevention of Black-Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities
Act,1980, no. 7 (India), available at http://ahara.kar.nic.in/blackecact.htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
102. The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, no.
46 (India), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal-library/in/legal-library-1989-10-
20_1989-9.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
103. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, no. 28 (India) available at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/Tada.htm (last visited May
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The legislature enacted NSA to prevent individuals from acting against the
interests of the state, including acts that threaten the "security of India," or the
"security of the State Government," or are "prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order." 1°4 The NSA has minimal procedural safeguards and it allows the
government to detain any individual if the State thinks the detention will prevent
the person from committing acts prejudicial to the order and security of India.
i05
The law allows detention of individuals in order to prevent acts threatening "public
order" and "national security." However, neither the Constitution nor the NSA
defines these words, and there is zero guidance as to what actions would constitute
a threat to public order or national security in any given case. 10 6 In Lohia v State of
Bihar, the Supreme Court tried to distinguish between the concepts "security of
State," "public order," and "law and order."'0 7 Justice Hidayathullah held that only
the most severe acts would warrant use of preventive detention:
One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the
largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the
smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may
affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order
but not security of the State.1
0 8
Roy v. Union of India challenged the NSA's constitutionality, but the
Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the Constitution.' °9 Nonetheless,
the court insisted that the extraordinary power of preventive detention be narrowly
construed." 0 These cases clearly demonstrate the fact that although Indian courts
are unwilling to declare preventive detention laws unconstitutional, they are
attempting to ensure that appropriate restrictions are imposed on the use of such
laws. Arguably, "preventive'detention" as defined in these laws is "inconsistent
with well-settled international human rights standards.""' The Preamble to the
Constitution of India manifests the framers' basic objective of building a new
socio-economic order where every person is guaranteed social, economic and
political justice, equality of status, and opportunity. 112 This basic objective
2, 2005); see also Nariman, supra note 60.
104. The National Security Act, 1980, no. 65, § 3 (India), available at
http://164.100.10.12/cgilnph-bwcgi/BASIS/indweb/all/secretr/SDW?M=I&W=actid='I98065' (last
visited May 2, 2005).
105. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 103-04.
106. Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalised Emergency: Preventive Detention and
Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 311, 330 (2001).
107. Lohia v. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 S.C.R. 709.
108. Id. at 746.
109. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 272.
110. Id. at 275.
111. SAHRDC, supra note 16, at 100.
112. Specifically, the Preamble reads:
We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular
democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social economic and political; Liberty of
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote
among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the
Nation; In Our Constituent Assembly, this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do Hereby Adopt,
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
mandates that every State institution, including the Executive, Legislature and
Judiciary, work together harmoniously in order to realize the objectives enshrined
in the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy."
3
The judiciary played a central role in strengthening the human rights
framework by interpreting constitutional provisions. The Constitution assigns the
task of enforcing Fundamental Rights to the Supreme and High Courts; the right to
move the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights has been
elevated to the status of a Fundamental Right under Article 32 of the
Constitution.114 From 1979 to 1980, local authorities in Bhagalpur, an Indian town
in the Bihar state, blinded thirty-three detainees in order to coerce their
confessions.1 5 A newspaper journalist wrote a commentary exposing this incident,
and a lawyer sent the article to the Supreme Court of India. Justice P.N. Bhagwati,
who received the article, treated it as a petition by the sender, 1 6 and the Supreme
Court obtained what later came to be known as "epistolary jurisdiction"'" 7 over
this case. The attorney-petitioner sought to enforce the due process guarantees of
the Constitution of India. 18 Remarkably, over the course of the next few years, the
Supreme Court of India ordered the State of Bihar to provide medical treatment for
the detainees and pensions for the detainees' families; in subsequent hearings, the
court monitored the victims' rehabilitation.' 9 This highly innovative grant of
Enact and Give to Ourselves this Constitution.
INDIA CONSTIT. pmbl. See also SHUKLA, supra note 20.
113. N.R. Madhava Menon, Public Interest Litigation: A Major Breakthrough in the Delivery of
Social Justice, 9 J. BAR COUNCIL INDIA 150 (1982).
114. Chief Justice A.S. Anand, Public Interest Litigation as Aid to Protection of Human Rights,
M.C. Bhandari Memorial Lecture (2001), in (2001) 7 S.C.C. (Jour) 1, available at http://www.ebc-
india.comlawyer/articles/2001 v7al .htm (last visited May 2, 2005).
115. AMNESTY INT'L, INDIA: TORTURE, RAPE AND DEATHS IN CUSTODY 50 (1992).
116. Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 623 ("KhatriP'). Khatriland its companion cases,
Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 408 ("Khatri I/"), and Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 S.C.C.
635 ("Khatri 1/1"), are collectively known as the Bhagalpur Blinding Cases.
117. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) ("decipher[ing] the
future of social action assembled, by convention, under a portal named human rights .. .[and] ...
problematic[ing] the very notion of human rights, the standard narratives of their origin, the ensemble
of ideologies animating their modes of production, and the wayward circumstances of their
enunciation"). Epistolary jurisdiction is a procedure by "which judges [take] the initiative to respond
proactively to grievances brought to their attention by third parties, letters, or newspaper accounts."
Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor": Access to Justice and the Rights of the
Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 795 (2004).
118. The guarantees are found in: (1) Article 14 of the Indian Constitution: "Equality before law. -
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India," INDIA CONSTIT. pt. II1, art. 14; and (2) Article 21: "Protection of life and
personal liberty. - "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law," Id. pt. III, art. 21. The basis for jurisdiction was Article 32(1): "The
right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed." Id. pt. Ill, art. 32(1). The Supreme Court's power is broad; for example,
Article 32(2) reads: "The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part." Id. pt.
III, art. 32(2).
119. Khatri I, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 623; Khatri 11, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 408; Khatri III, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 635;
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bystander standing 120 in the Bhagalpur Blinding case occurred in the same year
that several bar associations successfully sought expansion of the standing doctrine
in the highly politicized Judges' Transfer case.
121
VII. PRESERVING NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS WHILE
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS - INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Several countries face the problem of balancing the two seemingly competing
interests of preserving national security and protecting human rights. At the United
Nations and international human rights NGOs, there are serious global efforts to
articulate the human rights concerns underlying states' processes in formulating
national security policies. The U.N. Secretary General submitted a report entitled
Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism
to the Commission on Human Rights during its fifty-ninth session pursuant to the
December 18, 2002 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 57/219.122 Resolution
57/219 emphatically asserted the importance of protecting human rights, even
while pursuing all efforts to counter terrorism in order to preserve national
security. The resolution affirmed that: "States must ensure that any measure taken
to combat terrorism complies with their obligations under international law, in
particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law .... 123
During the sixty-second meeting of the Commission on Human Rights on
April 25, 2003, it adopted resolution 2003/68, which reiterated that the elimination
of the practice and threat of terrorism should go hand-in-hand with the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 124 Human Rights Watch, the New
York-based NGO, submitted a well-argued briefing paper on this subject for the
fifty-ninth session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. 125  The paper
commented that it was important for national and international counter-terrorism
initiatives to be within the human rights framework and observed: "Protecting
human rights during counter-terrorist efforts is more than a legal requirement. It is
integral to the success of the campaign against terrorism itself. Terrorism will not
be defeated solely by military or security means... Combating terrorism requires a
reaffirmation of human rights values, not their rejection., 26 The paper also noted
Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 2 S.C.C. 493 ("Khatri IV').
120. For a comprehensive discussion of standing and bystander standing, see William A. Fletcher,
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
121. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (popularly known as the Judges' Transfer
case).
122. Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism: Report of
the Secretary-General on Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 57/219, U.N. ESCOR, 59th
Sess., Agenda Item 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/120 (2003).
123. Id. 2.
124. Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism:
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/68, U.N. ESCOR, 62nd mtg., U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/2003/RES/2003/68 (2003). This resolution was adopted without a vote. Id.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
WORLDWIDE (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf (last visited
May 2, 2005).
126. Id. at 3.
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the U.N. Secretary General's remarks during a debate of the Security Council's
Counter Terrorism Committee in October 2002 when he observed: "[T]o pursue
security at the expense of human rights is short-sighted, self-contradictory, and, in
the long run, self-defeating.'
27
The numerous institutional mechanisms in the U.N. system have all
recognized the possible human rights violations that can occur as a result of state
efforts to combat terrorism. In fact, even before September 11, 2001, the UNHRC
formulated parameters upon which states responding to a national security threat
could justifiably derogate from their legal commitment to protect human rights.
28
In this regard, the UNHRC observed that, even in armed conflicts, states must
show that the situation threatens the life of the nation and that the measures
derogating from the international covenants are necessary, legitimate, and "limited
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."' 129 The
proportionality requirement, in the UNHRC's opinion, "relates to the duration,
geographical coverage and materials scope of the state emergency and any
measures of derogation.'
130
In its November 2001 statement, the Committee against Torture (CAT)
reminded state parties that most of their legal obligations were non-derogable, and
asked the States to ensure that their counter-terrorism responses conformed to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.' 31 The Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
also adopted a statement on racial discrimination and measures to combat
terrorism.13 2 The CERD postulated that counter-terrorism measures should be in
accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law; further, the
prohibition of racial discrimination was a peremptory norm from which no
derogation was allowed. 133 Thus, the policy formulation and statement adoption by
U.N. human rights mechanisms and the efforts of human rights NGOs undertaken
both before and after September 11, 2001 demonstrate the need for a balance
between the interest in protecting a state's national security from terrorist threats
and the importance in protecting an individual's human rights and civil liberties.
VIII. THE WAY FORWARD - TRANSITION FROM PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY
TO PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY
The State must be protected from both national and international threats.
National security strategies are increasingly designed with the belief that passing
stringent laws that grant the executive, including law enforcement authorities,
punishment and greater discretionary powers will help thwart terrorists and other
127. Id.
128. Id. at 5-6.
129. Human Rights Committee, States of Emergency (article 4): CCPR General Comment 29.
(General Comments), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.l 1, 31/0812001, 4.
130. Id.
131. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 125, at 6.
132. Statement on Racial Discrimination and Measures to Combat Terrorism, U.N. Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 61 st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (Chapter XI)(C) (2002).
133. Id. 3-4.
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internal and external threats. India has passed anti-terrorism laws with the intention
of preserving the security of the State from its own people and external threats. It
is ironic that the Constitution of India, which is similar to many other countries'
constitutions, along with the Bill of Rights provisions in several other constitutions
and other national and international human rights laws, were intended to protect
the citizens from the State. However, the contemporary worldwide efforts that
focus on protecting the State from its citizens are indeed a significant
development, especially when these developments affect peoples' human rights
and civil liberties.
There is little controversy regarding the need for States to pass laws
protecting national security, and it is accepted that doing so is a legitimate and
important public policy and governance mechanism vested in the State.
Nevertheless, states should be careful to ensure that these laws are not abused or
ineffectively implemented, as in India. The abuse of national security laws and
their resulting ineffectiveness threatens the rule of law and attacks the polity's
democratic foundation upon which the State exists. It is in this context that States
facing national and international terrorist threats and other problems must seriously
examine their entire government system, particularly the impact of its domestic
and foreign policies on its own people and people of other states. This
consideration has recently implicated a broader notion of human security.
In its Final Report, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) observed that
human security supplements state security while enhancing human rights and
strengthening human development. 134 The purpose of human security is to protect
people against a broad range of individual and community threats. It also
empowers the citizenry to act for themselves. 135 The goal is to bring the human
security elements to the forefront while moving state security, which is based on
laws protecting national security, toward an expansion of rights and development
of social and economic policies promoting human security.1 36 The CHS defines
human security as:
[Aiming] to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human
freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental
freedoms-freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from
critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means
using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means
creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems
that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and
dignity.
137
134. COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN SECURITY Now 2-17 (2003), available at
http://www humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/chapterl .pdf (last visited May 2, 2005).
135. Id.
136. See Sadako Ogata, From State Security to Human Security, Brown University Ogden Lecture
(May 16, 2002), available at http://www'humansecurity-chs'org/activities/outreach/ogata-ogden.pdf
(last visited May 2, 2005).
137. COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, supra note 134, at 4.
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The CHS's definition of human security is useful to comprehend the need to
shift the paradigm towards promotion of security in order to empower people and
protect them from all threats. Thus, under the human security paradigm, the
national security needs of a State will not be based solely on conventional notions
of internal and external sources of terrorist threats. It is necessary to understand
that preserving peace, stability, and order in an increasingly inter-dependent world
has to be based upon states recognizing that both national and international
government processes need to be based upon upholding human rights.138 The
national security policy, whether by state legislation, rule, regulation, or policy,
needs to be accompanied by an inclusive and equitable set of development policies
that foster greater understanding of, and respect for, the dignity and equality of the
world's people.1
39
The U.N. Secretary General had recently submitted a report to the U.N.
General Assembly entitled: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, in which he has emphasized the need for understanding
security from a holistic perspective and most importantly to appreciate freedom
from human rights and development perspectives. He has argued that: "Not only
are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each
other. This relationship has only been strengthened in our era of rapid
technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization and
dramatic geopolitical change". Discussing the relationship of terrorism to other
problems that affect humanity, he has observed that, "While poverty and denial of
human rights may not be said to "cause" civil war, terrorism or organized crime,
they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and
atrocities are far from the only reasons that countries are trapped in poverty, but
they undoubtedly set back development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on one side
of the globe, for example an attack against a major financial centre in a rich
country, could affect the development prospects of millions on the other by
causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty. And
countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens
are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to
development.'
140
The report further underlines that, "Accordingly, we will not enjoy
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development,
and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these
causes are advanced, none will succeed. In this new millennium, the work of the
United Nations must move our world closer to the day when all people have the
freedom to choose the kind of lives they would like to live, the access to the
resources that would make those choices meaningful and the security to ensure that
138. Id. at 5.
139. See e.g., C. Raj Kumar, War on Terror a Threat to Academic Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 22, 2002, at 16 (arguing that because greater understanding can be achieved through
academic discourse, attempts to thwart such discourse under the pretext of pursuing terrorists or
protecting national security should not be trusted).
140. Larger Freedom, supra note 15.
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they can be enjoyed in peace".' 4' The report is indeed a positive development in
providing a thematic framework for understanding security in a much wider
context. However, it is not clear how the report can provide a meaningful
challenge to the existing discourse on the "war on terror", which seems to
undermine human rights and, at times, international law for achieving certain
national security objectives. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the earlier
observations of the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Arman, that the Iraq war is
"illegal" and is not in conformity with the U.N. Charter. This has raised some very
important questions relating to the future of international law and the United
Nations. Even though Mr. Kofi Annan has been critical of the Iraq war from the
very beginning, the fact that he chose to call it "illegal" is truly significant. 42 This
only reinforces the view held by many independent international lawyers and non-
governmental organisations that the Iraq war violated the U.N. Charter. It may be
remembered that even before the illegal intervention that took place in Iraq, the
global public opinion was against the war in Iraq. The protests were very strong
even in countries like the United States and United Kingdom, which were key
proponents of the war. The transnational civil society, in the form of human rights
NGOs in different parts of the world, had made representations to the governments
in the United States and the United Kingdom not to go ahead with the war.
Human rights in all its ramifications have acquired social and political
legitimacy in the contemporary world. While nations have made efforts to protect
and promote human rights, there have been numerous challenges that confront the
enforcement of human rights. Terrorism is probably the greatest danger to human
rights one can think of, but unwise reactions and responses to it can itself lead to
human rights violations. Mahatma Gandhi said, "Any eye for an eye only end up
making the whole world blind.' 43 Terrorism violates human rights and attacks the
peace and stability of nations and its people. Responses to terrorism and possible
human rights violations that occur due to the implementation of anti-terrorism laws
demonstrate the perpetual conflict between public protection (national security)
and individual rights. What should be done when enforcement of human rights
appear to clash with the enforcement of national security measures is the key issue
facing the post-September 11 world. There is a need for states recognizing that
international law and domestic constitutional law are necessary to ensure that the
fight against terrorism does not violate human rights so that national security can
be achieved without violating civil liberties. There is a delicate balance between
ensuring national security and protecting human rights, which should be preserved.
IX. THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
The debates regarding the necessity of strengthening national security
legislation and formulating laws relating to anti-terrorism is of contemporary
significance in many parts of the world. There are some important Indian lessons
141. Id.
142. Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC News UK Edition, Sept. 16, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.ull/hi/world/middle-east/3661134.stm (last visited May 2, 2005).
143. This quote is attributed to Mahatma Gandhi and is available at
http://www.popartuk.com/general/gandhi-gn0097-poster.asp (last visited May 2, 2005).
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that would help other countries currently in the process of passing anti-terrorism
laws. It may be useful to bear in mind the Indian experience while structuring the
debates concerning national security legislation. The Indian government was
successful in passing anti-terrorism legislation, and the statute books still list
traditional offenses, like sedition and treason, relating to national security.
However, the laws relating to traditional national security matters have been
thoroughly interpreted. The anti-terrorism laws have taken more prominence in
India because they applied to national security offenses. There are four important
factors to serve as checks and balances in the potential abuse of anti-terrorism
laws. However, the effectiveness of these checks and balances has been seriously
questioned recently.
A. Human Rights Protected under the Constitution & Other Legislation.
The Indian Constitutional framework, as examined earlier, protects the
people's rights and guarantees constitutional remedies for fundamental rights
violations. In other jurisdictions, it would be useful to have a similar constitutional
or human rights framework as the basis for ensuring that the people's rights are
protected. Further, any national security legislation or other anti-terrorism
legislation ultimately passed must satisfy constitutional and human rights scrutiny
under the country's respective laws. These laws should also be consonant with the
particular nation's international human rights law and treaty obligations.
B. Role of the Judiciary in Protecting and Promoting Human Rights.
The Indian judiciary has been an independent and vibrant forum for human
rights discourse in Indian society. While the enforcement of human rights and the
effectiveness of judicial institutions in India are far from perfect, the courts'-
particularly the Supreme Court of India and various state High Courts- scrutiny
of human rights under the Indian Constitution has been fairly effective. That is,
the executive must ensure that the particular national security legislation and its
enforcement mechanisms are constitutionally valid. This requirement has always
been an important check on executive power; instead of possibly abusing the laws,
the executive must ensure that the laws satisfy constitutional protection of human
rights, as well as the human rights guarantees developed by Indian courts'
jurisprudence. The judiciary in various nations must play a similar role in
questioning the constitutional validity of the proposed national security legislation
and ensuring that law enforcement does not result in any violations of
constitutional rights or ICCPR obligations. These very valuable mechanisms place
useful checks on the exercise of executive power with regard to national security
and various offenses thereof.
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C. Role of the National Human Rights Commission in Protecting Civil
Liberties.'"
The Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993 established India's National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The NHRC is empowered to receive
complaints broadly relating to any human rights violations. 145 Over the years, the
NHRC has developed a good reputation both nationally and internationally with
regard to intervention on human rights matters. NHRC's opinions on numerous
matters are inconsistent with the Indian government's position. The NHRC also
engages state governments on various human rights and law reform matters, the
most important of which is ensuring that legislation conforms to the human rights
obligations in the Indian Constitution and other laws. The NHRC's moral
legitimacy is based on its members' impartiality and integrity, and not on its
institutional independence or its guaranteed powers in the Protection of Human
Rights Act of 1993.
While it is difficult to evaluate whether the NHRC has successfully reduced
human rights violations, it has certainly attempted to develop a human rights
culture in India. In addition, there have been serious attempts to create
accountability mechanisms for human rights violations in different levels of the
Indian government to help ensure that human rights remain the central focus of
Indian political and government discourse. The NHRC remains a forum in which
people can seek justice for human rights violations. The United Nations has
encouraged the formation of national human rights institutions worldwide to
promote institutionalization of human rights. However, it is important to recognize
that the NHRCs should function in an independent and autonomous manner for
them to be truly effective institutions in the protection and promotion of human
rights.
X. CONCLUSION
Before and after September 11, 2001, national security and counter-terrorism
concerns drove, and are still driving, nation states to introduce draconian laws and
amendments curtailing or restricting citizens' fundamental rights in democracies.
India, which has been afflicted with secessionist violence and terrorism in several
of its states, passed POTA. This article defends the Indian NHRC's position that
POTA was unnecessary. It proposes that the problem with anti-terrorist laws in
India is not that they are lacking or less in number, but rather, that they are
ineffectively implemented. Most forms of terrorist threats in India are effectively
contemplated by already existing laws. Yet, just as in the case of the U.S. Patriot
Acts,146 the Indian executive and Parliament enacted POTA without adequately
144. For a critical perspective on NHRCs, see C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions:
Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 259
(2003).
145. For further reading, see C. Raj Kumar, Role and Contribution of National Human Rights
Commissions in Promoting National and International Human Rights Norms in the National Context,
47 IND. J. PuB. ADMIN. 222 (2001).
146. For further reading on the Patriot Act, see Shirin Sinnar, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The
Mandatory Detention ofAliens Under The USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1419 (2003).
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assessing its necessity and potential impact on constitutional safeguards and other
international human rights standards. Later developments, like the Supreme Court
of India upholding the constitutional validity of POTA, while providing certain
checks and balances in the enforcement of POTA and the new UPA government
that came to power in India in May 2004 repealing POTA, have not changed the
context of the debate. In fact the need for protecting human rights while preserving
national security needs to be underlined as the government of India has
unfortunately passed an ordinance amending certain provisions of an existing
criminal legislation in the form of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
Some of the provisions of this legislation are as draconian as the provisions of the
POTA and hence, the human rights resistance in India needs to continue. This
article gives a broad historical overview of the Indian legislation limiting human
rights and highlights problematic aspects.
A balance between countering terrorism and promoting human rights is
attainable as long as the "reasonable" constitutional provision is developed and
Indian law evolves in conjunction with the efforts of the inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations in protecting civil liberties while combating
terrorism. 147 The best human rights defense regarding national security laws is the
prevention of abuse and erosion by improper and unwarranted government action.
The test of any historical theory is its capability to interpret past events in ways
that illuminate the present and help us see the path ahead. For example, in India,
the executive abused both TADA and POTA, which were in many ways the
UAPA's earlier equivalents. The voices that cry for vengeance urge us to renounce
our commitments to protect human rights at all times, including the times when we
are beset with terrorism and national insecurity of the gravest kind. It is during
these challenging times that we need to rise to the occasion and not forget the past.
We need to underline the fact that through valuing human rights and
promoting civil liberties, deliberative democracies like India and other countries
create a place for meaningful dialogue, debate, and dissent within civil and
political society. Terrorism defies all established norms of dignity, decency, and
decorum-mandatory for peaceful existence in any society. As a society, we must
condemn terrorism of all kinds and should never accept it as a method of achieving
any goals, however noble they may be. At the same time, as Benjamin Cardozo
said: "We are what we believe we are"; 148 thus, we should be careful to fashion our
response to terrorism-after all, posterity will judge our responses. We must take
care not to deviate from the universal values of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in our zeal to preserve national security.
147. See C. Raj Kumar, War on Terror Must Start with Respect for Human Rights, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 2002, at 16.
148. This quote is attributed to Benjamin Nathan Cardozo and is available at
http://www.happyotter.com/hoquote/Quotel Page 12.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
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No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME:* SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM
DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS**
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Christianity and Islam vaulted to great national
importance following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the "war on terror" that
the United States declared thereafter. Since the attacks, various commentators
have attempted to contextualize the role that religion plays in this conflict. For
example, Salman Rushdie, in a much-discussed New York Times op-ed, declared
bluntly that the war in Afghanistan following the September 11 th attacks was
"about Islam."' On the other hand, the Toronto Star editorialized: "That the Sept.
11 hijackers were Arab Muslims says no more than that Timothy McVeigh was
Christian or Baruch Goldstein was Jewish."2 But regardless of these differences
"Exodus 20:3 ("You shall have no other gods before me."). Cf THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN
10:66 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 10th ed. 1999) ("Behold! verily to Allah belong all creatures, in the
heavens and on earth. What do they follow who worship as His 'partners' other than Allah? They
follow nothing but fancy, and they do nothing but lie.").
." Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP; J.D. 2002, New York University School of Law; B.A.
1998, Wake Forest University. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Brian S. Prestes, with whom I
engaged in a number of useful discussions about this article; he also made significant contributions to
Part 11. I would like to thank Tom Hale for excellent research assistance, and would also like to thank
Michaelle Browers, Duane Castro, Robin J. Effron, Jordan Gans-Morse, John Hughes, Rashad Hussain,
Benedict Kingsbury, Matt Rice, Robert Shaw, Christi Siver, Laurie Straus, Eric Truett, David Weinstein
and Lee S. Wolosky for their comments and criticisms. Most of all, I thank my beautiful wife, Amy
Powell, for her insightful comments on this manuscript, and for her extraordinary perseverance and
understanding during the time that I spent working on this and other projects.
1. Salman Rushdie, Yes, This Is About Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at A25.
In a similar (although far from identical) vein, a number of books advancing sharp critiques of Islam
were published following the September I I attacks. See, e.g., ERGUN CANER & EMIR CANER,
UNVEILING ISLAM: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT MUSLIM LIFE AND BELIEFS (2002); MARK A. GABRIEL,
ISLAM AND TERROISM: WHAT THE QuRAN REALLY TEACHES ABOUT CHRISTIANITY, VIOLENCE, AND
THE GOALS OF THE ISLAMIC JIHAD (2002); ROBERT SPENCER, ISLAM UNVEILED: DISTURBING
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD'S FASTEST GROwING FAITH (2002).
2. It's Folly to Blame Islam for Hatred, Fanaticism, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 2001, at A13; see
also Scott Alexander, Inalienable Rights?: Muslims in the U.S. Since September 11th, 7 J. ISLAMIC L.
& CULTURE 103, 124 (2002) ("1 cannot help but ask how, on the level of rhetoric, these popular
Christian preachers [who have been severely critical of Islam] are any different than an Osama bin
Laden?").
Whether McVeigh actually considered himself to be Christian-as the Toronto Star's quote suggests-
is, at the very least, debatable. See Maggie Gallagher, Timothy McVeigh, Christian Terrorist,
TOWNHALL.COM, Oct. 28, 2002, at
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg20021028.shtml (arguing that the notion of
"Timothy McVeigh, Christian terrorist" is a "patent falsehood" in light of the fact that Jesus made no
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between commentators, virtually nobody would argue that religion is simply
irrelevant to the war on terror. Whether it is expressed through fears that combat
on Islamic soil will inflame the Muslim street3 or concern about the influx of
Christian missionaries that have tended to follow such military operations,4
virtually all observers agree that religion is a significant factor in this conflict.
Without a proper appreciation of both Muslim religious sensibilities and the
manner in which the West is perceived by that faith's adherents, policymakers do
indeed risk exacerbating extant problems, by, for example, increasing public
sympathy for terrorists within the Islamic world. Thus, this article describes a
powerful strain of thought that has historically existed within both Christianity and
Islam, and that continues to guide a significant number of both faiths' adherents
today. This strain of thought holds that both religions possess distinct
geographical "spheres of influence," in the same way that nation-states are thought
to possess their own spheres of influence.5 Thus, Christians whose worldviews are
shaped by this concept will be very concemed about perceived encroachments into
the "Christian West," while Muslims who share this perspective will be worried
about the erosion of Islam's power within the "Islamic world."
The notion that Christianity and Islam possess distinct geographical spheres
of influence is by no means universally held by Christians and Muslims. However,
a large number of adherents to both faiths conceptualize their religion as
possessing a geographical sphere of influence. Moreover, the believers who hold
this view tend to wield disproportionate influence within both faiths.6 This view
thus merits our attention, since even small, committed groups of believers have
often heavily influenced the course that Christianity and Islam have followed.7 A
framework for understanding the interactions between the Christian world and
Muslim world that takes into account this perception of religious spheres of
influence can thus help to reduce the potential for conflict between the two faiths.
appearance in McVeigh's rhetoric, McVeigh "had no furn convictions about an afterlife," and McVeigh
was described as "'an avowed agnostic' whose sudden last-minute decision to see a Catholic priest just
before his execution surprised everyone who knew him").
3. See, e.g., Rajan Menon, Why Russia Says 'Nyet' to the U.S., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2003, at 23C
("An American war against Iraq followed by a prolonged occupation could inflame the Muslim
world.").
4. See, e.g., Chandra Muzaffar, Evangelising the World, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), July
21, 2003, at 10; David Van Biema, Missionaries Under Cover, TIME, June 30, 2003, at 36.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. Their influence is magnified by the fact that they tend to be more religiously inclined-often
including acknowledged leaders of both religions-and hence more likely to lobby the state or
undertake independent action on their faith's behalf.
7. Examples of this phenomenon include the Reformation, wherein a small group of thinkers led
a major theological revolution within Christianity, see OWEN CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION (1964);
the rise of Wahhabism, which was made possible by the alliance between the theologian Muhammad
ibn Abdul Wahhab and the political leader Muhammad ibn Saud, see DORE GOLD, HATRED'S
KINGDOM: How SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTS THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM 17-21 (2003); and the life of
Sayyid Qutb, whose life and writings "inspired many of the radical Islamic movements of the 1970s and
1980s." Hamid M. Khan, Note, Nothing is Written: Fundamentalism, Revivalism, Reformism and the
Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 273, 308 (2002).
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The spheres of influence concept is usually identified with both realist and
neorealist theories of international relations (IR), which argue that nation-states
seek to maximize their power.8  The perception of Christians and Muslims who
believe that their faith possesses a geographic sphere of influence mirrors the
predictions of realist IR theories; these adherents view their faith as operating in a
manner similar to the nation-state, with the religion's power waxing or waning in
relation to a variety of competitors. Indeed, they may view their religion as a more
vital and more legitimate actor than the nation-state. 9 However, this article
employs liberal IR theory to examine how this perception of religious spheres of
influence affects the way that individuals and states behave internationally. In
contrast to realism, the liberal theory of international relations places greater
emphasis on state-society relations than on the structural relationship between
nation-states. 10
Although realist theory holds that spheres of influence are only one strategy
among many that nation-states may employ to expand their power, Christians and
Muslims who believe that their faith possesses a geographic component view
spheres of influence as far more important to their religion than to nation-states.
Such believers perceive spheres of influence as an essential strategy. In part, they
think spheres of influence are important for reasons rooted in the history and
doctrines of both faiths,"1 but there is also a structural reason for this view. This
structural reason derives from the facts that while religions may be powerful
elements within the state-and while some religions may even deny that any
separation should exist between the state and the faith12-religions are not
themselves coterminous with the nation-state. Instead, both Christianity and Islam
are today forced to vie for power within the state. The spheres of influence
strategy provides the nation-state a reason to act on the dominant religion's behalf
and also generates pressure from the faithful demanding that the state do So.
13
8. See JOHN T. ROURKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON THE WORLD STAGE 17-18 (7th ed. 1999);
see also infra Part II.B. L.a (discussing realist IR theories).
9. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.B. .b (explaining liberal theory).
11. See infra Parts III.A and IV.A.
12. See Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and North
Africa, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 139, 143 (1996) ("There is no separation of 'mosque and state' in
Islam."); see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
13. This structural reason for reliance on spheres of influence raises the obvious question of
whether adherents to other major world religions also perceive their faiths as possessing geographic
spheres of influence. Some evidence suggests that this perception of spheres of influence may indeed
extend to other religions.
For example, the recent wave of brutal attacks on missionaries in India suggests that some Hindus may
believe that Christianity is invading their faith's sphere of influence. See generally Marion Lloyd, Fear
and Violence Stalk Christians and Muslims in India, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 8, 1999, at A13
(describing the rape of several nuns, as well as an incident in which fifteen men barged into a church
and murdered a Roman Catholic priest); Paul Marshall, Hinduism and Terror, FIRST THINGS, June 1,
2004, at 10 ("In the past decade, extremist Hindus have increased their attacks on Christians, until there
are now several hundred per year."); Alessandra Stanley, Pope Tells India His Church Has a Right to
Evangelize, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at A3 ("Anti-Christian attacks by Hindu fundamentalists, often
encouraged by political extremists, have increased dramatically in the last two years, with more than
2005
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Both Christianity and Islam enjoy religious primacy within their perceived
spheres of influence. Many adherents to both faiths seek to expand these spheres
of influence while simultaneously preventing competitors from gaining a foothold
within them. One way these adherents attempt to expand their religions' spheres
of influence is through aggressive proselytism. 14 Also, both religions often employ
the coercive power of the state to increase their power and inhibit competitors'
150 recorded incidents of church lootings, beatings, rapes and killings.").
Most Buddhist states impose limitations on minority faiths within their borders, sometimes in a
dramatic fashion. In Bhutan, both proselytism by citizens of non-Buddhist faiths and also religious
conversions are prohibited. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 2001 at 507 (2001) [hereinafter REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM]. Dissidents have also
reported that "Buddhist religious teaching ... is permitted in schools; however, the teaching of other
religious traditions is not." Id. at 508. In Burma, governmental authorities prohibit Christian
proselytism in some areas, and in one instance "clergy were beaten to discourage proselytizing." Id. at
115. Christian groups have also experienced "increasing difficulties in obtaining permission to build
new churches," and are not legally allowed to import translations of the Bible into indigenous
languages. Id. at 115-16. Burmese Muslims face even greater restrictions, as they "report that they
essentially are banned from constructing any new mosques anywhere in the country." Id. at 113. The
Burmese government has gone so far as establishing "Muslim-free zones" where no Muslims are
permitted to live and mosques have been destroyed. Id. at 118. In Laos, foreigners are legally
prohibited from proselytizing, and religious conversions are also prohibited in certain localities. Id. at
173. The Laotian government has also arrested a number of adherents to minority faiths for their
religious activities. Id. at 175; see also NINA SHEA, IN THE LION'S DEN: A SHOCKING ACCOUNT OF
PERSECUTION AND MARTYRDOM OF CHRISTIANS TODAY & How WE SHOULD RESPOND 84 (1997)
(explaining that a Protestant pastor was imprisoned on charges of "showing a video without permission,
'causing division,' and illegally 'spreading his faith'). The Laotian government has explicitly
criticized Christianity as "a Western or imperialist 'import' into the country," REPORT ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, supra, at 174, thus suggesting that the government may view attempts at propagating
Christianity as an intrusion on a perceived Buddhist "sphere of influence."
Similarly, the Jewish nature of the State of Israel is codified in its laws. See Declaration on the
Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4, (1948) (providing for "the establishment of a
Jewish State in Eretz-lsrael [the Land of Israel]"); Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 9), 39
L.S.I. 216 (1984-85) (providing that a candidates' list cannot participate in Knesset elections if one of
its objects is "negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people"). One
commentator has noted that Israel's Jewish character is also demonstrated by "the fact that the Sabbath
and the Jewish holidays have been declared to be the official days of rest for the majority of the
population, that the flag and emblem express Jewish tradition, and that the army has to provide only
Kosher food to its soldiers." Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel, 47
CATH. U.L. REV. 441,443 (1998).
However, one area where other major world religions differ from Christianity and Islam is proselytism.
Christianity and Islam are both firmly committed to expanding their spheres of influence through
proselytism. See J. Paul Martin, Christianity and Islam: Lessons from Africa, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV.
401, 402 (1998); see also infra Parts III and IV. The other major world religions are generally non-
evangelical. See Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 563, 572 n.35 (1998) ("Jews do not proselytize or seek converts among the Gentiles."); Kinji
Kanazawa, Being a Buddhist and a Lawyer, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1171 (1998) ("Buddhism is not
an evangelical or apostolic creed; it does not seek followers, yet it encourages anyone who would
follow the path to enlightenment."); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 810 n.272 (noting "Hinduism's prominent ethos against evangelizing"). The
question of whether adherents to other major world religions also believe that their faiths possess
geographic spheres of influence may be a fruitful subject for future research.
14. See infra Parts III.A.4, III.B.3, IVA.1, IV.B.I.
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growth (although in the contemporary context, this is done more frequently and
more dramatically in the Islamic world). Individual adherents to the dominant
religion may simultaneously attempt to discourage competitors' growth
independent of the state's policies. In their extreme form, these efforts may result
in religiously motivated violence, but such efforts are not always so sinister.
The main competitors that Christianity and Islam face within their perceived
spheres of influence today are other faiths, secularism, and certain sects within the
same religion. Despite this variegated competition, Christians who believe in a
Christian sphere of influence are especially wary of Islam, while Muslims who
believe in an Islamic sphere of influence are especially wary of Christianity. This
mutual suspicion stems both from the faiths' historical relationship and also from
the fact that, in the words of R. Albert Mohler, president of the Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, they are "major competitors... for the convictions and the
souls of human beings around the world."' 15  Indeed, while Christianity is the
world's largest faith, 16 Islam is acknowledged to be one of the world's fastest
growing religions.'
7
Part II explains the concept of spheres of influence. Thereafter, Parts III and
IV illuminate the perception held by a significant number of Muslims and
Christians that their faiths possess geographic spheres of influence, as well as the
historical and contemporary strategies that adherents to both religions have
employed to preserve and expand these spheres.'
8
Finally, this article concludes by discussing the predictive value of applying
the spheres of influence concept to the relationship between Christianity and Islam,
and by suggesting policy prescriptions that follow from the concept's application.
If Western policymakers are sensitive to the widespread perception in the Muslim
world that the Islamic faith possesses a geographical sphere of influence, and if
they are aware of the potential for their own actions to be perceived as attempts to
extend the Christian sphere of influence, then they should be able to reduce the
15. R. Albert Mohler, quoted in R. Albert Mohler Discusses His Support for Allowing Christian
Evangelist Missionaries to Proselytize in Iraq, FRESH AIR, May 5, 2003 (NPR), LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
16. Christianity claims about two billion adherents. See, e.g., Amy Lee, Iraq Echoes Easter
Theme; Situation Mirrors Biblical Rebirth, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 20, 2003, at IC; Visual Bible
International Begins Filming the Gospel of John, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 27, 2003, at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File.
17. Islam is often described as the world's fastest-growing faith. See, e.g., The Gods That Failed,
EcoNoMiST, Sept. 13, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Michael Pakenham, Gregorian
Succinctly Explores the Global Complexity ofIslam, BALT. SUN, June 15, 2003, at I IF; Steven Simon,
The New Terrorism: Securing the Nation Against a Messianic Foe, BROOKINGS REV., Jan. 1, 2003, at
21. However, some controversy exists about whether Islam or Christianity is actually growing more
rapidly. See PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY 5-6
(2002) (arguing that Christianity is, in fact, the world's fastest-growing religion).
18. My goal in writing this article is not to engage theological controversies within either
Christianity or Islam. While some authors writing about the darker moments in the history of both
faiths have attempted to distinguish the religions' "true" doctrines from the manner in which the faiths
have been manipulated, I am content to leave this analysis to theologians. Instead, I am concerned with
how adherents to these religions have behaved-and continue to behave-in practice.
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potential for their pursuit of the war on terror-as well as other actions that they
take within the perceived Muslim sphere of influence-to result in more recruits to
the terrorists' cause.
II. FRAMEWORK
This Part describes the "spheres of influence" framework. Part II.A defines
and discusses the spheres of influence concept in the context of the nation-state
because this is the context in which scholars have traditionally understood and
developed the concept. Part II.B then discusses how the idea of spheres of
influence can help to produce a better understanding of the relations between
Christianity and Islam.
A.Nation-States' Use of Spheres of Influence
1. Early Use of Spheres of Influence
A "sphere of influence" is a geographic area within which a dominant state
exerts its power and attempts to exclude other states outside the region from doing
so. 19 A state's sphere of influence will, of course, include the territory within its
own borders. But, in addition, a state's sphere of influence will typically include
an area beyond its borders. This area may be large or small. It may be one that the
state firmly controls and from which the state successfully excludes competing
states, or it may be a sort of buffer zone or disputed frontier area in which a state
struggles with other states for influence or supremacy. A state's sphere of
influence is like a set of concentric circles, the innermost being the state's own
territory, often followed by geographic areas that are outside of the state but that
the state controls (through allegiances, agreements, or even brute force), and
ending with the outermost circle, which includes contested regions overlapping
with the outermost spheres of another state (or states). The outermost circles,
where states' spheres overlap, are where inter-state conflicts commonly emerge.
The term "spheres of influence" describes more than just geographic areas,
however. It also describes a strategy that has been used since the advent of the
nation-state. The strategic concept of "spheres of influence" refers to the method
by which states define, defend, and expand territory under their control, while
attempting to undermine competing states' attempts to do the same. They employ
this strategy in order to maintain their security or increase their power. States may
establish tacit spheres of influence by exerting military or economic might within a
less powerful region, or merely by announcing their intent to do so. States may
formally establish spheres of influence through agreements, either between the
more powerful state and the less powerful state within its sphere, or between two
powerful states that agree not to interfere in each others' spheres of influence.
Such agreements may be consensual or coercive. 20 It is this sense of the term-
19. Henry Kissinger, for example, has described "spheres of influence" as assigning
"preponderant influence over large regions to specific powers." HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 40-41
(1994).
20. For a description of how spheres of influence may be established by core states with the
consent of peripheral states, see Charles A. Kupchan, After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional
Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity, INT'L SEC., Fall 1998, at 42 (describing the
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spheres of influence as a strategy-that is central to this article's analysis of the
relations between Christianity and Islam.
In the United States, perhaps the earliest explicit manifestation of the spheres
of influence strategy was the Monroe Doctrine-President Monroe's famous
decision in 1823 to exclude European powers from the Western Hemisphere. The
traditional realist view of this doctrine is that it "arose from the attempt of the Holy
Alliance-composed of Prussia, Russia, and Austria-to suppress the revolution in
Spain in the 1820s. ' '21 The United States, fearing that the Holy Alliance's
intervention in Spain would spill over into intervention in Spain's colonies in Latin
America, responded with a policy designed to exclude European colonialism from
the Americas.22 The Monroe Doctrine moved American foreign policy from
merely opposing American intervention in struggles in Europe to opposing
European intervention in the Americas.23 It defined the United States' sphere of
influence as encompassing all of the Western Hemisphere.
"For the greater part of American history," the Monroe Doctrine defined "the
American national interest., 24 After defining its sphere of influence, the United
States exerted its power to defend and enlarge this sphere of influence by keeping
other states out. For example, Henry Kissinger describes President Polk's 1845
incorporation of Texas into the United States and President Andrew Johnson's
1868 purchase of Alaska as preemptive efforts by the United States to defend its
sphere of influence against even the possibility of an outside threat.25' By the early
1900s, the United States had gone so far as to proclaim its sovereignty over
virtually all of North America and had strongly encouraged, if not forced, even
Great Britain to abandon its role there.26 The Monroe Doctrine was alive and well
in 1919, when President Wilson unhesitatingly cited it as a focal point of the new
international order that he envisioned.27 And in 1939, soon after the Nazi
occupation of Prague, President Franklin D. Roosevelt argued that "the continued
political, economic and social independence of every small nation in the world
does have an effect on our national safety and prosperity. Each one that disappears
weakens our national safety and prosperity. 28 Although the United States did not
act on this articulated principle until after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor,
President Roosevelt's reasoning was an aggressive application of the spheres of
concept of "benign unipolarity").
21. KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 35. For the view held by liberal IR theorists, see infra notes 74-
76 and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. Message of President Monroe to Congress, December 2, 1823, in THE RECORD OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 182 (Ruhl J. Bartlett ed., 1954); see also Captain Davis Brown, The Role of Regional
Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. L. REv. 235, 238 (1997).
24. KISSINGER, supra note 19, at 812-13.
25. Id. at 36-37.
26. As an example of spheres of influence at work in the early twentieth century, Kissinger cites
President Theodore Roosevelt's understanding that the United States was to exert its influence in the
Western Hemisphere and that Great Britain was to do the same on the Indian subcontinent. Id. at 40-41.
27. Id. at 235.
28. Id. at 383 (quoting FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 13 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS
CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 262 (1939)).
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influence paradigm: America, in order to defend its sphere, will defend smaller
countries to prevent the emergence of threats to its core territory.
The United States is not the only country to adopt the spheres of influence
paradigm. Kissinger observes, for example, that Russia had, for two hundred years
before Stalin arrived on the scene, continuously attempted to resolve disputes with
its neighbors
bilaterally rather than at international conferences. Neither Alexander I in the
1820s, Nicholas I thirty years later, nor Alexander II in 1878 understood why
Great Britain insisted on interposing itself between Russia and Turkey. In
these and subsequent instances, Russian leaders took the position that they were
entitled to a free hand in dealing with their neighbors.
29
2. The Cold War
The Cold War, and the strategy of containment that accompanied it, was the
most vivid realization of the spheres of influence concept.30  For approximately
forty years, the United States and Soviet Union each defined a sphere of influence,
defended it primarily against intrusion by the other, and attempted to enlarge it at
the expense of the other.3 1 Just as the Soviet Union viewed the United States as
inherently and ideologically expansive, 32 the United States viewed the Soviet
Union in the same way, understanding the world as one of zero-sum competition in
which any gain for the Soviets was a loss for the Americans.33
As a result of both countries' perceptions that the other power posed a
substantial threat, bipolar competition between the United States and Soviet Union
was intense during the Cold War. This competition resulted in a virtual dividing of
the planet into either part of the United States' sphere of influence, part of the
Soviet Union's sphere, or in some instances neutral or nonaligned blocks. Samuel
Huntington describes this period: "For the forty years of the Cold War, conflict
permeated downward as the superpowers attempted to recruit allies and partners
and to subvert, convert, or neutralize the allies and partners of the other
29. Id. at 432.
30. The strategy of containment was first proposed by George Kennan, writing pseudonymously
as "X." See George F. Kennan, writing as "X" in The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566
(July 1947). Kennan warned of Soviet expansionism, and wrote that the United States' proper response
"was to conduct a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies
until either the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Id.
31. See James B. Steinberg, Policy and Principles: The Clinton Administration's Approach, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1340, 1341 (1996) (noting that the idea of containment "set the direction for more
than forty years of U.S. foreign policy"); Michael Hahn, Book Review, 3 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 209,
209 (1998) (reviewing RICHARD HAASS, THE RELUCTANT SHERIFF: THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE
COLD WAR (1997)).
32. See HENRY A. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 51-52 (abridged ed.
1958) (explaining that, because the Soviet Union viewed conflict between capitalist and Communist
countries as inevitable, "[c]onciliatory American statements will ... appear to Soviet leaders either as
hypocrisy or stupidity, ignorance or propaganda").
33. Id. at 3 ("Because harmony between different social systems is explicitly rejected by Soviet
doctrine, the renunciation of force will create a vacuum into which the Soviet leadership can move with
impunity.").
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superpower." 34  The United States, for example, announced the Truman
Doctrine-a policy, modeled on the Monroe Doctrine and intellectually rooted in
the spheres of influence paradigm, of allying with and defending democratic
nations throughout the world.35  The Soviets did the same for their Communist
counterparts.
To illustrate, the United States expanded its sphere by exerting influence over
Western Europe (countries such as West Germany and Italy), Northeast Asia
(Japan), and the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union did the same by defining several
Eastern European countries as its client states. Soviet leaders required these
satellite states to consult with the Soviet Union, and had the right to pick their
heads of government. 36 Frequently, "appointments to major Party positions in
Eastern Europe were only given to those individuals with extensive experience in
Moscow." 37 The Soviet Union was able to pursue such a heavy-handed Eastern
Europe policy because "[t]he Americans accepted a Soviet sphere of influence."
38
Although the United States and Soviet Union occasionally directly asserted
themselves within each other's spheres of influence during the Cold War,39 they
did so rarely. Both powers were far more likely to try to alter policies within the
other's sphere through persuasion or attempts to create an international consensus
in order to pressure the other power into altering the policies it pursued within its
sphere of influence.
B. Spheres of Influence in the Relationship Between Christianity and Islam
1. Theoretical Foundations of the Spheres of Influence Concept
Two separate IR theories-realism and liberal theory-help to shed light on
the implications of Christians' and Muslims' perception that their religions possess
geographic spheres of influence. Realist IR theory illuminates the perception of
believers who hold that their faith possesses a geographic sphere of influence;
these adherents view their faith as operating in a manner similar to nation-states,
34. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 272 (1996).
35. The Truman Doctrine was an expression of America's new strategy of containment of the
Soviet Union. One element of America's containment strategy was to defend "all future targets of
Soviet expansion." JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
POSTwAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SEcuRrrY POLICY 21 (1982). The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed on
March 12, 1947, stated that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." Id. at 22.
36. Stephen D. Krasner, Making Peace Agreements Work: The Implementation and Enforcement
of Peace Agreements Between Sovereigns and Intermediate Sovereigns, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651,
668 (1997).
37. Id. at 666.
38. Id. at 668.
39. One example is the Soviet Union's activities in Latin America during the 1980s. See, e.g.,
George Gedda, Salvadoran Gets a US. Visa Despite Being Murder Suspect, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 13, 1996, at 2A (mentioning that leftist guerillas in El Salvador in the 1980s
were backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba); T. Christian Miller, Ortega Tries to Disarm Terror as an
Election Issue, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at A28 (mentioning that the Soviet Union was linked to the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua).
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with the religion's power either increasing or decreasing relative to such
competitors as other faiths, secularism, and "deviant" sects within the same
religion. In turn, liberal IR theory helps us to understand how this perception of
religious spheres of influence affects the behavior of individuals and states on an
international level.
a. Realism
The spheres of influence concept is most consistent with, though not
inextricably linked to, the realist school of IR articulated by political scientists
such as Hans Morganthau, ° Kenneth Waltz, 41 and John Mearsheimer. 42 Realists
hold "three core beliefs. 43 First, realists hold that states are the principal actors in
international politics." Second, realists believe that the anarchic international
system, rather than the internal characteristics of states, primarily dictates states'
behavior.45 Realism's third and final core belief is that states compete for power or
security."
According to the defensive realism commonly associated with Waltz, states
focus on maintaining the status quo--not on maximizing their power, but on
maintaining what they have.47 According to defensive realism: "The international
system itself provides incentives for expansion and aggressive strategies only
under very limited conditions. States can often achieve security by pursuing
40. See HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE (5th ed. 1972).
41. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
42. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001). There is no
single "realist" theory. Rather, realism is "a collection of approaches with differing points of emphasis"
converging on a few central tenets. See JONATHAN HASLAM, NO VIRTUE LIKE NECESSITY: REALIST
THOUGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE MACHIAVELLI 12 (2002). One may divide the realist
school into several sub-categories of realism, ranging from "classical realism" (also sometimes labeled
"human nature realism"), see MORGENTHAU, supra note 40, to "defensive realism" (also known as
"structural realism"), see WALTZ, supra note 41, to "offensive realism," see MEARSHEIMER, supra. See
also infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (elaborating upon the differences between offensive and
defensive realism).
43. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 17.
44. See WALTZ, supra note 41, at 104; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to
International Economic Law: Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 722 (1995). Despite this core realist belief, realism is still useful in
illuminating the perception held by many Christians and Muslims that their faiths possess geographical
spheres of influence. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
45. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 17; see also John J. Mearsheimer, Disorder Restored, in
RETHINKING AMERICA'S SECURITY 222 (Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton eds., 1992) ("[T]he
international political system is anarchic, which means that each state must always be concerned to
ensure its own survival. A state can have no higher goal than survival, since profits matter little when
the enemy is occupying your country and slaughtering your citizens.").
46. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 18; see also KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND
WAR 238 (1959) ("Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force
is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of
reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of
anarchy.").
47. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,
INT'L SEC., Winter 2001, at 128 (2000) (describing and defending defensive realism).
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moderate foreign policies.
' 48
In contrast, according to the offensive realism most commonly associated
with Mearsheimer, "[t]he overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of
world power" rather than merely to maintain the balance of power.49  Great
powers, according to offensive realism, have hegemony as their ultimate aim
because a state maximizes its chances for survival only by being the sole power in
the system. ° They are not content with the status quo distribution of power, but
rather seek to gain for themselves a greater share, by war if the costs are
sufficiently low, or by waiting for more favorable circumstances to initiate force. 5'
Although realism is inherently state-centered, and does not "take account of
domestic political ideology or structure, or of the multiplicity of sub-state actors
that determine state policy at the domestic level,, 5 2 realist theory has value in
helping us to understand how many Christians and Muslims believe their religions'
spheres of influence operate. After all, most Christians and Muslims who believe
that their faith possesses a geographic sphere of influence also view their religion
as an independent international actor capable of challenging the nation-state-and
perhaps, as a more legitimate actor than the nation-state. Moreover, realism's
focus on power in international relations provides further insight into how many
Christians and Muslims view the relations between Christianity and Islam. As R.
Albert Mohler noted, Christianity and Islam are "major competitors" for the
"convictions and souls" of people worldwide. 3 Many Christians and Muslims see
this competition as zero-sum, wherein any gain that Islam makes within the
Christian world produces a net loss for Christianity, and any inroads that
Christianity makes within the Muslim sphere of influence represents a net loss for
Islam.
The implications of this perception varies from believer to believer.
Mirroring Mearsheimer's offensive realism, some Christians and Muslims think
that their religion should aim for hegemony, and attempt to marginalize other
faiths that pose a major challenge. 4 On the other hand, more similar to Waltz's
48. Id. at 129
49. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 2; see also Mearsheimer, supra note 45, at 217 ("States have
historically competed with each other for military security in circumstances best characterized as a
zero-sum game. That competition, which sometimes leads to war, has long been the defining
characteristic of international politics.").
50. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 42, at 2.
51. Id.; Waltz further explicates this view:
In anarchy there is no automatic harmony.... A state will use force to attain its goals if,
after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the
pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at
any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force,
all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of
weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the
circumstances in which all states exist.
WALTZ, supra note 46, at 160.
52. Slaughter, supra note 44, at 723.
53. Mohler, supra note 15.
54. See, e.g., Van Biema, supra note 4, at 36 (quoting evangelist Luis Bush as saying, "From its
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defensive realism, some Christians and Muslims are more concerned with
maintaining the religious traditions of the societies in which they live than in
aggressively spreading their faith.
b. Liberalism
Liberal IR theory provides us with further insight into the implications of the
perception of religious spheres of influence by demonstrating how this perception
affects the way that individuals and states behave internationally. The central
insight of liberal IR theory is that "state-society relations-the relationship of
states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are
embedded-have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.
5 5
This view contrasts with realism, which holds states to be autonomous, unified
actors driven by their power position vis-A-vis other states.5 6
Traditionally, liberal scholars have downplayed their theory's salience as a
coherent alternative to realism and institutionalism. Instead, they have focused on
teleological observations that form the "liberal family." These include the
theoretical possibility of international peace,57 the strong proclivity for peace
among democratic states and capitalist economies, 58 and the propensity of liberal
states to comply with international law.59 Liberal theory is also associated with a
number of normative prescriptions that stem from its concern for the individual,
including support for human rights and free enterprise. For these reasons, some
scholars--even those sympathetic to liberalism-have stressed that it is not
"canonical, 6 ° that it "is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural
theory, 6 1 and that it is best seen as an "approach" as opposed to a theory.62
center in the 10/40 Window [between the tenth and fortieth latitudes], Islam is reaching out
energetically to all parts of the globe; in a similar strategy, we must penetrate [its] heart with the
liberating truth of the gospel"); see also Dinesh D'Souza, Osama's Brain; Meet Sayyid Qutb,
Intellectual Father of the Anti-Western Jihad, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 29, 2002, at 16 ("[Muslim
ideologue Sayyid] Qutb contended that since the West and Islam are based on radically different
principles, there is no way that Islamic society can compromise or meet the West halfway. Either the
West will prevail or Islam will prevail.").
55. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,
51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513 (1997).
56. Liberalism can also be contrasted with institutionalism, which emphasizes regime structure as
a guide to state behavior. The three approaches are compared in id. at 514; see also generally
THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1998); CHARLES, W. KEGLEY, JR.,
CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL
CHALLENGE (1995).
57. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE 206 (1997).
58. Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts 1 and 2, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205 (1983) (democratic states); DOYLE, supra note 57, at 230 (capitalist economies).
59. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503 (1995).
60. DOYLE, supra note 57, at 206.
61. Robert 0. Keohane, International Liberalism Reconsidered, in THE ECONOMIC LIMITS TO
MODERN POLITICS 155, 172-73 (John Dunn ed., 1990).
62. Mark W. Zacher & Richard A. Matthew, Liberal International Relations Theory: Common
Threads, Divergent Strands 2 (paper presented at the 88th Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association; Chicago, I11, 1992).
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Recently, however, Andrew Moravcsik has led an attempt to reformulate
liberal IR theory into a "nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to
empirical social science. 63 It is this more scientific understanding of liberalism
that is useful to understanding how Christians' and Muslims' perception that their
religions possess spheres of influence affects international relations. Moravcsik
refines liberalism's focus on state-society relations into three core assumptions.
First, in contrast to realism, liberalism holds that the fundamental actors in
international politics are individuals and private groups.64 Second, liberalism holds
that states (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic
society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences.65
Third, liberalism holds that the configuration of interdependent state preferences
determines state behavior.
66
Liberalism is thus a "bottom-up" theory in which individuals and
aggregations of individuals are the primary drivers of politics. As Moravcsik
explains: "Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational
interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through
political exchange and collective action." 67 The state, then, is "not an actor but a
representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction
and reconstruction by coalitions of societal actors. 6 8 In this view, state behavior is
chiefly motivated by those individuals and groups able to foist their preferences on
the state-either through elections, violence, or other means.
It is important to note that this assumption applies equally to pluralistic and
tyrannical regimes; the societal coalition determining state policy can range from a
broad-based political party to a narrow cadre of elites. In each case, however, it is
sub-state, societal actors that drive policy. For this reason, liberal IR theorists see
regime type-insofar as it marks a certain arrangement of political power amongst
the societal actors within a state-as "a key determinant of what states do
internationally.,
69
Once they have captured the state, dominant societal actors convert their
beliefs and desires into "state preferences." These preferences "are by definition
causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to
specific interstate political interactions. 70  Whereas realism attributes state
behavior primarily to an exogenous variable-inter-state power relations-
liberalism emphasizes the endogenous preferences of societal forces as the "first"
motivator of state behavior, relegating strategic considerations to a secondary
consideration. However, as the third assumption of liberalism listed above implies,
63. Moravcsik, supra note 55, at 513.
64. Id. at 516.
65. Id. at 518.
66. Id. at 520.
67. Id. at 517.
68. Id. at 518.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 519.
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this constraint imposed by other states is "binding.",71 Though a state's preferences
may be determined by dominant internal actors, its actual behavior must take into
account the policies of other competing or cooperating states. It is only at this
stage that power relations enter the liberal calculus. Thus, liberal theory holds that
state behavior is fundamentally driven by the preferences of dominant societal
interests, which is then constrained at the international level by the "configuration
of interdependent state preferences. 72
While spheres of influence are discussed primarily in the realist literature,73
liberal theory is capable of explaining them both as a historical phenomenon and
also as an abstract strategy. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, is traditionally
seen through a realist lens, with a young America asserting its growing strength
vis-A-vis the more established European powers.74 In this view, the desire of the
United States to exclude other powers from its "backyard" arose from a strategic
consideration, specifically the need to prevent the conflict between the Holy
Alliance and Spain from spilling into Spain's American colonies. In contrast, a
liberal reading of the Monroe Doctrine would emphasize the desire of political
elites in the United States, eager to realize their "manifest destiny," to build their
nation into a world power and promote their domestic values abroad.75 It would
also consider the influence of U.S. business interests, which were eager to avoid
European competition in Latin American markets.76
Though it identifies different factors that push states to adopt spheres of
influence as a strategy, liberalism does not differ from realism when considering
the strategic benefits of employing spheres of influence. Liberalism's assumption
that social actors-rather than nation-states-are the fundamental units of IR
analysis does not preclude liberal theorists from recognizing the importance of
power differences as a constraint on state behavior. Indeed, liberal theorists
perceive the same strategic benefits that realists see in the use of spheres of
influence.
Liberal IR theory would hold that states that fall within either the perceived
Christian or Muslim spheres of influence are likely to be subject to strong
pressures from dominant societal actors seeking to bolster their faith for two
interrelated reasons. First, states within a religion's sphere of influence are by
71. Id. at 520.
72. Id.
73. See supra Part II.B.1.A.
74. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
75. Regarding the aspirations of the new nation, no less an authority than Thomas Jefferson
remarked of the Doctrine, "[Independence] made us a nation; [the Monroe Doctrine] sets our compass
and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time .... " Quoted in Elihu Root, The
Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 429 (1914). Regarding the desire of the United States to
promote its ideology in Latin America, see EDWARD WEISBAND, THE IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A PARADIGM OF LOCKIAN LIBERALISM 22 (1973) ("The Monroe Doctrine has
traditionally been interpreted as a great statement of realism .... This, however, represents only part of
Monroe's original intent, which otherwise stemmed from ideological considerations.").
76. See generally THOMAS H. REYNOLDS, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
(1938).
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defmition home to many adherents to that faith. The chance that the adherents'
views will be represented by the dominant societal actors is thus quite high. Even
when ruling elites themselves do not necessarily hold strong religious views, and
even when the state is formally secular-such as in Turkey or the United States-
religiously-motivated opinion is likely to carry significant sway in policymaking."
Second, beyond demographics, the fact that the state is territorially within a
religion's perceived sphere of influence is likely to strengthen religion's influence
on the state. For example, Islamist political movements 78 in Saudi Arabia
frequently invoke the fact that the kingdom is central to the Muslim Holy Land
when lobbying the state for religiously-driven policy.79 Similarly, some religious
advocates in the United States refer to America as a "Christian country" when
advancing their cause.
80
Given the strength of religious interest groups within the perceived Christian
and Muslim spheres of influence, liberal theory would predict that the policies of
states within those spheres are likely to promote the dominant religion. To the
extent that religiously-motivated actors are able to capture the state, liberal theory
would predict some degree of policy convergence amongst states falling within the
same religious sphere of influence.8'
Of course, liberalism also understands that religion is never the only interest
influencing state policy, and often not even the dominant one. Indeed, even a
theocratic state like Saudi Arabia pursues policies-such as close relations with the
United States-that run counter to a sizeable component of religious opinion
within the country.
However, many believers think that their faith should be the primary interest
motivating the state's policies. Indeed, this incongruence between the fact that
religion is often not the dominant interest motivating a state's policies while
adherents believe that it should be helps to explain the role of non-state religious
77. Regarding the United States, see generally JOHN C. GREEN ET AL., THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN
AMERICAN POLmCS (2003). Regarding Turkey, see generally Sami Zubaida, Trajectories of Political
Islam, in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY (David Marquand & Ronald L. Nettler eds., 2000).
78. This article employs the term "Islamist" in the same manner that it is employed by terrorism
expert Daniel Pipes: "This is the body of ideas that takes the religion of Islam and makes it the basis of
a radical utopian ideology along the lines of fascism and Marxism-Leninism It has ambitions to
replace capitalism and liberalism as the reigning world system." Daniel Pipes, Why America is
Unpopular in the Middle East, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 13, 2001, at B9.
79. See generally AYMAN AL-YASSINI, RELIGION AND STATE IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
(1985).
80. Pat Buchanan, Buchanan and Press, Transcript # 060502cb.463 (MSNBC television
broadcast, June 5, 2003), available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("This is a Christian
country, at least it was a Christian country."); see also Kent Faulk, Engel vs. Wallace Runoff Pits
Similar Conservatives, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), June 23, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File (quoting Republican candidate for Congress Gerry Wallace, as saying, "Somebody's
got to stand up and say, 'No, we were a Christian nation' ... And there are many today who would say
that was never true, but they're just wrong and we were better for it").
81. One example of intra-sphere policy coordination is the broad-based support of predominantly
Muslim nations for the Palestinian cause, as evidenced by their voting records in the U.N. General
Assembly.
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actors in international affairs. Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, unable to
realize their goals through state mechanisms, in essense take matters into their own
hands by directly engaging perceived enemies. 82 Because religions are not entirely
dependent on states to operate at the international level, liberalism is a useful lens
through which to view the relations between Christianity and Islam. Liberalism's
focus on individuals allows it to account for non-state actors like terrorist
networks.
While liberalism provides a valuable way to understand the relationship
between Christianity and Islam, it is ambivalent toward the nature of their
interactions. An observer influenced by realism's emphasis on structural conflict
might predict that the two faiths are predisposed to discord, as realism predicts of
nation-states.83 Conversely, liberalism maintains that the state of anarchy in which
nations and religions find themselves does not inherently bias them toward
competition; rather, conflict is a sub-systemic phenomenon. 84 In this manner,
liberalism would attribute recent hostilities between Christians and Muslims as
well as Muslim and Christian states to incompatibilities between the particular
agendas of societal actors. For example, liberal theorists saw nothing systemic
about the September I Ith attacks or their aftermath. Instead, these events were the
consequence of the desires and goals of both a small group of terrorists and also a
larger group of individuals who have a radical Islamist agenda, rather than
representative of any innate struggle between Islam and Christianity.
82. Indeed, many observers have noted that one of al-Qaeda's primary goals is to create a more
Islamic government within Saudi Arabia, and to return the Muslim world generally to adherence to
Islamic principles. In this sense, it is the dissatisfaction of radical Wahhabist elements with their ability
to capture the state that accounts for their terrorist activity. See generally MAMOUN FANDY, SAUDI
ARABIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISSENT (1999); JOSHUA TEITELBAUM, HOLIER THAN THOU: SAUDI
ARABIA'S ISLAMIST RADICALS (2000); Michael Scott Doran, Somebody Else's Civil War: Ideology,
Rage, and the Assault on America, in How DID THIS HAPPEN: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR (James
F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001).
83. Cf. HUNTINGTON, supra note 34.
84. It may sound unusual at first to hear religions described as operating in an anarchic state, since
religions are generally viewed as subordinate to the nation-state. However, both Christianity and Islam
provide people with a primary political identification other than the nation-state. Moreover, both faiths
can themselves challenge the nation-state. Huntington notes that "[i]n the modem world, religion is a
central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people." HUNTINGTON, supra note 34,
at 66. It is common for religious fundamentalists to "believe that loyalty to the religion should
supersede patriotism and that all adherents of their religion should be united politically." ROURKE,
supra note 8, at 183; see also infra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that many Muslims
believe that the legitimacy of states should be determined by their accordance with Islamic principles).
Nation-states themselves view religions as important international actors. Even a country as powerful
as China sees the growth of religion within its borders as a considerable threat. The head of China's
Religious Affairs Bureau wrote in 1995: "If, with a lapse of attention, [religious issues] are not handled
properly, it may undermine social stability, reform and opening up, and the overall interests of
economic construction." Ye Xiaowen, On the Need to Conscientiously Implement "Three Sentences"
in Carrying out Religion-Related Work Well, RENMIN RIBAO, at 9 (quoted in SHEA, supra note 13, at
66).
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2. Spheres of Influence as a Strategy
States utilize spheres of influence as one strategy in the pursuit of power or
security. They define, defend, and enlarge their own spheres of influence while
attempting to undermine the spheres of other states. In other words, great powers
seek to dominate their own geographic regions of the world and also seek to
prevent other states from gaining a foothold.
Likewise, many Christians and Muslims think that their faiths dominate and
are able to exert a large amount of influence over particular geographic regions.
As explained above, these believers' views tend to mirror those held by realists, as
they believe that Christianity and Islam are competitors intentionally and that one
faith's gain is the other's loss.85 Thus, adherents to both religions attempt to
pressure states within their perceived spheres of influence to adopt policies that
advance their faith, and also undertake independent actions to preserve and expand
their religion's sphere of influence (for example, proselytism).
The spheres of influence concept contains both descriptive and predictive
power for analyzing the interactions between Islam and Christianity. We should
expect, now and in the future, to see both Christians and Muslims acting to define,
defend, and enlarge their faiths' spheres of influence.
III. ISLAM
86
Islam, which means "submission" in Arabic,8 7 is the world's second largest
religion, after Christianity."8 Muslims believe in a supreme being, Allah.8 9 Islam
teaches that Allah delivered a series of prophets to all the people of the earth. All
of these prophets brought the same message, enjoining submission to Allah's will.
However, Muslims believe that, over time, the message that these prophets
85. See supra Part II.A.I.
86. This Part utilizes a large number of Arabic terms to denote Islamic concepts related to the
maintenance and expansion of the Muslim sphere of influence. Thus, it is worth noting that
"transliteration of Arabic is an imprecise art." Thomas A. Geraci, Book Review, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
754, 757 (1999) (reviewing MAJID KHADDURI & EDMUND GHAREEB, WAR IN THE GULF 1990-1991:
THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1997)). "[B]ecause there is no standard method
of transliteration from Arabic to English, there are numerous ways to spell certain key words relevant to
a discourse on Islam." Lindsey E. Blenkhom, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
189, 192 n.15 (2002). The spelling of Arabic terms employed in this article may differ from the
spellings employed by other authors.
87. To Muslims, the word signifies "complete submission to the will of Allah." Irshad Abdal-
Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27,41 (2002);
see also M. Ozonnia Ojielo, Human Rights and Sharia'h Justice in Nigeria, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
Comp. L. 135, 144 (2003). Because "Islam" is derived from the root word "salam," or peace, some
writers also claim that Islam "stands for and means peace." A.A. MAUDUDI, TOWARDS
UNDERSTANDING IsLAM 2 (no date given).
88. See Mark O'Keefe, 2 Christian Organizations Are Ready to Convert Iraqis; Missionaries Set
to Tend to Physical, Spiritual Needs, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 27, 2003, at A49; Nick Papadopoulos,
Islam in Asia; A Roundup of Issues Facing the Region's Estimated 670 Million Muslims, TIME INT'L,
Mar. 10, 2003, at 24.
89. "Allah" is Arabic for God. While the two terms can be used interchangeably, this article
employs the term Allah when referring to the Islamic deity.
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conveyed has been either lost or distorted.90 In particular, the Islamic faith holds
that both the Old Testament and New Testament represent genuine revelations
from Allah, but that the message of these books has become corrupted over time.
Muslims believe that the only scripture that remains uncorrupted today is the
Qur'an, which Islamic tradition holds that Allah revealed to the prophet
Muhammad ibn Abdullah through the Angel Gabriel from a period of
approximately 610 AD through 632 AD, the year of the prophet's death.9'
Islam's thoroughly monotheistic outlook is summarized in the Qur'an: "Say:
He is Allah, the One and Only; Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor
is He begotten; and there is none like unto Him. 92
The Qur'an teaches that there will eventually be a Day of Judgment, on which
the dead will be raised and either rewarded with heaven or punished with the
hellfire by their Creator.93  In Islamic theology, whether an individual attains
salvation is based both upon faith and works. At present, a debate exists among
Muslims over whether non-Muslims may reach heaven. Those who believe that
heaven is open to non-Muslims point to a Qur'anic ayah (verse) which states,
"Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures),
and the Christians and the Sabians-any who believe in Allah and the Last Day,
and work righteousness, shall have their reward with the Lord; on them shall be no
fear, nor shall they grieve. 94 Muslims who believe that only adherents to the
Islamic faith can attain salvation contend that the foregoing ayah was later
abrogated by a different Qur'anic ayah, which states: "[W]hoever seeks a religion
other than Islam, it will never be accepted of him, and in the Hereafter he will be
one of the losers."95 But regardless of whether they believe that adherents to other
90. HAMMUDAH ABDALATI, ISLAM IN Focus 12 (3d ed. 1997).
91. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 12-13 (1990); ABDUR
RAHMAN I. Doi, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAw 21 (1984).
92. THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN 112:1-4 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 7th ed. 1995)
[hereinafter HQ]. In addition to Yusuf Ali's translation, when it is necessary to illustrate more
conservative Islamic thought, this article relies upon a translation of the Qur'an that is steeped in
Wahhabi theology, INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANINGS OF THE NOBLE QUR'AN (Muhammad Taqi-ud-
Din AI-Hilali & Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans., 15th ed. 1996) [hereinafter NQ]. For background on
Wahhabism, see, e.g., GOLD, supra note 7; Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Culture of Ugliness in Modern
Islam and Reengaging Morality, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 33, 68-90 (2002-2003).
93. HQ, supra note 92, 2:177, 30:40.
94. Id. at 2:62. For examples of Muslims who use this verse to argue that some non-Muslims may
attain salvation in the afterlife, see, e.g., Ali S. Asani, "So That You May Know One Another": A
Muslim American Reflects on Pluralism and Islam, 588 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 40, 44-
45 (2003); Farid Esack, Muslims Engaging the Other and the Humanum, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 529,
555-56 (2000).
95. NQ, supra note 92, 3:85. AI-Hilali and Khan's translation can be contrasted with Mohammad
Pickthall's. Pickthall translates ayah 3:85 as follows: "And whoso seeketh as religion other than the
Surrender (to Allah) it will not be accepted from him, and he will be a loser in the Hereafter." THE
GLORIOUS QUR'AN: TEXT AND EXPLANATORY TRANSLATION 3:85 (Mohammad M. Pickthall trans., no
date given) [hereinafter GQ]. Pickthall's translation of the word "Islam" as "Surrender" suggests-
consonant with ayah 2:62-that non-Muslims who are faithful to their own religions may properly
surrender to Allah's will, and thus attain salvation. It is difficult to determine which meaning Yusuf Ali
attributes to ayah 3:85, as his translation is mired in ambiguity: "If anyone desires a religion other than
VOL. 33:2
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
faiths can attain salvation, all Muslims agree that they follow the only uncorrupted
scripture, and hence the only faith that is truly in accordance with Allah's will.
Thus, virtually all Muslims agree that their religion demands that they call others
to Islam.96
Islam constitutes "a complete way of life: a religion, an ethic, and a legal
system all in one.'  The guidelines that Islamic scholars have derived from the
Qur'an and Sunnah (the sayings and traditions of Muhammad) are quite extensive,
and can reach virtually every aspect of a believer's life. For example, in the course
of a single book, a prominent Saudi religious scholar decreed, among many other
things, that growing a beard is obligatory for Muslim men,98 that Muslims should
not listen to music or songs,99 that men should not hold their wives' hands outside
the home, °° and that "[h]andclapping and whistling are abominable acts which one
should abandon."'' While these rulings by no means represent consensus views
among Islamic scholars, they provide some indication of how far-reaching Islam's
strictures can be. The system of Islamic law that is derived from the Qur'an and
Islam (submission to Allah), never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the
ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good)." HQ, supra note 92, 3:85. Yusuf Ali translates the
word "Islam" literally, but his parenthetical clarification that Islam signifies "submission to Allah"
leaves room for Pickthall's more liberal interpretation. In no way does Yusuf Ali's explanatory
footnote clarify the point:
The Muslim position is clear: The Muslim does not claim to have a religion peculiar to
himself. Islam is not a sect or an ethnic religion. In its view all Religion is one, for the
Truth is one. It was the religion preached by all the earlier prophets. It was the truth
taught by all the inspired Books. In essence it amounts to a consciousness of the Will and
Plan of Allah and a joyful submission to that Will and Plan. If anyone wants a religion
other than that, he is false to his own nature, as he is false to Allah's Will and Plan. Such
a one cannot expect guidance, for he has deliberately renounced guidance.
Id. at 150 n.418. Yusuf Ali's statement simultaneously implies both that spiritual truth can be found in
faiths other than Islam because "all Religion is one, for the Truth is one," and also that those people
who reject the "Will and Plan of Allah" and stubbornly adhere to non-Islamic faiths are "false to
Allah's Will and Plan," and thus have "deliberately renounced guidance."
96. See Ali Khan, Islam as Intellectual Property: "My Lord! Increase Me in Knowledge", 31
CuMB. L. REv. 631, 669-73 (2001-2002) (outlining the principle of invitation in Islam); see also infra
Parts III.A.4, III.B.3.
97. J.N.D. ANDERSON, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD ix (1975); see also MUHAMMAD
BIN JAMIL ZNO, ISLAMIC GUIDELINES FOR INDIVIDUAL AND SOCLAL REFORM 12-13 (Ibrahim M. Kunna
trans., 1996).
98. ZINO, supra note 97, at 142-43. This view is shared by a large number of Islamic religious
scholars. For example, under the Taliban's rule, men could be imprisoned if their beards were too
short. Editorial, Biting the Hands That Feed Them, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2001, at N26; Former Taliban
Leader Arrested, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 2003, at A7.
99. ZNo, supra note 97, at 144-46. The Taliban banned music, as well as most other forms of
light entertainment, during its brutal rule in Afghanistan. See Noor Khan, U.S., Afghan Troops Force
Rebel Retreat; Allies Claim Victory After 9-Day Siege, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, at C3. Similarly, the
artist formerly known as Cat Stevens stopped making music for over twenty years after his conversion
to Islam, "believing that music was un-Islamic." Willis Witter, Music in JalalabadAwaits Official OK,
Hits Shaky Note, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at Al.
100. ZINO, supra note 97, at 127-28.
101. Id. at 150.
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the Prophet's example is called shariah.10 2  Many Muslims hold that those
governments that do not rule according to the principles of shariah are
illegitimate. 103
Since the shariah's inception, many Muslims have viewed it as both
codifying an Islamic sphere of influence and providing mechanisms for the
expansion of this sphere. Muslims have sought to protect this perceived sphere of
influence against competition from other religions, secularism, and rival Islamic
sects. This Part first discusses the doctrinal origins and historical usage of the
Islamic sphere of influence, and then discusses how the Islamic sphere of influence
is preserved and expanded today. Because a number of histories of Islam are
available, 1°4 I do not attempt to comprehensively outline the history of the faith.
Instead, my more narrow focus is on the perception that an Islamic sphere of
influence exists.
A. Doctrinal Origins and Historical Usage of the Islamic Sphere of Influence
Since the time of Muhammad, the Islamic faith has been tied to the state.
During his lifetime, Muhammad came to serve as the head of a powerful state. As
a ruler, he outlined a number of principles that established an Islamic sphere of
influence. Based on Muhammad's teachings, Islamic scholars have long divided
into the world into two spheres: the dar al-Harb ("home of war") and the dar al-
Islam ("homestead of Islam"). 10 5 Since the inception of this concept, it has
informed the Islamic view of international law by conceptually dividing those
lands that are consecrated to Islam from the lands that are dominated by
102. Technically, the law that is derived by man is calledfiqh, whereas the ideal law (which man
may not be able to discern completely) is shariah. However, this article generically refers to attempts
to implement Islamic law as shariah, because that is the sense in which the term is popularly
understood.
103. See ABU AMEENAH BILAL PHILIPS, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TAWHEED (ISLAMIC
MONOTHEISM) 26 (1990) ("The acceptance of non-Islamic rule in place of Sharee 'ah in Muslim lands
is Shirk [polytheism] and an act of Kufr [disbelief] .... [U]n-Islamic government must be sincerely
hated and despised for the pleasure of God and the upholding of Tawheed [Islamic monotheism]."); see
also KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 169 (2000), for a description of the views of
Sayyid Qutb; Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt:
The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 96
(1998) (describing Qutb as "extremely influential").
104. For general histories of Islam, see ARMSTRONG, supra note 103; JONATHAN BLOOM & SHEILA
BLAIR, ISLAM: A THOUSAND YEARS OF FAITH AND POWER (2000); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE
STRAIGHT PATH (3d ed. 1998). For histories of Shiite Islam, see generally SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, THE
SHADOW OF GOD AND THE HIDDEN IMAM: RELIGION, POLITICAL ORDER, AND SOCIETAL CHANGE IN
SHI'ITE IRAN FROM THE BEGINNING TO 1890 (1984); MOOJAN MOMEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI'I
ISLAM (1985). For biographies of Muhammad, see generally MICHAEL COOK, MUHAMMAD (1983);
MARTIN LINGS, MUHAMMAD: HIS LIFE BASED ON THE EARLIEST SOURCES (1983); W. MONTGOMERY
WATT, MUHAMMAD: PROPHET AND STATESMAN (1961). For histories of the Arab world, see generally
ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES (1991); PETER MANSFIELD, A HISTORY OF THE
MIDDLE EAST (1991).
105. For an explanation of the concepts of dar al-Harb and dar al-Islam, see Father David-Maria
A. Jaeger, The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel: A New Legal
Regime of Church-State Relations, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 427, 430 (1998). This concept is discussed at
length in Part III.A.1, infra.
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unbelievers.
Muhammad's pronouncements continue to inform and even dictate Muslims'
views on proper Islamic governance and on the relations between their religion and
other faiths. This is because, in Muslims' view, Muhammad received revelations
directly from Allah, and the manner in which Muhammad governed was divinely
inspired. Muslims believe Muhammad to be the perfect man of his generation.
10 6
Thus, many Muslims will carefully pore over the Qur'an and hadith (reports on the
sayings and traditions of Muhammad) before formulating their views on any given
subject.10 7 Most Muslims are especially attentive to Muhammad's views on
political matters.
The linkage between the Islamic faith and the state continued, and even
intensified, following Muhammad's death. One commentator has explained that
the faith went through "several stages during its development, evolving from a
mere city-state (the Medinan period, A.D. 622-32), into a young empire (632-750),
and then into an aspiring world hegemon (750-c.900)."' ' Eventually the West's
political, military, and economic strength came to surpass that of the Islamic
world, and Islam experienced "a period of decentralization (c.900-c.1500), and a
period of outright fragmentation. ' 1° 9 However, throughout these divergent stages
of Islam's history--even while most of the Muslim world was colonized by the
European powers-Muslims continued to perceive a linkage between their faith
and the state, and continued to believe that Islam possessed a geographical sphere
of influence.
A number of mechanisms have been relied upon historically to preserve and
expand this sphere of influence. This section first discusses the concepts of dar al-
Harb and dar al-Islam, which provide the theological justification for the
maintenance and expansion of an Islamic sphere of influence. It then discusses
three major tactics that Muslims have used to both preserve and expand the dar al-
Islam: jihad (military force), the imposition of shariah law, and spreading the faith
through da 'wah (Islamic proselytism).
1. Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam
The central theological concept that defines the Islamic sphere of influence is
the notion that the world is divided into the dar al-Harb and the dar al-Islam. "In
the classical view, the term Dar al-Islam describes those places in the world where
the Shari'ah, the corpus of Islamic law, prevails and is enforced."'1t0 In this view,
the rest of the world, "except those places where a peace treaty with the Muslims is
in place," is considered a part of the dar al-Harb."' The rationale for the
106. KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD 238 (1993).
107. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for examples of the broad scope that Islamic
religious decrees can have.
108. Christopher A. Ford, Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Law and Islam's
Constitutional Crisis, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 499,513 (1995).
109. Id.
110. Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal
History, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 299, 300 n.6 (2003).
111. Id.; see also Khan, supra note 7, at 323, which notes that the dar al-Harb is comprised of
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distinction between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-Harb "is that those living
within the realm of believers exist on a significantly advantageous religious plane
compared to those who do not. Consequently, there is a constant political and
religious preoccupation with trying to make the world more advantageous for
Muslims. ' 112 Classical Islamic jurists generally believed that the dar al-Harb was
only temporarily outside Islamic rule, and was "yet to make its submission."'
1 3
Classical jurists thus viewed the world as "a battleground" between these two
separate spheres.' 14 The classical jurists would authorize jihad to either extend or
protect the dar al-Islam, but only if there was "a reasonable prospect of
success."
115
Other implications that these jurists derived from the division of the world
into dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb illustrate the stark conflict that they perceived
between these two spheres. For example, the classical jurists held that it was "not
possible for a Muslim to live a good Muslim life in an infidel land."'1 6 Those non-
believers who saw the light and became Muslim, as well as Muslims who resided
in a formerly Islamic country that was conquered by infidels (for example, those
who lived in Spain immediately following the reconquista), were required to
emigrate from the non-Muslim country where they lived to the dar al-Islam." 
7
The dar al-Harb-dar al-Islam distinction clearly endorses the view that the
world is divided into religious spheres of influence. Most of the strategies for the
faith's expansion that have been codified in Islamic jurisprudence flow from the
division of the world into dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb. This article now turns to
an examination of such strategies.
2. Jihad
Jihad is currently a very controversial concept in the West. While fihad is
Arabic for "struggle," the word is often translated as "holy war.'" 8 Some recent
lands that are "dominated by unbelievers."
112. Khan, supra note 7, at 324.
113. Jaeger, supra note 105, at 430; but see HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR?: WAR,
PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2001)
("[T]erritory can be considered dar al-Islam even if it is not under Muslim rule as long as a Muslim can
reside there in safety and freely fulfill his religious obligations.").
114. Donna E. Arzt, The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda, 8
BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 15, 22 (2002).
115. CYRIL GLASSE, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 209-10 (1989); cf supra note 51 and
accompanying text. However, some jurisprudential schools held that jihad should only be invoked
defensively. "Early scholars such as Abu Hanifa and Shaybani, who stressed tolerance toward non-
believers, 'made no explicit declarations that the jihad was a war to be waged against non-Muslims
solely on the grounds of disbelief.' Arzt, supra note 114, at 22; cf supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
116. BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG?: THE CLASH BETWEEN ISLAM AND MODERNITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 36 (2002).
117. Id.
118. See Ford, supra note 108, at 502; J.M.B. Porter, Osama bin-Laden, Jihad, and the Sources of
International Terrorism, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 871, 872 (2003); Frank Vogel, Book Review,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 227 (1989) (reviewing HASAN MOINUDDIN, THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER STATES
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scholarship has been quite critical of both the concept ofjihad and also the manner
in which jihad has been carried out against non-Muslim lands." 9 On the other
hand, some authors insist that "holy war" is a mistranslation, and thatjihad is a far
less militant concept than the West fears.'
20
However, a powerful interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah exists which
holds that believers are obligated to fight for Allah's cause (which, for some
Muslims, includes wars of expansion designed to establish states governed by the
shariah). In assessing the manner in which some Muslims perceive an Islamic
sphere of influence, it is important to understand this interpretation of jihad.
Sheikh bin Humaid, the former Chief Justice of Saudi Arabia, has authored a
widely distributed essay that forcefully advances this view.' 21 In it, Chief Justice
bin Humaid concisely outlines his view of the three historical phases of jihad in
Islamic jurisprudence: "[A]t first 'the fighting' was forbidden, then it was
permitted, and after that it was made obligatory-(l) against them who start 'the
fighting' against you (Muslims)... (2) and against all those who worship others
along with Allah.'
122
Chief Justice bin Humaid's assertion that armed jihad was originally
forbidden refers to the early part of Muhammad's prophethood, when Muhammad
and his followers lacked political and military strength. During this period, when
Muhammad's followers encountered persecution at the hands of the powerful tribe
of Qureysh in Mecca, their faith prevented them from responding militarily.
Rather than fighting the Qureysh, Muhammad and his followers fled from Mecca
to Medina.
23
After the Muslims relocated to Medina, they gained in political and military
strength. Thereafter, Muslims believe that Muhammad received further revelations
permitting fighting against the Qureysh. It is upon these later ayat (verses) that
Chief Justice bin Humaid bases his argument that jihad was later made permissible
for believers. Surah 22, ayah 39 states: "Permission to fight (against disbelievers)
is given to those (believers) who are fought against, because they have been
wronged; and surely, Allah is Able to give them (believers) victory."' 24 The next
(1987)).
119. See, e.g., PAUL FREGOSI, JIHAD IN THE WEST: MUSLIM CONQUESTS FROM THE 7TH TO THE 21ST
CENTURIES (1998); SPENCER, supra note 1.
120. See, e.g., Anthony Day, Morality, War: Do They Mix?; As Americans Search Their Souls for
Answers, Some Religious Leaders Question Whether There Can Ever be a 'Just War' When Modern
Warfare Can be So Terribly Destructive, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1991, at Al (quoting Maher Hathout);
Hussein S. Elkhansa, What We Believe: Understanding Islam, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), May
7, 2000, at 4C; Raheel Raza, Pilgrimage a Time to Pray for the Blessing of Peace, TORONTO STAR,
May 11, 1995, at A29. See also infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (explaining non-military
meanings of jihad).
121. Sheikh 'Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Humaid, The Call to Jihad (Holy Fighting in Allah's
Cause) in the Qur 'an, reprinted in NQ, supra note 92, at 1224.
122. Id. at 1227.
123. This flight, known as the Hijra, also marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. See Abdal-
Haqq, supra note 87, at 37 n.45; M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shariah: Sources,
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, I UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 139 n.6 (2002).
124. NQ, supra note 92, 22:39.
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ayah states that fighting is also permitted for "[t]hose who have been expelled
from their homes unjustly only because they said: 'Our Lord is Allah.' 12 5 Thus,
after these verses were revealed, fighting against unbelievers was permitted for
Muslims who were either fought against by unbelievers or who had been expelled
from their homes because of their adherence to Islam.
Finally, Chief Justice bin Humaid argues that jihad was eventually made
obligatory for all Muslims, and that the previous strictures delimiting the
conditions for battle against unbelievers were broadened. He points to two
Qur'anic verses that were revealed late in Muhammad's life. The first enjoins
Muslims to "fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you. ' 126 And ayah 9:29
states:
Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor
forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger... (4) and
those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e. Islam) among the people of
the Scripture (Jews and Christians), until they pay the Jizyah with willing
submission, and feel themselves subdued.'
27
The language employed by these two later ayat is markedly different from
that employed in Surah 22, where Chief Justice bin Humaid argues that "'the
fighting'... was permitted," but not made obligatory.1 28 The two ayat from Surah
22 use permissive language indicating the circumstances in which believers may
fight against unbelievers. In contrast, the two later ayat are written in the
imperative tense. According to Chief Justice bin Humaid, this difference in
language indicates that believers do not simply have the option to fight against
unbelievers when the requisite circumstances have been satisfied. Rather, he
argues that Muslims have the affirmative duty to engage in jihad against
unbelievers when the unbelievers fight against them (ayah 2:190), and when
unbelievers refuse to believe in Allah and the Last Day, accept Islamic shariah,
and pay the jizya (ayah 9:29).129 Hence, Chief Justice bin Humaid implores his
readers: "Jihad is a great deed indeed and there is no deed whose reward or
blessing is as that of it, and for this reason, it is the best thing that one can
volunteer for.",
130
These verses have also led other Muslim ideologues to conclude that Islamic
wars of expansion fall squarely within the believer's obligation to participate in
jihad. Sayyid Qutb, for example, concluded from ayah 9:29 "that waging jihad
against the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) is a permanent, communal
125. Id. 22:40.
126. Id. 2:190. The reason that a verse revealed late in Muhammad's prophethood is found in the
second Surah is that the Qur'an is not arranged chronologically. The codified text's only organizational
system is placing the longest surahs before the shortest. See I MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 343, 353 (1997).
127. NQ, supra note 92, 9:29.
128. Bin Humaid, supra note 121, at 1227.
129. For a description of thejizya, see infra Part II.A.3.
130. Bin Humaid, supra note 121, at 1233.
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obligation upon the Muslims."
'13
Not all Muslims share this militant exegesis. A recent book by Hilmi M.
Zawati, for example, argues that "jihad is a just, defensive, and exceptional form of
warfare geared... to secure justice and equality among all people.' 32  Other
commentators de-emphasize the military meaning of jihad, and point out that
"[j]ihad can be accomplished by '[t]he heart, the tongue, and the hands, as well as
the sword."" 133  Similarly, Imam Muhammad Armiya Nu'Man has stated that
"[j]ihad... deals with the struggles within yourself, more than war with others."'
' 34
Imam Nu'Man's statement is based on a distinction that some scholars make
between "lesser jihad," or religious warfare, and "greater jihad," which is "the
warfare in oneself against any evil or temptation."' 35 This distinction between
greater and lesserjihad derives from a hadith in which Muhammad observed as he
and his followers were returning from a battle: "We return from the lesser jihad to
the greater jihad.' 36 The hadith implies that the struggle for one's soul is more
difficult and more important than struggles on the battlefield.
While there is some controversy on this point,1 37 it appears that after
Muhammad's death, the early Muslim leadership shared Chief Justice bin
Humaid's view that one important purpose offihad was expansion of the dar al-
Islam. In his history of Christianity, Brian Moynahan comprehensively outlines
the progress of the Muslim wars of expansion. He explains that "[t]he early
campaigns were aimed at winning complete control of Arabia and dominance over
the nomadic tribes on its Iraqi and Syrian borders."' 138 Thereafter, the Muslims
pressed westward. The resulting military confrontations represent the first Islamic
intrusion into the Christian sphere of influence. Islamic armies succeeded in
conquering such formerly Christian lands as Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North
131. Sherman A. Jackson, Jihad in the Modern World: To 'Abd al-Karim Salabuddin, J. ISLAMIC
L. & CULTURE 1, 22-24 (2002).
132. ZAWATI, supra note 113, at 4. For two compelling critiques of Zawati's book, see generally
Nishita Doshi, Book Note, 38 STAN. J INT'L L. 319 (2002) (reviewing ZAWATI, supra note 113); Mairaj
U. Syed, Book Note, Islamic Law and the Apologetics of Jihad: A Review of Is Jihad a Just War?, 2
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 155 (2002-2003).
133. Andrew Paine, Note, Religious Fundamentalism and Legal Systems: Methods and Rationales
in the Fight to Control the Political Apparatus, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 263, 280 (1997) (quoting
Ford, supra note 108, at 502); see also Aliya Haider, The Rhetoric of Resistance: Islamism, Modernity,
and Globalization, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 118-19 (2002) (arguing that "holy war" is a
mistranslation that "reveals a critical misunderstanding of what is going on 'over there' in the so-called
hotbeds of Islamist unrest"); Lance S. Lehnhof, Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of
Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, 2002 BYU L.
REV. 561, 575 (2002) ("The most common definition of jihad is a struggle, usually a struggle for
justice, righteousness, or a better way of life.").
134. IMAM MUHAMMAD ARMYA NU'MAN, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
ISLAM & THE MUSLIMS 17 (1985).
135. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 501 (John Bowker ed., 1997).
136. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 28 (2002). This
hadith is regarded by Muslim scholars as "weak," or of questionable authenticity.
137. For a dissenting view, see ARMSTRONG, supra note 103, at 29.
138. BRIAN MOYNAHAN, THE FAITH: A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 162 (2002).
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Africa.
1 39
One factor aiding this conquest was the fact that the Christian world was at
the time deeply divided over questions of Christology, and this division often led
the Christian state to brutally impose orthodoxy upon its subjects. 140 Because of
this repression, many Eastern Christians actually celebrated when Muslim armies
arrived because they believed that Muslim control would free them from the
persecution they had endured for their beliefs under Roman rule. 141 The Muslim
armies were perceived as tolerant because they did not initially destroy churches,
nor did they become involved in Christian theological quarrels. In fact, this
projected tolerance may have been another tool to help expand the Muslim sphere
of influence. Moynahan suggests that the Islamic "victories came from deep
insight as much as military brilliance," as the Muslim conquerors successfully
"used toleration and taxation as weapons, the first to secure easy surrender, the
second to finance further conquest and swell their numbers by stimulating"
conversion to Islam.1
42
After conquering the Middle East and North Africa in the seventh century,
Muslim armies gained a foothold in Europe in the eighth century. Using North
Africa as a launching point, they conquered Spain and Portugal, and invaded
France.43 "[I1n the ninth century they conquered Sicily and invaded the Italian
mainland."' 144 Centuries later, Muslim armies also swept through eastern Europe.
In fact, it was the Turkish threat that prompted Byzantine emperor Alexius
Comnenus I to appeal to Rome for military help, thus prompting the Crusades.
145
Thereafter, Muslim forces managed to overrun the Balkan peninsula, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and even Constantinople.
146
Although Muslim forces-in the form of the Ottomans-continued to be a
major power in Europe until late in the seventeenth century, the West gained in
political, military, and economic strength, and eventually came to far outstrip the
Islamic world's power.147 Today, Islamic states themselves pose little military
threat to the West. Instead, the biggest military threats emanating from the Muslim
world are terrorist cells and small, dedicated groups of holy warriors (mujahideen)
who engage in armed combat throughout the globe.
148
3. The Imposition of Shariah Law
When Muslim armies conquered non-Muslim lands, they would establish a
new government ruled by shariah law. There was both an offensive and defensive
139. LEWIS, supra note 116, at 4.
140. These controversies concerning questions of Christology, and the resultant state repression,
are discussed in infra Part IV.A.
141. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 157-58.
142. Id. at 159. The system of taxation that Moynahan mentions is discussed in infra Part III.A.3.
143. LEWIS, supra note 116, at 4.
144. Id.
145. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 103, at 95.
146. Id. at 109-11.
147. See LEWIS, supra note 116, at 16-17.
148. See infra Part 1II.B. 1.
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aspect to the manner in which shariah law bolstered the Islamic sphere of
influence. Offensively, it provided material incentives for non-Muslims to convert
to Islam. Defensively, the shariah politically disempowered non-Muslims, thus
preventing them from gaining strength.
The implementation of shariah law ensured that non-Muslims "became
inferior subjects, and visibly so.' 49 The treatment of non-Muslims under Islamic
rule depended on whether they were characterized as "People of the Book," whose
faith was based on what Muslims believed to be revealed (albeit corrupted)
scriptures150 Under shariah law, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabians
generally were considered People of the Book. 5' When Muslims conquered the
cities of People of the Book, they would present the inhabitants with the choice of
either continuing to adhere to their old faith or embracing Islam. Those who
retained their own faith were characterized as dhimmis (people under contract or
guarantee from the Islamic state). 5 2 Under the shariah, dhimmis were largely free
to practice their religion, and were free from pressure to convert under threat of
force. Other freedoms that dhimmis enjoyed "included protection from desecration
of their holy sites and autonomy in appointment of religious leaders, as well as
juridical autonomy in civil matters and equality with Muslims of punishment and
restitution in criminal matters."'5
3
Despite these freedoms, shariah law provided a number of material incentives
for dhimmis to convert to Islam, and ensured that dhimmis remained politically
disempowered. Dhimmis were forced to pay the jizya (poll tax) and also land
taxes. 154 The jizya served as a financial incentive for dhimmis to embrace Islam,
and Muslim citizens independently attempted to propagate their faith among the
dhimmis through da'wah.15 However, this process of conversion worked in one
direction only: Shariah law prohibited dhimmis from attempting to convert
Muslims to their religion.1 56  Any illicit attempts at proselytism that dhimmis
149. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171.
150. Carolyn Ratner, Book Review, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 137, 151 (1998) (reviewing JUDITH
MILLER, GOD HAS NINETY-NINE NAMES (1996)) (noting that People of the Book were "believers in
other religions which are deemed to have had a heavenly-revealed scripture"); see also Asani, supra
note 94, at 43-44; James David Phipps, Kiss of Death: Application of Title VI's Prohibition Against
Religious Discrimination in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1994 BYU L. REV. 399, 406 (1994).
151. Arzt, supra note 114, at 25; see also Esack, supra note 94, at 546 ("At various times, Hindus,
Buddhists, Zoroastrians, Magians and Sabeans were included among or excluded from the People of the
Book, depending on the theological predilections of the Muslim scholars and, perhaps more
importantly, the geo-political context in which they lived.").
152. For a more extended treatments ofdhimmis, see A.S. TRITTON, THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-
MUSLIM SUBJECTS: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE COVENANT OF UMAR (1970); BAT YE'OR, THE
DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (David Maisel et al. trans., 1985).
153. Arzt, supra note 114, at 26.
154. Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 349, 380 n.126 (1996); Dr. Moussa Abou Ramadan, The Transition from Tradition to Reform: The
Shari'a Appeals Court Rulings on Child Custody (1992-2001), 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 595, 601 n.30
(2003).
155. Arzt, supra note 114, at 25.
156. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171.
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engaged in were further frustrated by the fact that virtually all Islamic states
historically imposed anti-apostasy laws on their Muslim citizens, even while non-
Muslims were encouraged to convert to Islam. For approximately twelve
centuries, the penalty for conversion out of Islam was death in most Muslim
states. '57
Moynahan explains that Christian dhimmis typically faced a number of other
legal restrictions under Islamic rule:
They were not allowed to ride horses, a social humiliation and a military
precaution, for it was folly for a horseless person to contemplate revolt. Their
church bells were tolled softly, if at all, lest they offend Moslem ears. No cross
could be displayed in public; neither could a pig nor a glass of wine. No
Christian building could be higher than those of Moslems, no pomp could
accompany a Christian funeral. A Christian was required to respect the Koran
and never speak ill of Islam or Muhammad; he was forbidden to marry or be
intimate with Moslem women.... Provided he kept to these ground rule... the
Christian enjoyed the protection offered to dhimmis. 158
The combination of the jizya, the prohibition on proselytization by dhimmis,
anti-apostasy laws, and the visible social humiliations imposed on dhimmis were a
ringing success in driving Christians to convert to Islam. The fall injizya receipts
in both Mesopotamia and Egypt after Muslim conquests demonstrates the large
number of Christian apostates.15 9
Certain non-Muslims in lands that Muslim armies conquered could not be
categorized as People of the Book. For example, Muslims did not regard
polytheists and idolators as People of the Book.160 Those non-Muslims who were
not classified as People of the Book faced far greater restrictions under Islamic
rule. Unlike dhimmis, they were not given the option of continuing to practice
their own religion. Instead, they were given only three choices: "slavery,
conversion to Islam, or death.''
Not only did the system of shariah law entrench the Islamic sphere of
influence in conquered lands, but it also provided the engine for further expansion.
Moynahan notes that the jizya financed further incursions into Christian territory,
as "[t]he Dome of the Rock... the shimmering mosque soon built on the site of
Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem, was said to have cost seven years' revenue from
conquered Christian Egypt."'
162
157. See ABUL ALA MAWDUDI, THE PUNISHMENT OF THE APOSTATE ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC LAW
17 (Syed Silas Husain & Ernest Hahn trans., 1994).
158. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171; see also Arzt, supra note 114, at 27 ("Dhimmis ... were
forbidden to ... walk in the middle of the street, to sell their books or religious articles in marketplaces,
to raise their voices during worship .... ").
159. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 166, 181.
160. Arzt, supra note 114, at 27.
161. Id.; see also NQ, supra note 92, 9:5.
162. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 171.
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Thus, the implementation of shariah law has historically served to define a
state as Islamic in character, and to consecrate that state as part of the Muslim
sphere of influence. The shariah would bolster Islam's power within that state by
providing incentives for non-Muslims to convert to Islam and ensuring that non-
Muslims could not threaten the state's Islamic character.
4. Da'wah
Da'wah is the Arabic word that denotes invitation to Islam-essentially,
da 'wah is the equivalent of Christian missionary work. 163 Da 'wah has long been
an important tool for spreading Islam. In fact, Muhammad relied exclusively on
da 'wah to spread the faith during his early years in Mecca, as well as early in his
tenure in Medina.
The most important ayah relating to da 'wah states: "Invite (all) to the Way of
thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that
are best and most gracious; for thy Lord knoweth best, who have strayed from His
Path, and who receive guidance."' 64  From this verse, Ali Khan divines three
distinct rules governing da'wah. First, he states that da'wah must be "an
invitation, not a forced initiation.'' 65 His pronouncement that invitees must come
to Islam voluntarily is consonant with ayah 2:256, which provides that there shall
be "no compulsion in religion."' 66 Second, Khan finds that "da'wah mandates
wisdom and fair preaching."'167 He states that the invitor "is prohibited from
presenting a distorted or pandering picture" of Islam-for example, by
highlighting only the benefits of the faith without "mentioning the corresponding
obligations."'168 Third, Khan finds that the invitee's ultimate decision regarding
whether to accept Islam lies with Allah: "No human effort, without the will of
God, can succeed in matters of faith.' 69
Furthermore, Khan explains that specific strictures within the Islamic faith
dictate the manner in which da 'wah should be conducted:
Related to da'wah are the manners of discourse that the invitor must observe in
introducing Islam to the invitee. The Shari'a prohibits excessive argumentation
or impolite criticism of others' beliefs. The Quran states rather candidly that
when an invitee begins to ridicule God's message, the invitor must leave the
163. Abdul Rahman I. Doi, Proselytism and Islam in Southern Africa, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1147, 1147 (2000); Jorgen S. Nielsen, Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Islam,
2002 BYU L. REv. 353, 366 (2002).
164. HQ, supra note 92, 16:125. Daw'ah is also discussed in ayah 3:64, which states:
Say: "0 People of the Book! come to common terms as between us and you: That we
worship none but Allah; that we associate no partners with Him; that we erect not, from
among ourselves, lords and patrons other than Allah." If then they turn back, say ye:
"Bear witness that we (at least) are Muslims (bowing to Allah's will)."
Id. 3:64.
165. Khan, supra note 96, at 670.
166. HQ, supra note 92, 2:256. For commentary on this verse, see, e.g., Asani, supra note 94, at
45; Mohamed Nimer, Muslims in America After 9-11, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 16 (2002-2003).
167. Khan, supra note 96, at 670.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 671; see also HQ, supra note 92, 10:99-100, 72:21.
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company and not engage in a nasty or hurtful conversation. The Sunna also
prohibits annoying questions in matters of faith. Thus, da'wah is not a contest
for winning an intellectual debate. It is a sincere invitation to Islam, a positive
message that does not vilify other religions.17
0
Da'wah has historically been used not only to convince individuals to
embrace Islam, but also to dramatically expand the perceived Muslim sphere of
influence. One example is Malaysia, where Karen Armstrong writes: "Muslim
merchants, every one a missionary for the faith, had settled... at a time when
Buddhist trade had collapsed there, and soon enjoyed immense prestige. Sufi
preachers followed the businessmen, and by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
Malaya was predominantly Muslim." 7 '
B. Contemporary Defense of the Islamic Sphere of Influence
The September 11 attacks revealed and intensified deep schisms within
contemporary Islam. Many Muslims would agree with Islamic scholar Khaled
Abou El Fad] that their co-religionists have, by and large, "lost touch with the
thoughtful, pluralistic, introspective faith of the past.' 72 Even before 9/11, liberal
and reform-minded Muslims had been challenging conservative Islamic
interpretations of the mechanisms used to promote the Islamic sphere of
influence.17 3  The 9/11 attacks helped to provide reformist Muslims with the
impetus they needed; since then, such groups as Free Muslims Against
Terrorism174 have launched bold and comprehensive critiques of the radicalism
within their faith.
Thus, an explosive and crucially important debate is currently occurring
among Muslims about the proper relationship between Islam and the West, and
Islam's compatibility with democracy and modernity. Even the idea that the world
is divided into dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb has come under some attack.1
75
However, the idea that the world is divided into dar al-Harb and dar al-Islam
is far from dead. Most conservative Muslims' conceptions of international affairs
are still shaped by the dar al-Islam-dar al-Harb distinction. And even Muslims
who are inclined to reject this division of the world are uncomfortable with actions
by non-Muslims that would traditionally be regarded as intrusions into the dar al-
Islam, such as the organized missionary efforts that followed the United States'
170. Khan, supra note 96, at 672.
171. ARMSTRONG, supra note 103, at 110.
172. Jane Eisner, Muslims Find a Haven in U.S., PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 4, 2002, LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
173. For examples of challenges by liberal Muslims that preceded the September 11 th attacks, see
generally AN-NA'IM, supra note 91, and FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM & MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION
OF AN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION (1982).
174. The website of Free Muslims Against Terrorism can be found at http://www.freemuslims.org
(last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
175. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 7, at 323-25; Ihsan Yilmaz, The Challenge of Post-Modern
Legality and Muslim Legal Pluralism in England, 28 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES 347 (Apr.
2002) ("[M]ost Muslim community leaders in Europe today regard the concepts of dar al-harb and dar
al-Islam as irrelevant in the present-day context.").
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toppling of both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime.
176
What will come of the vital struggle for the soul of Islam remains to be seen.
However, at present, the Same mechanisms that historically have been used to
preserve and expand the Islamic sphere of influence are still utilized today. This
section now examines the contemporary use of the mechanisms for strengthening
the dar al-Islam.
1. Jihad
While the Islamic state once engaged in frequent wars of expansion designed
to spread the faith throughout the world, Muslim states do not do so today.
177
Today, small but dedicated groups of Islamic warriors who have been engaged in
combat throughout the globe since long before 9/11 have taken up the mantle of
radical jihad.
Al-Qaeda is one such group, but many others exist. In general, these groups
share the common goal of toppling secular governments and replacing them with
Islamic regimes. For example, in the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), a group that claims up to 12,000 guerillas, has been fighting to
establish an Islamic state for twenty-five years.178 It has been reported that "[u]ntil
Philippine troops in 2000 overran [MILF's] major training base, Camp Abu Bakar,
the facility served as a kind of mini-Afghanistan, training militants from across
Southeast Asia.' 79  MILF is joined in the Philippines by Abu Sayyaf, another
insurgent Filipino group that "purports to have an Islamist agenda but has
descended into criminal gangs of kidnappers and thieves."' 80 Abu Sayyaf gained
notoriety in 2001 when it kidnapped American missionary couple Gracia and
Martin Burnham.'
81
176. See Muzaffar, supra note 4.
177. This fact may not represent an ideological shift so much as it reflects Muslim states' military
weakness vis-A-vis the West. For example, with its weak military, see Michael Levi, Royal Pain, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 2, 2003, at 14, Saudi Arabia would be hard pressed to fight a war of expansion.
Nonetheless, Islamic charities financed by the Saudi regime have actively propagated the notion that
Muslims have a duty to engage in jihad for the purpose of expanding the dar al-Islam. See generally
GOLD, supra note 7.
178. See David E. Kaplan et al., The Shadow Over the Summit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20,
2003, at 29; Philippines President Says al-Ghozi Shot Dead, a "Warning to Terrorists," AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 13, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
179. Kaplan et al., supra note 178, at 29.
180. Id. In a similar vein, the Korea Herald described Abu Sayyaf as "little more than a criminal
gang specializing in kidnappings and beheadings, with only tangential connections to international
terrorism." Powell's Visit to Southeast Asia at Crucial Time, KOREA HERALD, July 24, 2002, at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. Regardless of the questionable strength of Abu Sayafs
present connections to terrorism, its terrorist links in the mid-1990s are indisputable. Peter Bergen
explains that in 1994 Islamist militants "collaborated with Abu Sayyaf ... on a plan to blow up eleven
passenger jets and to assassinate Pope John Paul I1 on his visit to the Philippines." PETER L. BERGEN,
HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN LADEN 222 (2001). These plots were
discovered when authorities seized 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef's laptop computer
after a failed explosives experiment in his Manila apartment. Id.
181. Philippines Loses 300,000 Dlrs in Failed "Sting" of Abu Sayyaf Kidnappers, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 23, 2003, News Library, News Group File, Martin Burnham was killed in a
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Another prominent example of these contemporary holy warriors can be seen
in the current conflict in Chechnya. The Chechens originally battled Russia in a
war of independence between 1994 and 1996.182 "Islam became a rallying cry in
Chechnya's 1994-95 war for independence, but was not a driving force."'
8 3
However, after Chechen military victories in that war earned them de facto
independence, the conservative Wahhabi sect gained political power in Chechnya.
In early 1999, Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov was pressured to introduce
shariah law.'8 4 Later that year, a series of apartment bombings in Russia were
blamed on Islamist militants, and a Chechen warlord twice invaded the Russian
province of Dagestan in an attempt to establish an Islamic state.' 8 5  The
combination of the bombings and attacks on Dagestan caused Russian troops to
reenter the region, thus igniting the current Chechen conflict.
The Chechen conflict illustrates the linkages between international jihadist
groups. Few international Islamists were involved in Chechnya's 1994-96 war of
independence; most of the international Islamists who signed on did so as a result
of the Russian military's brutality in pursuing the campaign.8 6 However, when
new hostilities broke out between Russia and the Chechens in 1999, the casus belli
was an attempt to establish an Islamic state, a goal that resonated with international
jihadist groups. Hence, Chechnya experienced a "massive influx of foreigners that
one could reasonably call terrorists from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and other
Middle Eastern states."' 8 7 These foreign fighters came to comprise an important
part of the Chechen rebels' forces.
rescue attempt on June 7, 2002. Id.; see also Bruce Finley, Kidnapping a Growth Industry: Abduction
Now a Tool of Terror, DENVER POST, July 6, 2003, at Al.
182. See Islamic Court in Chechnya Suspends Parliament, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 25,
1998, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Henry Meyer, New Chechen President Vows "Even
Harsher" Crackdown on Rebels, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 7, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File; Fred Weir, Putin Links Chechnya Bombing to Saudi Blasts, INDEP. (London), May 15,
2003, at 10, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
183. Marshall Ingwerson, Muslims of the Mountains Feel a Rift Over an Islam They Barely Knew,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 21, 1997, at 10.
184. Chechnya 's President Declares Islamic Law, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Feb. 4, 1999,
at A4; Chronology of Events in Chechnya After Collapse of Soviet Union, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 30, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
185. Reese Erlich, Chechens Deny Their Republic is bin Laden Pawn, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2001, at
5C.
Whether the apartment bombings were really the work of Islamist militants is questionable. David
Frum and Richard Perle write:
The Russian government blamed Chechen Islamic terrorists [for the apartment
bombings]-a story that did not seem very convincing even at the time and that became a
whole lot less convincing after a team of Russian secret policemen were caught shortly
afterward planting a large bomb in the basement of an apartment building in Ryazan.
(Their story: They were testing "security measures.")
DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR 264 (2003).
186. Fareed Zakaria, Suicide Bombers Can be Stopped, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 2003, at 57.
187. Georgie Anne Geyer, Moscow Ignoring Chechens' Valid Complaints, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 22, 2003, at A 1l.
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International Islamist groups also operate in many other countries, including
China,'8 8 Indonesia,'89 Thailand,1 90 and Uzbekistan.' 9' These holy warriors seek to
both extend the dar al-Islam in those areas where Islam's sphere of influence
overlaps with Christianity's and also forcibly establish Islam's preeminence within
the dar al-Islam itself. Muslim governments have been seen as legitimate targets
when the jihadists see them as insufficiently Islamic. Thus, for example, Islamist
groups in Egypt have been "engaged in a bloody battle to topple Mubarak's secular
regime and replace it with an Islamic state." 192  Even Saudi Arabia, with its
conservative system of shariah law, has not been safe from the militants' ire.
Journalist Peter Bergen has dubbed Saudi Arabia's misguided foreign policy
"riyalpolitik," wherein the Saudi government seeks to establish its Islamic
legitimacy by funding militant organizations outside its borders. 93  However,
Saudi Arabia's strategy continually backfires because the very groups that Saudi
Arabia funds generally see its government as un-Islamic. 94
These jihadist groups are a significant presence internationally. While the
growing backlash among liberal Muslims against the harsher incarnations of the
faith includes criticism ofjihadist groups,' 95 these groups' critics are often prone to
threats and intimidation. 196 These threats are even more severe when the critics
188. See, e.g., Beijing Links Four "Terrorist" Groups in China to Foreign Countries, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 15, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Derk Kinnane Roelofsma,
Confronting Islamism-2, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 14, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
189. See Doug Bandow, Modern Religious Wars, NAT'L REv., July 17, 2002, LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File (discussing Laskar Jihad); Jane Perlez & James Brooke, Indonesian in Terror
Inquiry Lauds bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A10.
190. See Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network,
CONTEMPORARY S.E. ASIA, Dec. 1, 2002, at 427; Andrew Perrin, Thailand's Terror; Has Thailand's
Muslim-Dominated South Served as a Training and Staging Base for Jihadi Terrorists?, TIME INT'L,
Nov. 25, 2002, at 24.
191. See David Filipov, Terror Crackdown May Push More to Extremism, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
27, 2002, at A28 (describing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as "the most-feared terrorist
organization in Central Asia"); Ottawa Adds 7 to List of Banned Terrorist Groups, EDMONTON SUN
(Alberta, Canada), Apr. 4, 2003, at 47 (discussing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).
192. Mohamad Bazzi, Egypt's War on Islamists; Government Acted Harshly to Crush Terrorist
Movements, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 12, 2001, at A57.
193. BERGEN, supra note 180, at 58-59.
194. Id.
195. Jihadist groups have been particularly prone to criticism by Muslims living in the West. For
examples of criticism by Western Muslims, see, for example, El Fadl, supra note 92. Another example
is Shaykh Hisham Kibbani, chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America. See Alex Alexiev,
The End of an Alliance, NAT'L REV., Oct. 28, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("As early
as 1999, the Naqshbandi leader in America, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, persuasively documented the
threat that Wahhabism posed to America; his warnings were met with vitriolic denunciations by the
Islamic establishment, and indifference on the part of the U.S. government."); Jeff Jacoby, Islam's
Unheard Moderates, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2000, at A13; Stephen Schwartz, Sufi Surfing: Pico Iyer
and the Californication of Mystical Islam, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 22, 2003, LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File ("Here at home, no Islamic leader has been more outspoken, in demanding loyalty on
the part of American Muslims to the United States and its democratic polity, than Sheikh Muhammad
Hisham Kabbani of the Naqshbandi Sufis.").
196. For example, Khaled Abou El Fadl has reported: "Throughout my work, I've met so many
people who sympathize with me who tell me for the sake of my family, please quit speaking out." Rod
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reside within the Islamic sphere of influence.197 The fact that moderates are often
silenced only magnifies the power of groups devoted to the global jihad.
2. The Imposition of Shariah Law
Shariah law is still enforced today in most Muslim states, in one form or
another. Many Muslim states have officially established Islam as their state
religion. 198 This is true even of some Islamic states that are considered secular,
such as Egypt.' 99 Also, many officially secular Muslim states have largely
incorporated the shariah into their legal codes, and politicians are under great
pressure to uphold and enforce it.
The shariah's incorporation can be seen by the fact that proselytism by
minority faiths is explicitly forbidden under the law of most Muslim countries.
The most striking of these legal proscriptions can be found in Saudi Arabia, where
all non-Islamic expressions of religion are illegal. "It is even illegal to wear a
cross necklace, read a Bible, or utter a Christian prayer in the privacy of your own
home. '200  Other Islamic countries that ban proselytism by non-Muslim faiths
include Brunei, 20 1 Comoros,
20 2 Egypt,20 3 Iran,204 Jordan,
205 Kuwait, 20 6 Malaysia,
20 7
Dreher, Inside Islam, NAT'L REV., Jan. 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. See also
Salim Mansur, The Bloody Struggle for Islam's Soul: Battle That Divides Muslims Has Spilled Over
Into a Global War, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 16, 2004, at 16 (explaining that Islamic fundamentalists have
attempted to systematically "intimidate and silence" more liberal Muslims living in the West).
197. See, e.g., David Crumm, Extreme Words Between Muslims, Christians Fuel Fires of Discord,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 3, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("There is no question
that extremists in Pakistan, claiming to act on behalf of Islam, are threatening moderate Muslims as
well as non-Muslims."); Incense, Silk and Jihad, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File (noting that, in Southeast Asia, "extremists ... dominate the news and intimidate
more moderate Muslims"); Fred Nile, Chirac Right to Open Veil Debate, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 22, 2003,
at 7 ("Moderate Muslims are being threatened by fundamentalist Muslims in Iraq, Egypt and
elsewhere.").
198. See, e.g., BANGL. CONST. art. 2A (1972), established by Constitution (Eighth Amendment)
Act No. 30 of 1988, reprinted in Bangl. Gazette Extraordinary (1988); Basic Law of Palestine art. 9
(2002); IRAN CONST. art. 12; KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA CONST. ch. 1, art. I; MOROCCO CONST. art.
6; PAK. CONST art. 2; REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 58 (noting that Islam is the
state religion in Mauritania), 176 (Malaysia); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things:
Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 791, 813 (1995) ("Islam is the state religion in Niger .... "); Toby R. Unger, The Status of the
Arts in an Emerging State of Palestine, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 193, 218 (1997) (noting that "the
majority of Arab states recognize Islam as their state religion").
199. Egypt is generally regarded as a secular country. See, e.g., Cameron Kamran, Iran Could Yet
be a Model for the Mideast, FIN. TIMES (London, England), June 20, 2003, at 21; Jonathan Steele,
Vengeful Fires Burn in Arabian Hearts: A New Generation is Angry and Islamist Terrorism Could
Reap Rewards, OBSERVER (London, England), Apr. 6, 2003, at 7. However, Egypt's Constitution
explicitly makes Islam the country's state religion. EGYPT CONST. art. 2; see also Christy Cutbill
McCormick, Comment, Exporting the First Amendment: America's Response to Religious Persecution
Abroad, 4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 283, 303 (1998) ("Islam is the state religion of Egypt .....
200. SHEA, supra note 13, at 40.
201. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 110.
202. Id. at 17 ("Foreign missionaries work in local hospitals and schools, but they are not allowed
to proselytize.").
203. Issandr el Amrani, Egypt Jails Two Scientologists, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 5, 2002, LEXIS,
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Mauritania, °s Morocco, 0 9 Somalia,1 ° Sudan,211 Uzbekistan,212 and Yemen." 3 In
many Muslim states where proselytizing is not officially forbidden, it is often
officially discouraged.
14
Consistent with Saudi Arabia's ban on all non-Islamic expressions of religion,
conversion out of Islam by Saudi citizens is a capital offense. 2 5  A number of
other Islamic states have also enacted laws prohibiting Muslims from converting to
another religion.2 16 Consistent with the classical implementation of shariah law,
these prohibitions on proselytism and conversion only cut one way. Proselytism of
non-Muslims is not prohibited, nor is it illegal for non-Muslims to convert to
News Library, News Group File (describing restrictions on proselytism in Egypt); Charles Kimball,
Resentment, Not Gospel, Likely to Spread, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), May 5, 2003, at A19; Andrew
Metz, One Egyptian's Junk is Another's Parish; Priest Converts Dump Into a Promised Land for
27,000 Cairo Poor, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Sept. 30, 1994, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
("It is illegal for Christians to proselytize Muslims in Egypt.").
204. Religious Freedom Precarious in Middle East-Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 9,
1999, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File [hereinafter Religious Freedom Precarious].
205. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, JORDAN - CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET (Nov. 26, 2001) LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File [hereinafter Jordan Consular Information Sheet].
206. Religious Freedom Precarious, supra note 205; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, KUWAIT - CONSULAR
INFORMATION SHEET (May 7,2001) LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
207. Faisal Bodi, Face to Faith: Conversion Theory, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 8, 2001, at 20.
208. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 59.
209. David Ivanovich, Beliefs vs. Business; Proposed Sanctions Draw Fire, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Sept. 9, 1997, at I (describing restrictions on proselytism in Morocco); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
MOROCCO - CONSULAR INFORMATION (July 17, 2001) LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
("[S]ome activities, such as proselytizing or encouraging conversion to the Christian faith-both
considered legally incompatible with Islam-are prohibited .... In the past, American citizens have
been detained or arrested and expelled for discussing or trying to engage Moroccans in debate about
Christianity.") [hereinafter Morocco Consular Information Sheet].
210. See Martha Sawyer Allen, From the Crescent to the Cross, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.),
June 7, 2003, at 7B ("In Somalia it is illegal for non-Muslims to propagate their faith openly . .
211. SHEA, supra note 13, at 35.
212. Id. at 52 ("[T]he government has prohibited "missionary activities" in an ambiguous 1991 law
that fails to define such activities. Proselytism is prohibited in an attempt to avoid religious tensions
even though the constitution declares that citizens can 'profess and spread their faith."'); Religious
Extremism Threatens Kazakhstan: Security Chief AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 22, 1998, LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
213. Missionaries' Killer 'Defending' Islam, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario, Canada), Apr. 21,
2003, at C6 ("Yemeni law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing in this overwhelmingly Muslim
country.").
214. See, e.g., REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 28 (noting that while "[tihere is
no legal prohibition against proselytizing" in Djibouti, "proselytizing is discouraged").
215. SHEA, supra note 13, at 40.
216. See, e.g., Iran; Walk in Fear, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1994, at 39 (noting that apostasy is illegal
in Iran); Jordan Consular Information Sheet, supra note 205 (Jordan); Morocco Consular Information
Sheet, supra note 209 (Morocco); David Pryce-Jones, Islam in Action: Extremism Now, and
Everywhere. What Later?, NAT'L REv., Dec. 3, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File
(Algeria); Ira Rifkin, Vatican Official Says Christian-Muslim Relations Must be Reciprocal, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Tex.), June 7, 1997, at 10B (Kuwait); Willis Witter, Christians Hunker
Down in Pakistan, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at AI (Pakistan).
Similarly, legal rulings in Malaysia make it almost impossible in practice for Muslims to convert to
another faith. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 177.
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Islam.
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These restrictions on proselytism and conversion are not the only legal
obstacles that minority faiths face in Muslim states. Indeed, many Muslim states
have implemented restrictions that are not dictated by the shariah in order to
discourage the growth of minority faiths. For example, Comoros has restricted the
use of the country's three churches to noncitizens, and prohibits Comoros citizens
from congregating in them.218 The State Department reports that members of
minority religions in Iran "reported imprisonment, harassment, and/or intimidation
based on their religious beliefs." 21 9 In Nigerian provinces that have implemented
shariah law, it is "increasingly difficult to get a license to build a church," and
"several churches have been desecrated or burned down., 220 And Christian groups
in Sudan, such as those that provide humanitarian services, are required to apply
for special licenses, and there are both frequent delays and denials.221
Muslim states' efforts to bolster the Islamic faith are often buoyed by local
vigilante groups. While many commentators contend that these groups' actions are
contrary to true Islamic teachings, these groups believe that they are upholding the
shariah. To illustrate this point, one commentator vividly describes the kind of
oppression that Islamist groups inflict on Egypt's Coptic Christians:
Coptic Christians are among the most vulnerable of groups to persecution in
Egypt.... In February of 1997, 15 Coptic Christian youth were murdered by
Islamic fundamentalists. In March, nine more were victims in a terrorist attack.
Reports of murders of Christians are on the rise. Extremist Muslims routinely
abduct and rape non-Muslim women and girls and either marry them or force
them to convert to Islam. The government not only does nothing to protect non-
Muslims, it cooperates with the extremists by actively closing its eyes to the acts
of abduction, forced marriage, and murder. Over 1,000 people were killed by
militant Muslims since 1992, many of whom are Christian, and the Egyptian
government does nothing to punish these crimes. In March 1998, the thirteen-
year old daughter of a family who had converted to Christianity was kidnapped,
raped, and forced to convert to Islam. When her captors later released her, the
family members were killed by the terrorists who slit their bellies, and crushed
their heads with stones.
222
Local Muslim populations have also frequently engaged in acts of violence
directed at missionaries, and a number of missionaries have been killed in Muslim
217. See e.g., SHEA, supra note 13, at 35 (Sudan); Barney Zwartz, Unholy Free Speech Row
Catches Fire, THE AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 18, 2003, at 5 (describing a Pakistani Christian's account of
the pressure he faced to convert to Islam in Pakistan).
218. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 16-17.
219. Id. at 429.
220. Ann M. Simmons, Nigerian States' Embrace of Islamic Law Triggers Alarm, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2000, at Al.
221. SHEA, supra note 13, at 35; see also Chris Hedges, Sudan Presses Its Campaign to Impose
Islamic Law on Non-Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at A6.
222. McCormick, supra note 199, at 304.
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nations since 9/11.223 Such attacks are intended not only to dispose of the
immediate victims, but also to intimidate anybody else who similarly considers
promoting a non-Islamic faith.
The coercive apparatus of the state is employed in Muslim countries not only
to prevent non-Islamic faiths from gaining power, but also to restrain Islamic sects
that are perceived as heretical. For example, Chad's Ministry of the Interior
banned an Islamic group that incorporated singing and dancing into its ceremonies
and allowed intermingling of the sexes.224 In Malaysia, members of what the
government perceives to be "deviant sects" are often detained without trial, and
members of the country's Shiite minority are subjected to surveillance.225 And
Saudi Arabia is intent on suppressing Sufism, which is perceived by Wahhabi
clerics as a deviation from true Islam.226
3. Da'wah
Global da'wah efforts are very strong at present, in large part because a
number of Middle Eastern states have chosen to funnel a substantial amount of
money to Islamic charities dedicated to spreading the faith. For example, a Saudi
news magazine has claimed that the Saudi royal family's efforts have resulted in
"some 210 Islamic centers wholly or partly financed by Saudi Arabia, more than
1,500 mosques and 202 colleges and almost 2,000 schools for educating Muslim
children in non-Islamic countries in Europe, North and South America, Australia,
and Asia.,
227
Motivations for either funding or carrying out da'wah efforts differ from
individual to individual. Virtually all Muslims evince a clear desire to help others
truly submit to Allah's will, and potentially, to save them from the hellfire in the
afterlife. For many, this desire is coupled with an urge to strengthen Islam
geopolitically. For example, Shamim A. Siddiqi's book, Methodology of Dawah
Ilallah in American Perspective, lays out a detailed plan for establishing Islamic
rule in the United States.228 Siddiqi argues that the conversion of the United States
to Islam is the most pressing task of Muslims today for three reasons. First,
Siddiqi asserts that Washington is the premier enemy of Islam in the contemporary
world. He writes that whenever Muslims have come close to establishing an
223. Scheherezade Faramarzi, US. Troops, Shiite Fighters Clash in Karbala; Gunmen Slay Two
Journalists from Polish Television, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 7, 2004, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File; Laurie Goodstein, Seeing Islam as 'Evil' Faith, Evangelicals Seek Converts,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at Al; see also Gethin Chamberlain, Al-Qaeda Targets UK Muslims in New
Terror Campaign, SCOTSMAN, Apr. 3, 2004, at I (reporting that a top al-Qaeda official has sent a
message to bin Laden's followers stating that their "prime target ... should be missionaries in Islamic
countries who try to convert Muslims to Christianity").
224. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 15.
225. Id. at 178.
226. See, e.g., Stephen Schwartz, Whose Saudi Arabia, JERUSALEM POST, June 11, 2004, at 14.
227. Quoted in, Steven Stalinsky, Inside the Saudi Classroom, NAT'L REv., Feb. 7, 2003, available
at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
228. See Daniel Pipes, The Danger Within: Militant Islam in America, COMMENT., Nov. 2001, at
19 (discussing Siddiqi's book), available at http://www.danielpioes.oryliff.oho?id=77 (last visited Nov.
8, 2004).
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Islamic state, the "treacherous hands of the secular West are always there... to
bring about [their] defeat., 229 Second, Siddiqi states that establishing Islamic rule
in America "would signal its final triumph over its only rival, that bundle of
Christianity and liberalism which constitutes contemporary Western
civilization., 230 Finally, Siddiqi contends that "the infusion of the United States
with Islamism would make for so powerful a combination of material success and
spiritual truth that the establishment of 'God's Kingdom' on earth would no longer
be 'a distant drean.'
231
Other Muslim leaders share Siddiqi's view that nothing would be a bigger
boon to their faith than an Islamized America. Ismail al-Faruqi, who founded the
International Institute of Islamic Thought in Hemdon, Virginia, has stated that
"[n]othing could be greater... than this youthful, vigorous, and rich continent [of
North America] turning away from its past evil and marching forward under the
banner of Allahu Akbar [God is great]. 232
Many other Muslim leaders believe that the idea of America turning toward
Islam is not a mere pipe dream, but rather a realistic goal. Siraj Wahaj, the first
Muslim to deliver the daily invocation before Congress, 233 has stated: "If we were
united and strong, we'd elect our own emir [leader] and give allegiance to him....
[T]ake my word, if 6-8 million Muslims unite in America, the country will come to
us."234 Ahmad Nawfal, who speaks frequently at Muslim rallies in the United
States, has stated that because "the United States has 'no thought, no values, and
no ideals,' if militant Muslims 'stand up, with the ideology that we possess, it will
be very easy for us to preside over this world.' ' 235 Canadian business professor
Masudul Alarn Choudhury has written "matter-of-factly and enthusiastically about
the 'Islamization agenda of North America.'
' 236
This "Islamization agenda of North America" is bolstered by the influx of
money from Islamic countries to Muslim organizations in the United States.
Perhaps because of this funding, which largely comes from Saudi Arabia, many
Muslim organizations in the United States have coalesced around a common
agenda. Moreoever, these efforts at promoting the Islamization of North America





233. See Rebecca Buckman, Muslim Voice Delivers House Invocation, USA TODAY, June 26,
1991, at 2A.
234. Pipes, supra note 228, at 19.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Abigail R. Esman, The Arabian Panther, SALON.COM, June 14, 2004, available at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (stating that the Arab European League "positions itself as an
uncompromising defender of European Muslims, eschewing assimilation and espousing confrontational
political ideas such as the introduction of sharia law in Europe"); Jane Barnes Mack-Cozzo, The
Islamization of Europe, AM. ENTER., Jan. 1, 2003, at 36, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m2185/is1_-14/ai_96010652/print (last visited Nov. 6, 2004)
VOL. 33:2
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
also a geopolitical aspect to da'wah work that has been concretely articulated by
Muslim thinkers.
IV. CHRISTIANITY
The perception among Muslims that their faith possesses a geographic sphere
of influence is both more obvious and more dramatic in the present day than
Christians' perception of a Christian sphere of influence. However, to many
Christians, the idea of a Christian sphere of influence and the fact of intrusions into
this historical sphere are very real.
Groups that perceive a Christian sphere of influence are very influential in
some Western countries, and have a palpable influence on these countries' foreign
and domestic policy. Moreover, the "center of gravity in the Christian world has
shifted inexorably southward, to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. ,
23
8 As the
center of Christendom moves toward the Southern Hemisphere, the notion of a
distinct geographical Christian sphere of influence may become even more
important. After all, while Western Christians are increasingly secularized,
Christians in the Southern Hemisphere "are morally conservative, often to the
point of being what northerners would call puritanical, and theologically orthodox.
They adhere strictly to the word of Scripture, which commands their loyalty far
more than state or society; and they expect supernatural intervention in their daily
lives."2 3 9
Christianity is the world's largest religion, with about two billion adherents
worldwide. 240 Although Jesus Christ never had an army at his disposal, nor was he
ever a head of state, the Christian faith has been a major geopolitical force ever
since the Roman Empire became Christianized. 241 After the Christianization of the
Roman Empire, "Christians in government found themselves faced with...
questions that their religion had not wrestled with before." 242  These questions
spurred the development of a doctrine of religious warfare,243 and led theologians
to grapple with a number of other issues concerning Christian governance.
Today, Christianity's three major branches are Roman Catholicism, Eastern
Orthodoxy, and Protestantism.2 "4 In countries that fall within Christianity's sphere
of influence, Christians attempt to preserve their faith's primacy against secularism
(saying "Several Muslim leaders call openly for the introduction of sharia in Europe as soon as the
Muslim population increases enough to enforce the archaic Islamic law.").
238. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 2.
239. Sarah E. Hinlicky, Steeple Chase, NAT'L REV., May 20, 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
240. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
241. See J. Paul Martin, Religions, Human Rights, and Civil Society: Lessons from the Seventeenth
Century for the Twenty-First Century, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 933 (2000).
However, the Roman Empire's Christianization is not the first occurrence of "Christianity forming a
relationship with the secular state." JENKINS, supra note 17, at 18. "Almost certainly, Armenia was the
first state anywhere to establish Christianity as an official faith, which it did around the year 300." Id.
242. THOMAS F. MADDEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES 1-2 (1999).
243. Id.
244. HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 317 (1991).
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and other religions, and occasionally against other Christian denominations. This
Part first provides a historical account of how Christians have attempted to
preserve and expand their faith's perceived sphere of influence, and then examines
such efforts in the contemporary context.
A. Historical Use of Spheres of Influence
A number of excellent histories of Christianity are available, 245 and thus this
section does not attempt to comprehensively outline the history of the faith.
Instead, this section describes the methods that Christians have historically
employed to both preserve and expand the faith's sphere of influence. Five basic
tactics have been used: proselytism, state promotion of Christianity, state
enforcement of orthodoxy, military defense of the sphere of influence, and church
assertion of greater authority than the state. Each tactic will be explored in turn.
1. Proselytism
Since the advent of Christianity, the faith has relied heavily on proselytism to
fuel its expansion. Proselytism follows rather naturally from Christian theological
beliefs. Christians believe in a literal afterlife. They believe that, after we die,
some people will be rewarded with eternal life in heaven, while others will be
condemned to hell.246 The religion further holds that "humankind, although
created in God's image, fell into sin, and thus... human beings are intensely and
inherently sinful. 247 Because of humankind's sinful nature, Christians believe that
nobody can attain salvation in the afterlife through works alone. 248  Instead,
humankind's sins must be paid for. Christians believe that our sins are paid
through Jesus' sacrifice, that because Jesus was divine and perfect, he could give
his own life to allow all of humankind to attain salvation.
Christianity thus holds that only by accepting the gift of Jesus' sacrifice can
one be saved. 249 Because Christians hold an exclusivist view of salvation, many
245. For two such excellent histories see generally PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
(1976), and MOYNAHAN, supra note 138. For a history written from a Catholic perspective, see
generally THOMAS P. NEILL & RAYMOND H. SCHMANDT, HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1957).
246. See Jonathan Edwards, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God, in JONATHAN EDWARDS:
REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 155, 161 (Clarence H. Faust & Thomas H. Johnson eds., rev. ed. 1962),
available at http://www.ccel.org/e/edwards/sermons/sinners.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
247. David M. Smolin, Church, State, and International Human Rights: A Theological Appraisal,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1515, 1523 (1998).
248. See Titus 3:5 ("[Hie saved us, not because of righteous things we had done, but because of his
mercy."); Ephesians 2:8-9 ("For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith-and this not from
yourselves, it is the gift of God-not by works, so that no one can boast."); Hebrews 11:6 ("And
without faith it is impossible to please God ...."); John 6:29 ("Jesus answered, 'The work of God is
this: to believe in the one he has sent."'). Works are more important to salvation in Catholic theology
than in Protestant theology. Nonetheless, Catholics generally do not believe that salvation can be
attained through works alone, without faith in Christ.
249. See John 8:24 (Jesus states: "[l]f you do not believe that I am the one I claim to be, you will
indeed die in your sins"); John 14:6 (Jesus states: "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one
comes to the Father except through me"); Acts 4:12 ("Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no
other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved."); I Timothy 2:5 ("For there is one
God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus .... ").
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have felt compelled to share their faith with others since the religion's inception.
Moreover, as one missionary has explained, mission work is compelled in the
Bible through "the 'great commission' found at the end of the Bible's account of
Jesus' life on earth when he commissioned his followers to 'go therefore and make
disciples of all nations (ethnic groups), baptizing them... [and] teaching them to
observe (obey) all that I have commanded you."'
250
Paul was the key figure in the early church's evangelical efforts. Prior to his
conversion, Paul had been a zealous Pharisee who fervently aided the persecution
of Jesus' followers.2 5  However, after Paul's conversion, he "felt himself to be
'entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision,' that is, with the conversion of
,,252non-Jews. ' 2 Driven by this belief, Paul traveled widely, preaching the gospel
during his journeys. Because of the efforts of Paul and other early believers, "[b]y
the 150s there were churches in almost all the provinces between Syria and Rome,
extending through Alexandria to Carthage in North Africa and beyond to





Although the Eastern church was, early in the faith's history, "the glory of
Christendom," the emergence of Islam forced Christianity westward into "the dark
recesses of barbarian Europe.' 2 4 Christianity first took root in Europe through
proselytism, and eventually came to completely dominate the continent through
political arrangements. For example, after the Germans finally defeated the
Magyars on the battlefield, the Germans "pressed their religion on them."
255
Political marriages were also used to spread the faith.
As Christianity became dominant in Europe, evangelism on the continent
intensified in a variety of forms. As sea travel became more viable in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, Christianity spread even further. For example, the faith
took root in Japan during this period before being brutally suppressed.
25 6
In this overseas mission work, missionaries who were sensitive to local
culture and were willing to adapt the faith to local customs were particularly
effective.257 However, colonialism was also strongly linked to proselytism. For
example, after Spain conquered the Philippines in 1565, the Spanish crown funded
and controlled extensive proselytism efforts that produced over two million
converts by 1620.258 Likewise, the spread of Christianity was linked to the
250. E-mail from Richard P. Bailey, Christian Missionary, to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (Apr. 14,
2002, 17:48:40 EST) (on file with author) (quoting Matthew 28:19, 20); see also Mark 16:15; Luke
24:47-48; John 20:21; Acts 1:8.
251. See, e.g., Acts 8:1, 9:1-2. Christians believe that God miraculously led Paul (known as Saul in
Hebrew) to belief in Christ. See id. 9:2-6, 9:17.
252. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 25-26.
253. Id. at 65.
254. Id. at 157.
255. Id. at 208.
256. Id. at 561-62.
257. For example, it was through sensitivity and adaptation to local customs that the Jesuit
Alexander de Rhodes helped to spread Christianity through Vietnam. Id. at 566.
258. Id. at 567.
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colonization of the Americas. Although Christianity was often spread
coercively, 259 some missionary efforts, such as those of the Jesuits in Paraguay,
were more humane and sensitive to indigenous culture.260 European colonialism,
coupled with such developments in transportation technology as steam power,
"provided the Christian soldier and missionary with global reach" by the early
nineteenth century.261
2. State Promotion of Christianity
Although the early Christians faced an enormous amount of persecution under
Roman rule,262 their fortunes changed dramatically in 312 when Emperor
Constantine believed that he received a sign from God that led him to embrace
Christianity.263 In 313, Constantine and the Eastern Emperor Licinius jointly
issued an edict protecting all religious creeds.264 Thereafter, Christian power in
Rome grew. Eventually the Roman Empire was consolidated as a Christian
259. See JAMES AXTELL, THE EUROPEAN AND THE INDIAN: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOHISTORY OF
COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 270 (1981); George Dargo, Religious Toleration and Its Limits in Early
America, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 341, 358-59 (1996) ("For Native Americans, conversion to Christianity
was more a matter of survival than of liberation. Assimilation to European culture on European terms
was the only alternative to physical annihilation.").
260. Father Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, a Jesuit in Paraguay, proudly wrote, "Spaniards have not
penetrated this area. It was conquered by the Gospel alone." MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 525.
261. Id. at 633.
262. NEILL & SCHMANDT, supra note 245, at 33.
Although paganism was the official religion of Rome, Rome maintained an attitude of religious
tolerance toward the cultures it conquered, "provided they added the goddess Rome and the divine
emperor to their circle of deities." Id.; see also David Stockton, The Founding of the Empire, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE ROMAN WORLD 146, 162-63 (John Boardman et al. eds., 1991). Those who
refused to worship Rome's pagan gods were subject "to the charge of atheism, a capital offense under
Roman law." NEILL & SCHMANDT, supra note 245, at 33-34. Although the Jews' thoroughly
monotheistic beliefs made them unwilling to adopt additional deities, Rome was willing to exempt them
from this religious edict because Jewish monotheism was ethnically circumscribed. Id. at 34.
However, after Paul converted to Christianity, he concentrated on spreading the gospel to the Gentiles.
See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text. Once Gentiles began to embrace Christianity, the faith
lost any entitlement it may have claimed to the exception to Rome's atheism laws that had been
afforded to Judaism. Although there was "considerable variation" in the degree of persecution that the
early Christians faced, NEILL & SCIIMANDT, supra note 245, at 33, it was often quite severe. See
Robert John Araujo, S.J., The International Personality and Sovereignty of the Holy See, 50 CATH. U.
L. REV. 291, 295 (2001); Scott Kent Brown II, Note & Comment, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A
Comment on Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1049,
1052-53 (2000).
263. See David M. Smolin, The City of God Meets Anabaptist Monasticism: Reflections on the
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 841, 848 (1996). In October 312,
Constantine was camped north of Rome, about to do battle with his rival Maxentius. According to
legend, Constantine there experienced a vision of a cross of light in the heavens which bore the
inscription "Conquer by this Sign." G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and
the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REv. 829, 902 n.181 (2002). Constantine
dutifully carried the cross into battle, and subsequently "gave credit for the victory to the god of the
Christians." Milner S. Ball, Book Review, Cross and Sword, Victim and Law: A Tenative Response to
Leonard Levy's Treason Against God, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1007, 1007 (1983) (reviewing LEONARD W.
LEvY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY (1981)).
264. Blakey & Murray, supra note 263, at 902 n.181.
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stronghold.
The Christianization of the Roman Empire spurred Christians to perceive a
linkage between church and state. Ever since the Roman Empire became
Christianized, some Christians have attempted to promote their faith through the
state, and to extend the faith's sphere of influence into the non-Christian world.
Perhaps due in part to the early Christian experience of persecution at the
hands of the state, the newly Christianized Roman Empire suppressed other
religions. In 356 Constantine's son Constantius ordered all pagan temples closed
and "prohibited sacrifices to the gods on pain of death. 265 In 391, all pagan cults
were banned. Pagans "were denied the legal right to own property," and clerics
assisted Christian mobs in destroying pagan idols.26 Such repression of other
faiths periodically resurfaced throughout the history of Christianity-for example,
in the expulsion of all Jews and Moors from Spain following the reconquista.267
The state has also historically promoted Christianity through the enactment of
laws that codify Christian morals. For example, when Charlemagne breathed new
life into the Western empire, he established special clerical courts, and made "the
murder of priests, eating meat in Lent, pagan cremations of the dead, damaging
church buildings, and refusal of baptism" capital offenses.268 A later dramatic
example of state enforcement of Christian morals is Spain's inquisitors, who, in
addition to expelling the Moors and brutally clamping down on perceived
blasphemers, made equally brutal efforts at enforcing general Christian morals.
These efforts included the burning of bigamists, usurers, and homosexuals.269
There were also biblical justifications for the witch hunts that took hold in Europe
from the late fifteenth through seventeenth century, and reached the Americas in
the form of the Salem witch trials.270
3. State Enforcement of Orthodoxy
The state has also been used to promote the Christian sphere of influence
through the enforcement of orthodoxy. The first example of this promotion was
Constantine's decision to convene a worldwide council of the Church in May of
325 to resolve the controversy surrounding the teachings of Arius.271  Later,
265. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 105.
266. Id. at 107.
267. See Tim Dunne, The Spectre of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999);
Andre Lambelet, Book Review, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 630, 631 (2000) (reviewing DAVID S.
LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE So RICH AND SOME So POOR
(1998)).
268. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 204; see also Steven D. Smith, The "Secular," the
"Religious," and the "Moral": What Are We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 495
(2001) (noting that Charlemagne was "persuaded of the value of compulsory baptism").
269. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 450.
270. Id. at 479. One such justification can be found in Exodus 22:18, which states, "Thou shalt not
suffer a witch to live."
271. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BIBLICAL WORLD 565 (Michael D. Coogan ed., 1998); Richard
Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of His Theory oflnviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289, 364 n.321
(1997). Arius was "a priest at Alexandria who denied the full divinity of Christ and held that the Son
was subordinate to the Father." MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 99. Although Arius was
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ruptures occurred in the church over relatively obscure questions of Christology,
and Christian states attempted to resolve these theological issues by brutally
imposing orthodoxy upon their subjects. For example, although Arianism was
repudiated by the Council of Nicea, it later came to dominate Africa. "All who did
not convert to Arianism were declared heretics; all Catholic churches were closed,
all masses, baptisms, and ordinations banned, all liturgical books destroyed.,
272
This brutal imposition of orthodoxy caused great schisms in the Christian
world, and aided Muslims in expanding the Islamic sphere of influence by
conquering Christian lands.273 Yet despite the problems that state enforcement of
orthodoxy produced during Islam's ascendancy, Christian states often continued to
enforce orthodoxy of beliefs thereafter.
One example of this is the Counter-Reformation. As the Reformation eroded
the Catholic Church's power, the Church attempted to maintain its influence
throughout Europe with the Counter-Reformation, which employed such tactics as
"censorship, inquisition, and the military leagues of Catholic powers., 274
But the Inquisition took these policies designed to enforce Orthodoxy within
the Christian state to their extreme. 275 Pope Alexander III introduced the concept
of professional inquisitors in 1163 to unearth heretics, and "[h]is successor, Lucius
III, established a bishops' inquisition, dependent on local sees, and opened the way
for the execution of heretics by fire. 276 Before the Catholic Church was dissolved
in England, its persecution of Protestants was so severe that "[t]he Book of
Martyrs, a work of racy propaganda... which.., recorded Protestant deaths, was to
become a second bible in English homes."
277
Pope Paul III appointed six cardinals as inquisitors-general, "to whom all
baptized Christians were subject, at least in theory., 278 One cardinal was so eager
to proceed with the Inquisition that he "bought a house at his own expense, and
equipped it with offices and dungeons, without waiting for a grant from the papal
treasury. '279 Among the rules that the Inquisition set for Catholics was that "[n]o
man is to lower himself by showing toleration towards any sort of heretic, least of
all a Calvinist."
290
One particularly brutal form of the continent-wide Inquisition was the Spanish
Inquisition, which lasted from 1478 to 1834. Moynahan notes that "[t]he vast
majority of its victims were of Jewish and Moorish blood.",281 The Spanish
excommunicated for this teaching, Constantine felt that a worldwide council was warranted because a
large following of convicted Arians remained even after their leader's excommunication. Id.
272. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 155.
273. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
274. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 415.
275. See generally EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION (1988).
276. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 278.
277. Id. at 408.
278. Id. at 440.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 441.
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Inquisitors made special efforts to root out those who secretly practiced either
Islam or Judaism. Protestants were also "burned out of Spain before they had a
toehold., 28 2 .Numerous Protestants were literally burned at the stake because the
Spanish government feared that the rise of Protestantism could divide that
country.
283
Conversely, Catholics were often suppressed by the new Protestant states that
emerged during the Reformation. This was the case in England, where the
Treasons Act of 1534, the Act for the Dissolution of the Lesser Monasteries of
1536, the Act for the Dissolution of the Greater Monasteries of 1539, and the Six
Articles Act "destroyed the last vestiges of the Catholic Church within the English
realm."'28 Thereafter, unrepentant Catholics "faced execution and forfeiture of
their estates. 28 5 In Elizabethan England, the government required a.special license
before books of Scripture could be published, and "[e]xtremist puritan works as
well as Catholic devotional literature were banned.,
286
Attempts to utilize the state to impose Christian orthodoxy continued when
the New World was settled. For example, during colonial times, the government
of Virginia declared "that 'no popish recusant' who strayed into the colony could
hold office as a 'secretary, counsellor, register, commissioner, surveyor or sheriff,
or any other public place, but be utterly disabled for the same. ' - 287 Attempted
imposition of orthodoxy in America could also be seen many years later in the
Scopes trial, where a biology teacher in Tennessee was prosecuted for teaching
evolution in defiance of state law.288 At the trial, special prosecutor and former
presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan made this obvious by "stat[ing]
282. Id. at 450.
283. Id. at 425-26. The Catholic Church also targeted Catholics who fell short of the Church's
ideals. Pope Paul IV imprisoned a liberal cardinal on the grounds of "heresy on the veneration of saints
and relics." Id. He also devoted attention to the problem of "married men singing in the Sistine choir,"
concerned that they may "contaminate the chaste purity of the papal chapel." Id. Pope Paul IV's
successor, Sixtus V, "executed clergy who broke their vows of chastity and attempted to impose the
death penalty for adultery." Id. at 427.
284. Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian
Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 CAP.
U. L. REV. 483, 537 (1997).
285. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 405.
286. Id. at 432.
287. Id. at 577.
288. See EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA'S
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997); Judith A. Villarreal, Note, God and
Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation/Evolution Controversy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 335, 340-43
(1988).
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before a national audience that he objected to Darwinism because he 'fear[ed] we
shall lose the consciousness of God's presence in our daily lives if [people] accept
[evolution].' ' 289 Indeed, Bryan began his opening statement with the proclamation
that "[i]f evolution wins, Christianity goes." 290
4. Military Defense of the Sphere of Influence
Christians first grappled with the question of religious warfare after the
Roman Empire became Christianized. 291 The just war doctrines that emerged
gained relevance in the seventh century and beyond, with the emergence of Islam.
Christian countries frequently responded to Islam's challenge through military
action carried out in Christ's name. The justifications advanced for these military
actions underscore the perception that Christianity possessed a geographic sphere
of influence. For example, the reconquista was in large part motivated by the
notion that Spain remained a part of Christendom even after Muslim armies
conquered it.292 Likewise, the major motivating factor behind the Crusades was
Turkish armies threatening the Christian sphere of influence through their advance
on the Christian Byzantine Empire.
293
The battle for control of Europe was hotly contested between the forces of
Christianity and Islam for several centuries. While Islam gained a strong foothold
in Europe, the Christian countries were eventually able to drive it from the
continent, and later colonize much of the Islamic world.294
Some battles to consolidate the Christian sphere of influence were waged
against faiths other than Islam. During the Crusades, for example, both Jews and
heretics in Europe proved ready targets for the Crusaders. As far as some
Crusaders were concerned, "[t]he distant Moslems had played no part in [Christ's]
Passion," while the Jews were "the descendants of those who had. ' '295  Also,
although the Teutonic Order was "founded as a hospital order of German knights
and priests in Palestine," it later became a military order and shifted its focus from
289. Diana M. Rosenberg, Notes & Comments, Monkey Business and Unnatural Selection:
Opening the Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets of Darwinism, 9 J.L. & POL'Y
611,618 (2001).
290. Mark B. Lewis, The Monkey Trial, Revisited: 75 Years Later, Scopes Still Fires the
Imagination, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 2000, at 30.
291. See MADDEN, supra note 242, at 1-2.
292. Id. at 4. Conversely, some Muslims now believe that Spain must be forcibly returned to
Islamic rule because it had once been Muslim territory. See BERGEN, supra note 181, at 53 (quoting
Abdullah Azzam).
293. MADDEN, supra note 242, at 5.
294. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
295. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 229. The clergy and officials in European cities often
attempted (generally without success) to protect the local Jewry. Id. at 230 (discussing the efforts of the
bishop of Prague and the Hungarian king Coloman).
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the Holy Land "to the pagan borderlands of Europe" in an effort to Christianize
those borderlands. 296  Later, when conflict between Protestants and Catholics
reigned throughout Europe, both sects engaged in military warfare against the
other.297
The conquest of the New World provides a further example of how military
means were used to expand the Christian sphere of influence. The early Spanish
conquistadors arrived in the Americas armed with the Requerimiento
(requirement), which they would read to the natives upon encountering them. The
Requerimiento explained that the Pope, God's earthly representative, had granted
the natives' land to the king of Spain, and that the natives should recognize the
authority of the Pope and Spanish crown or else "with the help of God we shall
forcefully enter your country and shall make war against you in all ways... that we
can., 298 When Pope Alexander VI granted all lands in the New World west of the
Azores to Spain and those to the east to Portugal, he stated that the purpose of this
act was to ensure that Christianity "may in all places be exalted, amplified, and
enlarged, whereby the health of souls may be procured, and the barbarous nations
subdued and brought to the faith. ' 299 Needless to say, the conquistadors had a
dramatic effect on the New World. "Not only did millions of Indians perish at the
hands of Columbus, the Spanish, and pioneers; they were plagued with diseases
intentionally loosed upon them, tortured by domestic animals, disemboweled,
roasted on pits, scalped for state sanctioned bounty, and forced to walk thousands
of miles in inhumane conditions."
3° °
Similarly, the Portuguese exploration of the West African coasts was aided by
a "series of papal bulls [that] gave them title of ownership over newly found lands,
power to enslave the natives, and a commission to propagate the faith.",30 1 When
the Roman Church endorsed these conquests of Africa and the Americas, "[t]he
belief that Christian conquest was sanctified-and indeed demanded-by the
expansion of the faith was... firmly implanted. 30 2
Later, religion would play a role in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, which
fueled the United States' geographic expansion.30 3 One frontiersman, for example,
296. Id. at 220.
297. Id. at 376, 459-62, 468, 475-76.
298. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 48-49 (3d ed.
1993); see also WILLiAM H. PRESCOTr, TIE HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO 136 (C. Harvey
Gardiner ed., 1966) (explaining that because Europeans believed that paganism was "a sin to be
punished with fire... in this world, and eternal suffering in the next," the Europeans believed that "the
territory of the heathen, wherever found, [was forfeit to the Holy See], and as such was freely given
away by the head of the Church, to any temporal potentate whom he pleased, that would assume the
burden of conquest").
299. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 506.
300. David M. Osterfeld, Plastic Indians, Nazis, and Genocide: A Perspective on America's
Treatment of Indian Nations, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 623, 626 (1998).
301. MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 506.
302. Id. at 507.
303. ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY (1935); William Bradford, "With a Very Great
Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with
Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 35 n.162 (2002-2003) ("'Manifest Destiny,' a term which first
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declared: "The same inscrutable Arbiter that decreed the downfall of Rome has
pronounced the doom of extinction upon the red men of America. ' 3°
5. Church Assertion of Greater Authority than the State
The church has also historically asserted that it possesses greater authority
than the state does. This assertion is especially true in the Catholic tradition. Pope
Gregory VII provided a "list of twenty-seven theses he drew up to outline his
powers as Vicar of Christ and St. Peter's successor" which was known as the
dictatus. 30 5 The dictatus provided, among other things, that no person on earth
could judge the Pope, that princes are required to kiss the Pope's feet, and that the
Pope is empowered to depose emperors.
30 6
Pope Gregory VII also acted on his thesis that the pope could depose
emperors. "He accused Emperor Henry IV... of simony and interference in the
affairs of the Church., 30 7 In response, Henry IV convened a council designed to
declare Gregory's election void. Gregory's response was furious: "On the part of
God the omnipotent, I forbid Henry to govern the kingdom of Italy and Germany.
I absolve all his subjects from every oath they have taken or may take, and I
excommunicate every person who shall serve him as king., 30 8 The young Henry
backed down in the face of this furious papal response, crossing the Alps in
midwinter to do penance. Upon entering the Pope's presence: "Henry was stripped
of his clothes and thrown the hair shirt of beggary; he clutched a broom and a pair
of shears, tokens of his willingness to be whipped and shorn." 30 9 Henry then stood
in ankle-deep snow for three days, praying for forgiveness.
310
B. Contemporary Use of Spheres of Influence
Today, "[t]he United States expressly separates church and state and the
nations of Europe likewise have secular legal systems., 31  Religious minorities in
Christian countries are generally afforded great latitude in the practice of their
appeared in print in 1845, refers to the nineteenth-century political philosophy holding that the United
States was charged with a divinely-inspired mission of extending its moral enlightenment, democratic
principles, and republican values to the furthest reaches of North America."); Hon. Hugh F. Landerkin,
Custody Disputes in the Provincial Court of Alberta: A New Judicial Dispute Resolution Model, 35
ALBERTA L. REv. 627, 634 (1997) ("During reconstruction after the Civil War, American society
changed rapidly. Industrialization occurred. With increased immigration people moved westward,
spurred on by the doctrine of manifest destiny.").
304. See MOYNAHAN, supra note 138, at 607.
305. Id. at 217.
306. Id.




311. Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the
North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say "Property"? A Lockeian, Confucian, and
Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 351 (1996); see also Maimon Schwarzschild,
Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like Rum
and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903, 913 (1993) ("The situation in the developed countries
today is very different. Whatever the rate of church-going ... we live in societies that are essentially
secular.").
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faith, and are even allowed to proselytize to Christians.312 The success of Islamic
da'wah in the West is testament to the greater latitude afforded to religious
minorities in Christian countries.313
However, this tolerance does not mean that efforts to preserve and expand
Christianity's perceived sphere of influence are moribund. Rather, some Christian
groups in the West, such as the religious right in the United States, wield great
political influence even over foreign policy matters. These groups often use their
influence to attempt to strengthen the perceived Christian sphere of influence.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the global center of Christianity is moving toward
the Southern Hemisphere, where adherents' practice of the Christian faith takes on
a completely different character-more puritanical and orthodox-than it does in
the North.314 These Southern Christians appear more intent upon preserving a
geographical Christian sphere of influence than do their Northern counterparts.
Thus, as the center of Christianity moves southward, the efforts to define, preserve
and expand a Christian sphere of influence may become more apparent.
This section now examines how four of the mechanisms that historically have
been used to preserve and expand the Christian sphere of influence are employed
today.
315
312. See REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 1-2 (discussing freedom of religious
practice in Angola), 7-8 (Burundi), 10-11 (Cape Verde), 18-20 (Democratic Republic of the Congo),
20-21 (Republic of the Congo), 33-36 (Ethiopia), 39-43 (Ghana), 51-52 (Lesotho), 54-55 (Madagascar),
55-57 (Malawi), 64-65 (Namibia), 77-78 (Sao Tome and Principe), 80-81 (Seychelles), 84-87 (South
Africa), 93-95 (Swaziland), 99-102 (Uganda), 102-03 (Zambia), 109-10 (Australia), 146-48 (Fiji), 179-
80 (Marshall Islands), 180-81 (Federated States of Micronesia), 182-83 (Nauru), 183-85 (New
Zealand), 185-87 (Palau), 187-88 (Papua New Guinea), 188-92 (Philippines), 192-93 (Samoa), 196-97
(Solomon Islands), 201-02 (Tonga), 202-03 (Tuvalu), 203-05 (Vanuatu), 221-23 (Andorra), 227-31
(Austria), 241-44 (Belgium), 255-58 (Croatia), 265-67 (Denmark), 267-69 (Estonia), 269-71 (Finland),
280-86 (Germany), 292-95 (Hungary), 295-98 (Iceland), 298-99 (Ireland), 300-02 (Italy), 310-12
(Latvia), 312-13 (Liechtenstein), 314-18 (Lithuania), 318-19 (Luxembourg), 319-21 (Macedonia), 321-
22 (Malta), 323-27 (Moldova), 327-28 (Monaco), 328-31 (the Netherlands), 331-33 (Norway), 333-37
(Poland), 337-39 (Portugal), 364-65 (San Marino), 365-69 (Slovak Republic), 369-70 (Slovenia), 370-
73 (Spain), 373-75 (Sweden), 375-78 (Switzerland), 391-97 (Ukraine), 397-401 (United Kingdom),
541-42 (Antigua and Barbuda), 542-46 (Argentina), 546-47 (Bahamas), 547-48 (Barbados), 548-50
(Belize), 550-52 (Bolivia), 552-54 (Brazil), 554-55 (Canada), 555-58 (Chile), 567-68 (Dominica), 568-
69 (Dominican Republic).
313. See, e.g., Peter Brookes, Jihadi Juniors Are Growing Up Fast, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 23,
2003, at 31 (noting that the French government estimates that there are 100,000 converts to Islam in that
country); Tamer el-Ghobashy, Fertile Crescent: Conversions to Islam on Rise in U.S., DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Dec. 26, 2003, at 35 (explaining that 30,000 Americans convert to Islam annually); Fabien
Novial, Growing Number of Germans Embracing Islam, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 25, 2003,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
314. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
315. A fifth historical mechanism, state promotion of Christianity, is not worth discussing in depth
because secularizing trends have minimized the importance of this mechanism. However, it is worth
briefly noting that there are a number of contemporary examples of states promoting the Christian faith.
For example, many commentators perceive the Bush Administration's faith-based initiatives as "a
conspiracy to move big bucks from secular to Christian groups." Marvin Olasky, Faith-Based Plans
Advance With Little Fanfare, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Tex.), Oct. 3, 2003, at Al5.
The Greek government provides financial support to the Greek Orthodox Church "by, for example,
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1. Proselytism
Christian missionary efforts are very strong today. For a period following
decolonization, there was a retrenchment in evangelistic efforts because the
missions were viewed as "an arm of colonialism." 316 Indeed, Professor Jenkins
reports that "[b]y 1970, African churches in particular were calling for a
moratorium on Western missions because they stunted the growth of local
initiatives. 3 17  However, missions today are well-funded and plentiful, and are
increasingly focused on the Muslim world.
This shift in missionary focus toward the Islamic world has occurred
gradually. Through the late 1970s, missionary efforts primarily focused on Latin
America, Africa, and the Iron Curtain countries. 318 A Time cover story by David
Van Biema recounts the intellectual forces behind the shift toward greater
evangelism in the Middle East:
A missions strategist named Ralph Winter suggested in 1974 that Christians turn
their attention from areas already exposed to Christ to "unreached people
groups" who had never heard the Gospel.... In 1989 Argentine-born evangelist
Luis Bush pointed out that 97% of the unevangelized lived in a "window"
between the 10th and 40th latitudes. This immense global slice, he explained,
was disproportionately poor; the majority of its inhabitants "enslaved" by Islam,
Hinduism and Buddhism and, ultimately, by Satan. In a later paper, Bush urged
Christians, "Put on the full armor of God and fight with the weapons of spiritual
warfare."
3 19
Today, the organizational strength of Christian missionary efforts that target
paying for the salaries and religious training of clergy, and financing the construction and maintenance
of Orthodox Church buildings." REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 287. Leaders of
other religious groups in Greece have argued that taxes on religious organizations are discriminatory
because the government subsidizes the Greek Orthodox Church but not other faiths. Id. at 288. In
Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church have been established as the state
churches. Id. at 270. The governments of some Catholic countries have also implemented policies
designed to promote Catholicism. Before the Italian Constitution was adopted in 1947, a 1929
Concordat "established Catholicism as the country's state religion." Id. at 300. Although a 1984
revision "formalized the principle of a secular state," it also "maintained the principle of state support
for religion." Id. The Catholic Church is also able to select the teachers for "'hour of religion' courses"
in the public schools. Id. at 301. Italy has provided financial assistance to Catholic schools when
enrollment declined, and the presence of Catholic symbols on Italian courtroom or government office
walls seems to make some religious minorities feel uncomfortable. Id. In Spain, four 1979 accords
between Spain and the Holy See define the country's relationship with Catholicism on economic,
religious education, military and judicial matters. Id. at 371. The Catholic Church is also financed
through the Spanish tax system, and, received approximately $10 million in 1999. Id. Other majority
Catholic countries in which the state promotes the Catholic faith in some way include Angola, where
state-owned television broadcasts Catholic Church services live on Sunday morning, id. at 1, and Cape
Verde, where the government provides the Catholic Church with "free broadcast time for religious
services." Id. at 11.
316. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 42.
317. Id.
318. Van Biema, supra note 4, at 40.
319. Id.
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Muslims is striking. Soon after the United States toppled Afghanistan's Taliban
and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in Iraq, evangelical missionaries entered both
countries with the hope of spreading the gospel.32° One missionary team shipped
1.3 million Christian tracts to Iraq following the U.S. military victory, and an
American evangelical reports plans to bring one million Bibles to the country in
future missions.
321
Many contemporary evangelists have clearly articulated a worldview in which
Islam has been intruding upon the Christian sphere of influence through its
extensive da'wah efforts in the West, while Islamic countries prevent Christian
missionary efforts from making similar inroads in the Muslim world. Luis Bush
has written: "From its center in the 10/40 Window, Islam is reaching out
energetically to all parts of the globe; in a similar strategy, we must penetrate [its]
heart with the liberating truth of the gospel.,
322
Like Muslims who engage in da'wah work, the sincerity of Christian
missionaries cannot be doubted. "They are far better informed and more actively
concerned than the average American citizen about the Islamic world's material
needs, and their desire to share Christ springs in the main from a similarly
generous impulse. 323 However, many of them clearly perceive their missionary
efforts to be linked to an expansion of the Christian sphere of influence. One
missionary, preparing to share the gospel in Iraq, referred to Christian missions as
attempts to pierce "Satan's armor., 324 After engaging in extensive interviews with
missionaries working to bring the gospel to Muslims, Van Biema concluded that
"while most evangelical missionaries love Muslims, they hope to replace Islam.' 325
2. State Enforcement of Orthodoxy
Today, religious minorities clearly enjoy far more rights in the Christian
world than they do in the Muslim world. Virtually every Christian country
provides religious minority groups with extensive rights to practice their own
faiths.
326
However, some state-led efforts to impose religious orthodoxy are apparent.
Sometimes these efforts manifest themselves in suspicion of newer, non-traditional
faiths. For example, Spain's parliament "approved a nonbonding resolution calling
on the Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive 'sects'
in the country and to create a permanent organization to monitor these
organizations. 32 7 Consequently, the Helsinki Human Rights Federation released a
320. Id. at 38.
321. David Rennie, Bible Belt Missionaries Set Out on a 'War of Souls'in Iraq, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 27, 2003, at 22, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
322. Van Biema, supra note 4, at 40.
323. Id. at 44.
324. Id. at 43.
325. Id. at 44.
326. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
327. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 372. Even the Salvation Army was
unable to receive permission to operate in one of Spain's regions on the grounds that it is a "destructive
sect." Id.
2005
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
report in April 1999 criticizing Spain for discrimination against "new religions."
328
Similarly, in Armenia all religious denominations other than the Armenian
Apostolic Church are required to register with the State Council on Religious
Affairs. Organizations petitioning for registration are required, among other
things, to "subscribe to a doctrine based on 'historically recognized Holy
Scriptures.' 329 The Armenian government has consistently denied registration to
the Jehovah's Witnesses.330 In Georgia, "[1]ocal police and security officials at
times harassed nontraditional religious minority groups and were complicit or
failed to respond to attacks by Orthodox extremists against Jehovah's Witnesses
and other nontraditional religious minorities." 33  The German government has
refused to recognize Scientology as a religion, and for some time has been
"investigating" its ideology to determine whether Scientology is compatible with
the democratic order.332  Scientologists often experience employment
discrimination in Germany, as some state and local government offices and
businesses "require job applicants and bidders on contracts to sign a 'sect filter,'
stating that they are not affiliated with the teachings of L. Ron Hubbard and do not
use the technologies of L. Ron Hubbard., 333 Other states that have taken action
against "harmful sects" or "cults" include Belgium
334 and France. 335
In addition to enacting restrictions on non-traditional religions, some modem
Christian states-in particular, those where the Orthodox church is dominant-
place restrictions on proselytism. These restrictions on proselytism are often
enforced against other Christian denominations. The laws of Greece, for example,
provide that "[a]nyone engaging in proselytism shall be liable to imprisonment and
a fine." 336 Greek law defines proselytism as attempts to "intrude on the religious
beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion" through improper means,
such as "any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or
material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his
inexperience, trust, need, low intellect, or naivety.' '337 These anti-proselytism laws
were at issue in the landmark case Kokkinakis v. Greece,338 in which the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) overturned the conviction of Mr. Kokkinakis, a
Jehovah's Witness, under the anti-proselytism law.33 9  The ECHR noted that
328. Id.
329. Id. at 224.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 275.
332. Id. at 280.
333. Id. at 284.
334. Id. at 241-44.
335. Id. at 273-74.




339. Id. For more on Kokkinakis, see Joseph Brossart, Legitimate Regulation of Religion?
European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Doctrine and the Russian Federation Law "On
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, " 22 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REv. 297, 302-05
(1999); Keturah A. Dunne, Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Application of
VOL. 33:2
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
Greece had offered no evidence which indicated that Mr. Kokkinakis had
employed improper means to lead others to his faith.34 ° Instead, it appeared that
the conviction of Mr. Kokkinakis stemmed from hostility toward his attempts to
convert the wife of an orthodox cantor. Thus, the ECHR struck down the
conviction as a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which is designed to safeguard freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.34 1 However, the Court did not strike the law down as a whole. Instead,
the ECHR stated that it would recognize the law's legitimacy "if and in so far as
[the law was] designed only to punish improper proselytism.,
342
Similar to Greece's anti-proselytism laws, Armenian law "forbids
'proselytizing' (undefined in the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic
Church., 343 In Bulgaria, a Communist-era law adopted in 1949 which prohibits
foreigners from evangelizing or leading religious services in the country is still
technically in effect. 344 Pursuant to this law, some municipalities have adopted
laws designed to inhibit proselytism efforts that are not undertaken by the
Orthodox Church. For example, one municipality enacted a regulation that
"forbids references to miracles and healing during religious services."
345
Observers fear that such regulations could be used "as a pretext to ban or interrupt
services by charismatic evangelical groups.,
34 6
In certain other majority Christian countries, proselytism by other faiths or
denominations is not prohibited by law, but is impeded in practice. For example,
Belarus has stringent registration requirements for religions that operate within
it. 347 While there is no theoretical barrier to proselytizing in that country, the State
Department has noted that Belarusian "authorities have intervened to prevent,
interfere with, or punish individuals who proselytize on behalf of an unregistered
religion. 3 48  And in Romania, "several minority religious groups continued to
claim credibly that low-level government officials and the Romanian Orthodox
clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. 349
The Russian Orthodox Church's concern over other sects' proselytism in
Russia also illustrates the perception of high-ranking church members that the
Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 117, 133-39 (1999); Lehnhof, supra note 133, at 594-96.
340. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 49.
341. Id. at 21, 49-50.
342. Id. at 21, 48; see also REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 286 (noting that in
addition to Greece's anti-proselytism laws, other Greek governmental policies are obviously intended to
promote the Greek Orthodox church. For example, non-Orthodox groups "sometimes face
administrative obstacles or encounter legal restrictions on religious practice" that the Orthodox Church
does not face).
343. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 224.
344. Id. at 250-52.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 235-37.
348. Id. at 238.
349. Id. at 339-40.
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Orthodox Church possesses a geographical sphere of influence. The Russian
Orthodox Church's leadership believes that the church was greatly disadvantaged
in its efforts to gain new adherents and to keep old adherents within its fold by the
atheistic system that predominated during the Soviet reign. 350 As such, the Russian
Orthodox Church has been very sensitive to what it perceives as intrusion into its
sphere of influence. Professor Harold Berman has explained that a Church
representative told him
that the Lutherans should be free to give religious leadership to the German
population of Russia, the Roman Catholics to the Polish population of Russia,
the Jews to the Jews, the Muslims to the Turks in Russia, and so forth-but the
Russians... the ethnic Russians, the russkie, he said, belong chiefly to Russian
Orthodoxy.
351
Professor Berman recounts that he argued with the representative, explaining
that the vast majority of missionaries do not draw Russians away from Russian
Orthodoxy, but rather from the ranks of atheists and agnostics. 352  The
representative was unimpressed by this argument: "It is true that after more than 75
years of Marxist-Leninist education and Communist Party pressure, a great many
Russians are ignorant of Russian Orthodoxy or indifferent to it. But their roots are
Orthodox. It is our task to return them to Orthodoxy. 353 When Professor Berman
opined that it sounded as though the Russian church feared competition, the
representative replied:
The Russian Orthodox Church is like a very sick person that is only beginning to
recover her health .... Moreover ... we lack both the material and the human
resources needed to compete on an equal basis. The foreign missionaries are
pouring huge sums of money into evangelization, paying for billboard
advertisements and for television programs featuring American preachers and
hiring huge stadiums for spreading their message.
354
One of the foreign missionary groups that the Russian church feels most
threatened by is the Catholic Church. This rift was widened by a Vatican decision
in February 2002 to carve the nation into four new dioceses. While the Vatican
"characterized the move as an almost routine elevation of its Russian operations to
the same status maintained by virtually every other Catholic presence
worldwide, 355 the Russian Orthodox Church did not share that view. Rather, a
representative of the Russian Church stated: "Our attitude toward this step is the
350. See Irina G. Basova, Freedom Under Fire: The New Russian Religious Law, 14 TEMP. INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 181, 184-86 (2000) (detailing the Soviet Union's repression of the Russian Orthodox
Church).
351. Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transitions: A
Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 301 (Johan van der Vyver &
John Witte eds., 1996).
352. Id. at 301-02.
353. Id. at 302.
354. Id. at 303.
355. Michael Wines, Catholics Upgrade Presence in Russia, Annoying Orthodox, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 2002, at A3.
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same as the Catholics' if we were to appoint an alternative pope in Rome. 356
The Russian Orthodox Church's views are particularly important to other
religions and denominations operating within that country because of the "growing
convergence between the Russian Orthodox Church and the State." '357 Indeed, the
church's influence may help account for the "Law on Religion" that Russia
implemented in 1997, which "seriously disadvantages religious groups that are
new to the country by making it difficult for them to register as religious
organizations, and thus obtain the status of juridical person.,
358
Thus, efforts within some modem Christian states to restrict non-traditional
faiths and to impede conversion out of the dominant sect demonstrate that state
enforcement of orthodoxy is still used as a method of preserving the religion's
sphere of influence.
3. Military Defense of the Sphere of Influence
The strategy of preserving and expanding a Christian sphere of influence
through military means manifests itself in two major ways at present. First, in
Western countries, some Christian groups use their political power to persuade the
state to adopt foreign policies that are more consonant with the defense of
Christianity. Second, while Western countries appear unlikely in the near future to
go to war for religious reasons, a number of battles have been raging between
Christians and Muslims in lesser-developed countries for years. These conflicts
are likely to intensify as the population of these lesser-developed countries
continues to rapidly expand.
Of the industrialized Western countries, Christian groups exert the most
influence on foreign policy in the United States. A number of commentators have
noted the Christian lobby's strength, particularly with respect to ensuring
continued American support for the state of Israel. 35 9  Rabbi Daniel Lapin has
succinctly summarized the importance of evangelical support for Israel by stating:
"The Bible Belt is Israel's security belt." 360 The chairman of the Ethics and
Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention has explained
356. Id.
357. REPORT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 13, at 349.
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Stephen Farrell, Behold, Lions for Zion, TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2003, at 12
(stating that Christian conservatives' "unswerving financial, political and moral support for Israel has
made them a force that no US President, senator or congressman can ignore at election time"); Craig
Nelso, Israel Finds an Ally in U.S. Evangelicals; Christian Zionists Provide Moral, Monetary Support
in Religious War, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN (Tex.), Jan. 4, 2004, at Al ("Christian Zionists... provide
not only moral support [for Israel] but also substantial funds to Israel's sputtering economy, and they've
proven their political clout in the Bush White House.").
360. Laura Blumenfeld, Terrorism Jars Jewish, Arab Party Loyalties, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2003,
at Al.
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that two major theological reasons underlie evangelical Christians' support for
Israel: "The reason most evangelicals support Israel is that we believe in the Bible.
God gave Israel to the Jews. We believe God gave that land to them forever. The
second reason is that God says he would bless those who bless Israel and curse
those who curse Israel."36 1
The influence that evangelical support for Israel has had in maintaining the
United States' special relationship of support for the Jewish state is one illustration
of the Christian lobby's foreign policy clout in the United States. The Christian
lobby also pushes for the U.S. government to implement legislation relevant to the
rights of Christians abroad. For example, Christian groups lobbied heavily for the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).362 IRFA promotes religious
freedom overseas by creating three new governmental bodies tasked with that
responsibility, including the Department of State's Office on International
Religious Freedom. 363  The Office on International Religious Freedom issues
annual reports on the state of religious freedom in foreign states, advises the
President and Secretary of State on international religious freedom issues, and
diplomatically represents the United States on religious freedom issues.3 4 Also, in
response to the Islamist group Laskar Jihad's brutal campaign against Christians in
Indonesia, a senior fellow at Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom
suggested that the war on terrorism could include a resumption of military ties with
Indonesia in order to train and reform its military, coupled with applied pressure
for Indonesia to clamp down on its violent Islamists.
3 65
In terms of perception, some observers, particularly within the Muslim world,
view the war on terror as a series of military adventures designed to promote
Christian interests and to topple Islam.366 The U.S. government, on the other hand,
361. Maura Reynolds, Bush Commitment is Key to 'Road Map 'for Mideast, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2003, at 17 (quoting Richard Land); see also Susan Page, Mideast Presents Next Big Gamble for Bush,
USA TODAY, June 3, 2003, at 6A (noting that "evangelical Christians ... see support of Israel as a
matter of Biblical prophecy"); Yonat Shimron, Zionism in Two Varieties, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Apr. 11, 2003, at E3 (explaining Christian Zionism).
362. Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.). For a description of Christian groups lobbying for IRFA's passage, see McCormick, supra
note 199, at 330-31. However, IRFA is not narrowly focused on Christian concerns; rather, it
encompasses all religious groups that suffer from persecution abroad. See T. Jeremy Gunn, A
Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 841, 851-56 (2000).
363. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6411, 6431 (1998); 50 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1998).
364. See 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c).
365. Paul Marshall, Jihad Comes to Indonesia; Bin Laden's Allies Attempt a Hostile Takeover,
WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 31, 2001/Jan. 7, 2002, at 20. Marshall also makes a realist case for engaging
the Indonesian military, noting that "Indonesia controls most of the sea routes to Asia .... An Islamist
or fragmented Indonesia would have dramatic repercussions for the politics of Asia and the world and
would present a national security nightmare for the United States." Id.
366. See, e.g., Michael Scott Doran, The Saudi Paradox, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 2004/Feb. 2004, at 35
(observing that, following May 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh, Saudi clerics defended the attackers
as "the flower of the mujahideen," and decreed that any assistance that citizens provided in capturing
those responsible "would constitute aid to the United States in its war against Islam"); Kenya:
Commentary Says USA Using "Weapons of Mass Deception" Against Islam, BBC MONITORING INT'L
VOL. 33:2
No OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
has repeatedly stated that it is not pursuing a war against Islam.3 67 Despite this, the
view that the United States has pursued the war on terror out of a base desire to
advance Christian interests is widely held in the Muslim world, and even some
highly-educated Westerners share this view. For example, Sol Encel, an
Australian emeritus professor of sociology, described President Bush's use of the
word "crusade" to describe the war on terrorism
368 as "a gigantic Freudian slip." 36
9
Encel opined that "[a]lthough the spin doctors quickly realized the negative
implications of this usage, which was then retracted, I believe that... the original
message was the real one." 370 Regardless of the merits of Encel's analysis-and
personally, I believe that his analysis is asinine-the fact that a sociology professor
from a Western country holds these views demonstrates the propensity for a
perceived linkage between the war on terror and Christian interests.
37'
Moving beyond Western countries' foreign policy, a number of conflicts have
been raging between Christians and Muslims for years. One obvious example is
the battle between Christian Serbs and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.7 In
fact, "[t]he Serbian massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebenica in 1995 remains the
REPORTS, Jan. 4, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting an article
published in a Kenyan newspaper, which stated that America has been attempted to "equate Islam with
radicalism and terrorism," and that "[t]he events of 11 September provided it with the perfect
opportunity to wage war against Islam as an ideology"); Yasmin Moll, A Shattered Dream, EGYPT
TODAY, Dec. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting a Muslim
professor as fingering an "alliance between Christian fundamentalists, neo-cons and Zionists" who say
"this is a war against Islam... that Islam is the largest 'weapon of mass destruction"').
367. See, e.g., Pamela Hess, DOD to Investigate General's Speeches, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 21,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("After briefly characterizing the war on
terror as a 'crusade,' Bush has since taken pains to praise Islam, to differentiate terrorists from the
faithful and to meet with Muslim leaders at the White House."); Rice Reaffirms That War on Terror is
Not War on Islam, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Oct. 20, 2003, at AI0, available at LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File.
368. See John Kifner, Forget the Past: It's a War Unlike Any Other, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, §
4, at 8 ("President Bush at first spoke of a 'crusade' against evil, a word the White House swiftly
retracted when its implications became clear."); Dick Polman, So Far, Bush Handling Role as War
Leader with Aplomb, PHtLADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al ("Critics also winced last week
when Bush urged a crusade against evil-perhaps unaware that the word offends many Muslims, who
associate it with the Christian holy war against their forebears.").
369. Sol Encel, September 11 and Its Implications for Sociology; World Trade Center and
Pentagon Attacks, 2001, 223 J. Soc. 38(3), 226 (Sept. 1, 2002), available at: http://jos.sagepub.com/.
370. Id.
371. For more on other Westerners' perception that the war on terror is actually a "global crusade,"
see Slovene Dailies Say US Administration Causing Global Instability, BBC MONITORING INT'L
REPORTS, Nov. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting a Slovene daily
as opining that "Messianic-inspired Christian fundamentalists are using [the claim that Islamic terrorism
threatens Western democracies] for a modem-age Crusade under the pretence that they are leading a
war on terror"); Natasha Wallace, PM Has No Intention of Helping Aust. Detainees in Cuba, AAP
NEWSFEED, Feb. 7, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (quoting an Australian
politician who described President Bush as a "Christian fundamentalist," and likened "his war on
terrorism to the Christian crusades").
372. See Holger Jensen, Bombs Can 't Spread Love, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.),
Mar. 23, 1999, at 2A.
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largest single crime of its kind in post-1945 Europe. 373  Another example is
Sudan, where a civil war that raged between the Muslim north and Christian and
animist south between 1983 and 2004 left more than two million dead.374 In
Nigeria, "a million died in a Muslim-Christian clash between 1967 and 1970" and
"religion-related violence continues to erupt" to this day.375
Professor Jenkins notes that while "Christians have committed their share of
atrocities," at present "there is no question that the threat of intolerance and
persecution chiefly comes from the Islamic side of the equation. '376 However,
especially as demographic trends shift the center of Christendom southward,
Professor Jenkins warns that there could arise "a future Christendom not too
different from the old, defined less by any ideological harmony than by its unity
against a common outside threat."377 In that case, Professor Jenkins warns: "We
must hope that the new Res Publica Christiana does not confront an equally
militant Muslim world, Dar al-Islam, or else we really will have gone full circle
back to the worst features of the thirteenth century."
378
4. Church Assertion of Greater Authority than the State
Today the Christian faith sometimes asserts that it possesses greater authority
than the state. Such assertions occasionally manifest themselves in the Western
world. One prominent example is former Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama,
who was removed from the bench after refusing a federal court's order to remove a
statue of the Ten Commandments that he had placed outside his courthouse.379
The justification that both Moore and his supporters proffered for keeping the
statue in place was explicitly religious. Moore stated: "When a federal judge tells
373. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 170.
374. See Julia Duin, Finding the Way; Local Church Helps Sudan's 'Lost Boys,' WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2; Ted Fry, In Search of "Heaven" in America, Sudanese Boys Lost in
Heartbreaking Limbo, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at H21; Colum Lynch, Sudan Accused of
Blocking Darfur Relief, WASH. POST, May 28, 2004, at AI5 (stating that in 2004, the Bush
administration "brokerted] an agreement to end [the] 2 1-year civil war").
375. Robert McClory, Faith: Catalyst to Inflame or Unite?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2003, at 7; see
also Davan Maharaj, The World; Tension Fills Air Ahead of Nigeria Vote; Many Fear That Violent
Sectarian Clashes, Pending the Outcome of Today's National Poll, Could Undermine the Fledgling
Democracy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at 12 (stating that about 10,000 Nigerians have died in clashes
between Christians and Muslims since 1999).
376. JENKINS, supra note 17, at 170.
377. Id. at 190.
378. Id. Such a world would, in all likelihood, probably be far worse than the worst features of the
thirteenth century. Professor Jenkins conjures images of "a wave of religious conflicts reminiscent of
the Middle Ages, a new age of Christian crusades and Muslim jihads. Imagine the world of the
thirteenth century armed with nuclear warheads and anthrax." Id. at 13.
379. See John Johnson, Panel Removes Alabama's 'Ten Commandments Judge,' L.A. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2003, at Al.
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the state of Alabama that we cannot acknowledge God, we have a serious
problem."380 The national director of Operation Rescue/Operation Save America
went even further, stating that Moore was "initiating the second American
Revolution."
38'
More significant, though, are Christians in the Southern hemisphere whose
loyalty to their faith outweighs their loyalty to the state.382 These Christians'
loyalty to their religion may pose a significant challenge to the countries in which
they reside, as many of them live in weak states. Robert Kaplan has observed that
in such states "criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger," as
characterized by "the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and
regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness
of war."383 Under such conditions, the fact that many citizens' loyalties lie not
with the state but with their faith will have a dramatic impact.
V. CONCLUSION
Understanding that many Christians and Muslims believe that their faiths
possess geographical spheres of influence yields both predictive and prescriptive
conclusions. This Conclusion first addresses the predictive implications that can
be drawn from recognition of this framework. It then turns to the prescriptive
implications.
A. Predictive Implications
Predictively, one may conclude that Christians and Muslims will continue to
attempt to define, defend, and expand their religions' spheres of influence, just as
adherents to both faiths have historically done. The idea of spheres of influence-
as theologically rooted in the concept of dar al-Harb and dar al-Islam-has
informed the Islamic view of international relations for over a millennium.
Similarly, many Christians have perceived a powerful linkage between the faith
and the state ever since the Christianization of the Roman Empire.3 4 In particular,
they perceive Christianity as possessing spheres of influence in relation to Islam.
Christians and Muslims have historically used a variety of methods-ranging
from proselytism to armed struggle-to define, defend, and expand these perceived
spheres of influence.385 Just as adherents to both faiths will likely continue to
believe that their religions possess geographical spheres of influence, they will
likely continue to embrace the use of many of the mechanisms that have
historically defended and expanded these spheres. Although reliance on each of
these various methods of preserving the faiths' perceived spheres of influence will




382. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
383. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44, 46, 48.
384. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Parts III and IV (explaining the strategies employed to preserve and expand the
Christian and Muslim spheres of influence).
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The reaction of believers to intrusions into their faith's perceived sphere of
influence is likely to be most violent when the faith's preeminent position appears
to be threatened. This reaction has been true historically. For Christianity, both
the Crusades and reconquista were reactions to substantial threats to the Christian
sphere of influence. Similarly, the Inquisition was perhaps fiercest in Spain
because, after the Moors conquered Spain, Spanish Christians viewed minority
faiths as more of a threat than did Christians from elsewhere in Europe.3 8 6 More
recently, the extreme reaction to the theory of evolution in the United States was
triggered by many Christians' concern that science might displace their faith.387
And Islam, since the time of Muhammad's ascendancy as a head of state, has been
associated with a system of shariah that is designed to ensure the faith's
supremacy. When dominant understandings of the shariah are flouted, for
example, by the conspicuous presence of Christian missionaries in the Muslim
world, Muslims will perceive a greater threat to their faith's dominance. Christian
missionaries in Muslim countries are often subject to violent attacks because many
Muslims perceive them as threatening the virtual monopoly on religious expression
that Islam has enjoyed in these societies.88
Moreover, Muslims will likely continue to be especially wary of Christianity,
while Christians are likely continue to be especially wary of Islam; after all, both
states' perceived spheres of influence have largely been defined in relation to each
other for over a millennium. Highlighting the intensity of the conflict between
these faiths, Bernard Lewis has noted that "[t]he confrontation between Ottoman
Islam and European Christendom has often been likened to the Cold War of the
second half of the twentieth century."389 Because of the length and intensity of the
conflict between the two faiths, coupled with the fact that they remain the world's
two largest religions and two of the modem world's major civilizational forces,
adherents to both faiths are intensely aware of the other religion.
B. Prescriptive Implications
The understanding that Christians and Muslims believe that their faiths
possess geographic spheres of influence also yields prescriptive implications. In
terms of future relations between the two faiths, an awareness and sensitivity to
this perception may be able to reduce the propensity for violent clashes. The
contours and implications of such sensitivity to perceived religious spheres of
influence would be a fruitful and important area for future research.
In terms of prosecution of the war on terrorism, one important goal that
Western countries should keep in mind is avoiding policies that inadvertently
386. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
389. LEWIS, supra note 116, at 33. Lewis himself is not completely convinced by the analogy. For
example, he finds the difference in movement of refugees to be significant: "In the twentieth century
this movement was, overwhelmingly, from East to West; in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and even in the
seventeenth centuries, it was primarily from West to East." Id. Regardless of the difference between
the two conflicts, the fact that this analogy is taken seriously can help to provide the reader with some
sense of the intensity of the conflict between the two faiths.
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increase support for terrorist groups. Thus, it is essential that policymakers are
sensitive to both the historical and contemporary relations between Islam and
Christianity. As Professor Charles Kimball stated in response to a missionary's
comment that the bombing of Iraq was a "ripeness moment" to the extent that it
caused Muslims to question their God's power: "This is an area that lives with a
history of crusades and in the shadow of colonialism. The image of an
overwhelming military power coming in already provokes major questions about
deeper U.S. intentions." 9
A thorough understanding of the historical relations between Christianity and
Islam, as well as the manner in which both religions continue to vie with each
other for more believers and more influence, can help the United States and its
allies to avoid taking actions that may be perceived as attacks on Islam itself.
One way that Western countries engaged in the war on terrorism can help to
avoid the perception that they are engaged in an all-out battle against Islam is by
more clearly delineating who the enemy is in this war. While the U.S. government
has gone to great pains to emphasize that the war on terror is not actually a war
against Islam, a fair question is precisely against whom or what the war on
terrorism is being fought. Daniel Pipes has noted that this question "has far-
reaching implications for strategy, for public diplomacy, and for foreign and
domestic policy alike," but that the answer is not obvious. 39' Immediately
following the September 11 attacks, President Bush spoke in generalities, referring
to the "evildoers" or "the evil ones" rather than to a specific enemy against whom
the war on terror was directed.392 Now, more than three years after the September
1 th attacks, the answer has still not been adequately defined through official
channels. To illuminate this problem, we can ask whether the "war on terror" is
being waged against all terrorists. If so, why are the FARC in Colombia,3 93 and
Jewish terrorist groups Kach and Kahane Chai 394 seemingly not viewed as a part of
the war on terror? If the war on terror does not encompass all terrorists, is it being
waged against the more limited class of terrorist organizations that potentially pose
a direct threat to the United States, or to Americans? Or is this war being waged
more broadly against extremist Islamist ideology, such as the radical Wahhabi
sect?
Because no answer to these questions is immediately apparent, numerous
commentators have noted the open-ended nature of the present conflict.395 When
390. Van Biema, supra note 4, at 44.
391. Daniel Pipes, Who is the Enemy? Analysis of United States War on Terrorism, COMMENT, Jan.
2002, at 21, available at http://www.danielpipes.org/pf.php?id=103.
392. Id.
393. See, e.g., 11 Killed in Colombian City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at A13 (describing a
terrorist attack blamed on the FARC); Juan Forero, Rebels Execute 10 Hostages in Colombia, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A14 (describing another FARC atrocity).
394. See, e.g., Ron Csillag, Rabbi Compares Kach Founder to Moshe Rabeinu, CANADIAN JEWISH
NEWS, Nov. 27, 2003, at 6 (providing background on both groups); Jerry Seper, 4 Jewish Web Sites
Deemed 'Terrorist'; Designation Carrying U.S. Sanctions Extended to Internet for 1st Time, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at A2 (providing background on both groups).
395. See, e.g., Editorial, Noble Goal in Iraq Lacks Moral Foundation, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Dec.
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the war on terror appears more open-ended, and when the enemy appears ill-
defined, there is a greater chance of the war on terror being misperceived as a war
against Islam itself. Policymakers should think critically about how they define
the scope of the war. A clear definition of the enemy, and a clear definition of the
war's objective, will reap many benefits.
The Islamic sphere of influence is very real to many Muslims, and legitimate
actions that Western countries take to ensure their own security may be seen as
attempts to expand the Christian sphere of influence. If this fact is clearly
understood, policymakers may be able to formulate their methods to take account
of the perceived Muslim sphere of influence, and thus minimize the probability of
walking into a broader and more deadly conflict than they intended.
12, 2003, at 32, available at http:/natcath.org/NCR Online/archives2/2003d/121202/121202s.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2004); Simon Tisdall, Resist All Official Pol-Speak, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 13,
2003, at 14.
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DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND INDIA
ARUNABHA BHOUMIK*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four planes, crashing one each
into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.' Approximately three-thousand people from eighty-seven countries
were killed.2 That evening President Bush addressed the nation, stating that the
full resources of the intelligence and law enforcement communities would be
devoted to finding those responsible for the attacks.3 The President further stated
that, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts
and those who harbor them."4 On September 20, the President addressed a joint
session of Congress, declaring, "[o]n September the 1 th, enemies of freedom
committed an act of war against our country."' The war against terrorism was
6
soon in full swing.
Terrorism is of course not a new problem. Many have noted that history is
replete with instances of groups using violence to achieve political objectives.7
Modem terrorism, with its emphasis on "liberty and self-determination" can be
traced to the Britain's Glorious Revolution, and the use of violence for symbolic
purposes was later legitimated by the French Revolution.8 Others have noted that
terrorism was an effective tool of national liberation movements after the Second
' B.A., Binghamton Unversity, 2001; J.D. Harvard Law School, 2004. 1 am grateful to Amr Shalakany
for his guidance throughout the writing process, and to the staff of the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy. I would also like to thank Lena Lee, Susannah Tobin, Josh Goodman, Anna
Lumelsky, Ben Schiffrin, Matt Van Itallie, and Beth Schonmuller for their valuable suggestions and
encouragement.
1. N. R. Kleinfield, U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon In Day
Of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, September 12, 2001, at Al.
2. Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 328
(2002).
3. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
2 0 0 10911-16.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
4. Id.
5. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American Public
(Sept. 20, 2001) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010
9 2 0-8 .html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2004).
6. Dana Milbank, Bush Disavows Hussein-Sept. 11 Link; Administration Has Been Vague on
Issue, but President Says No Evidence Found, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2003, at A18.
7. See, e.g., Ramsey Kleff, Terrorism: The Trinity Perspective, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
VIOLENCE: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CONTROL 15 (Henry. H. Han ed., 1993) (noting
evidence of terrorism by the Israelites in the Old Testament).
8. Id. at 16.
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World War.9  During the 1970s and 1980s, the frequency of terrorist attacks
substantially increased. The U.S. Department of State, for example, recorded
13,572 incidents of international terrorism between 1968 and 1991.10 In 2002, the
State Department recorded 199 incidents of international terrorism." Furthermore,
there is good reason to believe that terrorist activity will persist in coming years.
Yonah Alexander, for example, notes that terrorism will increase because 1) it has
been successful in attracting publicity, 2) resources such as weapons, financing,
and communication are readily available, and 3) an international network of groups
and states supporting terrorism already exists.' 2 More importantly, many of the
underlying causes of terrorism, including the ideological roots of terrorist
movements, remain.'
3
Given these trends, it is clear that all governments need a comprehensive
strategy for effectively combating terrorism. This paper takes a comparative
approach to studying strategies implemented by various countries to combat
terrorism. I first examine what we mean by "terrorism." Next, I will examine
three models for dealing with terrorism: the "criminal justice" model, the
"intelligence" model, and the "war" model. Next, I will examine the
counterterrorism approaches employed by the United States, Israel, and India.
Using a functional approach, I will attempt to place each country's counterterrorist
policy within one of the three models discussed. Particular attention will be paid to
the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies in each country.
Specifically, I argue each country has adopted a war-model of counterterrorism,
and except in the case of India, has increased its application since the September
11 attacks. The "war on terror" terminology is more than just a rhetorical device.
Rather, it reflects a new model for both U.S. counterterrorism policies and those of
other countires-policies which have increasingly encroached on the civil liberties
and human rights, while at the same time ignoring the underlying causes of
terrorism and therefore exacerbating the terrorist threat.
9. See PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 21
(2000).
10. A.J. Jongman, Trends in Terrorism, 1968-1988, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 34
(Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds. 1993).
11. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1. The State Department
notes that this is a 44% decline from the 355 attacks in 2001, and the number of deaths from attacks
decreased from 3,295 to 725. Id. However, the 2001 number includes the deaths resulting from the
September 11 attacks. The vast majority incidents of international terrorism in 2002 occurred in the
Middle East and Asia. No attacks were recorded in North America. Id. at xviii. Of course, the State
Department's report does not include the large numbers of acts of purely "domestic" terrorism. See
WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 45.
12. YONAH ALEXANDER, COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES 7 (2002).
13. Id.
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Defining the Problem
Terrorism is not simply the act of madmen. It is "a calculated move in a
political game.' 14 Actors engage in terrorism with objectives in mind. Moreover,
terrorism is an important means for non-state actors who lack resources to achieve
these objectives. 15 Violence is perceived to advance objectives, most typically by
inciting fear and bringing attention to the terrorist's cause, and by increasing the
bargaining power of groups engaged in terrorism.16 Terrorism, therefore, is not
merely an act of violence; it is "propaganda by deed."'
7
Beyond these observations, however, defining "terrorism" is problematic.
First, terrorism is not a monolithic concept.' 8 Wilkinson, for example, notes that a
typology of terrorism would include distinctions between "state" and "factional"
terrorism, international and domestic terrorism, and distinctions based on politics.' 9
Ideological underpinnings may include nationalism (as in the case of the Irish
Republican Army), ideological (Germany's Red Army Faction), religio-political
terrorists (Hamas in the Middle East), and single issue terrorists (such as anti-
abortion groups).2°
Second, the term terrorism has a significant negative connotation. One
condemns something by calling it terrorism. 2' As a result, many have noted that
the terms "terrorist" and "terrorism" have become so overused that they have lost
much of their significance.22 At the same time, this continuous expansion of the
definition of the word exaggerates the threat posed by terrorism and influences
public reaction, and therefore government policy.23 For example, some have noted
that compared to traffic accidents, drug crimes, or domestic violence, terrorism is a
minor problem.24 Yet large amounts of resources are devoted to the terrorist
threat.25 As a result, terrorists have disproportionate power over policy relative to
their threat.26  More importantly, the implicit condemnation of the word
14. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY xi (1998).
15. RICHARD J. CHASDI, TAPESTRY OF TERROR: A PORTRAIT OF MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM,
1994-1999 3 (2002).
16. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 79 (2002).
17. L. Paul Bremer 1II, The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 256.
18. Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining the Problem, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 13 (David A. Charters ed., 1991).
19. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 19.
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Mitchell, supra note 18, at 13.
22. See, e.g., Kleff, supra note 7, at 17.
23. Grant Wardlaw, The Democratic Framework, in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT
ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN SIX COUNTRIES 6 (David A. Charters ed., 1994).
24. Jongman, supra note 10, at 26.
25. See Jongman, supra note 10, at 26.
26. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 4
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"terrorism" ignores the accurate if clich6 observation that, "one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter., 27 The German occupying force during the Second
World War, for example, referred to the Dutch resistance as "terrorists. '28 In 1948,
several prominent American clergyman condemned Menachem Begin for leading
"a terroristic band."29 Begin, repeatedly asserted, however, that members of his
organization were "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists.3 °
Statutory definitions have tended to ignore this terrorist/freedom-fighter
ambiguity. The United States defines terrorism as "violent acts" or acts
"dangerous to human life" that appear to be intended to i) intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping.3' Similarly, the British Prevention of Terrorism Act
of 1974 defined terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the
public in fear. 3 2 Such definitions are unsatisfying because they are the creation of
policymakers, for whom acts that constitutes "terrorism" are often self-evident.
33
In addition, in marginal cases, the ability of executive officials to use discretion in
the enforcement of statutory provisions, allows legislators to be over-inclusive in
their definitions of terrorism. Statutory definitions are therefore not useful
frameworks for understanding terrorism, and may also be poor mechanisms for
understanding a country's counterterrorist policy.
In contrast, moral ambiguities considerably curtail the ability of academics to
settle on a single definition of terrorism. In 1988, Schmid and Jongman reported
109 different definitions currently in use among leading academics.34 Eventually,
and based on comments from the academic community, Schmid put forth his own
definition:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed
by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic,
criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct
targets of the violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims
of violence are generally chosen at randomly (targets of opportunity) or
selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and
serve as message generators. Threat - and violence-based communication
processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets
(2003).
27. Mitchell, supra note 18, at 9.
28. Alex P. Schmid, The Response Problem as a Definition Problem, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 11.
29. ROBERT KUMAMOTO, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS,
1945-1976 12 (1999).
30. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000).
32. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 3.
33. See Mitchell, supra note 18, at 12.
34. Id. at 15.
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are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of
terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.
35
While Schmid's definition is comprehensive, the definition of terrorism I will
employ will differ in several ways. First, while States may engage in terrorism, I
will only be concerned with terrorism committed by sub-state actors. State
terrorism will typically involve conduct by a state against its own citizens, as was
the case in the Soviet Union under Stalin. 36  In such situations, a state's
"counterterrorist" policy is irrelevant. In situations where a state engages in direct
acts of violence against citizens of another State, such acts would constitute acts of
war. The models of counterterrorist policy that are the focus of this paper are
irrelevant in both situations. 37
Second, terrorism in this paper will only refer to activities which have the
purpose of effectuating political change. Idiosyncratic or purely "criminal"
terrorism, for example when organized crime actors use violence to prevent
prosecution, can most likely be dealt with through standard law enforcement
techniques because such terrorists will typically not have the resources of State
sponsorship or popular support that would require a state to choose between the
models discussed in this paper. In short, idiosyncratic, criminal, and state
terrorism, do not present the interesting dilemmas for democratic states that does
political sub-state terrorism.
Finally, Schmid's definition does not address the moral ambiguities of
terrorism. As mentioned earlier, policymakers perhaps do not need to concern
themselves if their definitions are over-inclusive because political forces will
dictate when they decide to employ their counterterrorist policies. However,
employing counterterrorist policy based on political preferences may lead to
accusations of hypocrisy. An over-inclusive definition may also allow a
government to use a terrorism statute to prosecute those whom legislators never
intended to come under the statute (for example, if the USA Patriot Act was used
to investigate animal rights groups). It may even be argued that such an approach
is antithetical to the rule of law.
The opposite approach is to simply condemn all terrorism. This approach is
advocated by Benjamin Netanyahu, who argues that "nothing justifies terrorism...
it is evil per se."'38 But such an approach is equally unsatisfactory because it does
not take into account the complexity of many of the world's conflicts. Where is
35. Schmid, supra note 28, at 8. However, Schmid acknowledges that his definition is too lengthy
for policymakers. Id. Eventually, Schmid asserts a legal definition of terrorism as the peace-time
equivalent of war-crimes (in other words, activities, which if committed during war time, would be
considered war-crimes).
36. See, e.g., Kleff, supra note 7, at 17-18.
37. State terrorism, here, is distinguished from state-sponsored terrorism. State-sponsored
terrorism refers to terrorism by sub-state groups which are supported by States. Unlike state terrorism,
state sponsored terrorism does raise interesting questions of which models of counterterrorist policy a
State should apply, and therefore is important to this analysis.
38. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 4.
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the line between terrorism and self-defense? Moreover, many of those who would
condemn all terrorism would agree that violence by States is often necessary.39 To
argue that members of groups may not resort to violence simply because they do
not have a State, smacks of circularity - often groups resort to terror because they
do not have their own State. A workable definition of terrorism therefore requires
sufficient flexibility to take into account the moral ambiguity of terrorism, while
not having so much flexibility so as to collapse into the quagmire of
deconstructionist nihilism.
Taking into account the idea that terrorism is the result of political
marginalization, I would therefore propose the following solution to the terrorist-
freedom-fighter dilemma: violence against a state constitutes "terrorism" when that
State is a well-working democracy. In a well-working democracy, groups would
have mechanisms to achieve political change without resorting to violence. Under
this definition, many groups which have been regarded as both "terrorists" and
"freedom-fighters," such as the African National Congress, would no longer be
considered terrorists because they were incapable of achieving their objectives
through political processes. In contrast, group which resorts to political violence
when, as an objective matter, alternatives are available, deserve the condemnation
of the term "terrorist.
''4°
Many ambiguities are avoided under this definition because the merits of
terrorists' claims are not at issue. Instead, moral ambiguities are collapsed into
questions of whether a set objectively verifiable procedural conditions generally
viewed as essential to democracy (e.g., free speech and press, secret ballots, multi-
party elections, rule of law, etc.) were met. Political responsiveness is also
something that is already measured by political scientists, albeit imperfectly. In
addition, while there is not complete agreement on what is a "democracy", there is
substantially more agreement on this than on what consititutes the differences
between terrorists and freedom-fighters.
The definition of terrorism for the purposes paper will therefore be: the use of
violence, or threat of violence, by sub-state actors, with or without the support of
some State actor, against a democratic State,4' which has the purpose of achieving
political change by instilling fear in the public or government of the target state.
B. Democracies and Terrorism
As a theoretical matter, stopping terrorism ought not be too difficult. Phillip
Heymann notes that to execute an act of terrorism, the terrorist needs a set of
42
definable things, such as access to the target, resources, and popular support.Prevention of terrorism merely requires denying the terrorist one of these
39. Id. at 70.
40. See also id. at 9 (noting that defining terrorism as "violent domestic politics" directed at
democratic regimes retains "moral clarity" for the definition).
41. I do not mean to imply that citizens of an autocratic state who are victims of political violence
do not fear or suffer. One suffers equally as the victim of violence regardless of whether that act was an
act of terrorism.
42. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 84.
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conditions. 43  Given that the problem and solution are definable, the problem
facing governments today is not preventing terrorism per se; it is preventing
terrorism within a democratic framework.44
There are several reasons why democracies will be particularly vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. First, democracies generally offer a wide degree of freedom of
movement, both within a country and across borders.4a This allows access to
targets,46 a means of escape, and the ability to seek shelter in foreign countries. 4 7
Second, free speech rights allow organizations to criticize leaders and institutions
to gain popular support,48 facilitating access to resources and recruits. This
problem is exacerbated by free association rights in democracies. 49 Third, the
constraints of democratic legal systems, with their emphasis on rights for the
accused, may make it difficult to investigate and prosecute terrorists.f ° Finally, in
addition to allowing the discussion of ideas, the free press which is necessary to
democracies allows for the uncontrolled dissemination of information about a
terrorist attack.51 A free media in a democracy therefore facilitates the very
attention that terrorist organizations seek.
Exacerbating this vulnerability is the fact that political pressures in
democracies can affect the way democracies respond to terrorist incidents.
Heymann, for example, suggests that responses to terrorism can be analyzed based
on three criteria: effectiveness, infringement of civil liberties, and political
expediency.5 2 A significant danger exists when policies infringe on civil liberties
and are also politically expedient (more so if the policy is also ineffective). The
biggest threat posed by terrorism may therefore be that the "interplay of terrorism,
public reaction, and governmental response... may severely undermine the nation's
democratic traditions.
5 3
Several authors have engaged in comparative studies of how different
countries have responded to terrorism. Christopher Hewitt (1984) approaches his
comparative analysis as an objective empiricist, with the purpose of determining
which policies have been most effective against urban terrorism.5 4 Five cases are
selected for his study: the IRA in Northern Ireland (1970-81), ETA in Spain (1975-
81), the Red Brigades/Frontline in Italy (1977-81), the Tupamaros in Uruguay
(1968-73) and EOKA in Cyprus (1955-58). 55 Using time-series analysis, Hewitt
examines the effectiveness of six counterterrorist policies: (1) ceasefires and
43. Id.; see also HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 40 (2003).
44. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 159.
45. Schmid, supra note 28, at 18.
46. Id. at 19.
47. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 19.
48. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 23.
49. Schmid, supra note 28, at 18.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 22-23.
52. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 88.
53. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 2.
54. CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES xi (1984).
55. Id. at 1-25.
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negotiations with terrorists, (2) improving economic conditions, (3) making
reforms, (4) collective punishments, (5) emergency powers and other anti-terrorist
legislation, and (6) the use of security forces.
5 6
In assessing ceasefires and negotiations, Hewitt concludes that ceasefires
result in a significant decline in violence. However, negotiations are unlikely to
result in conflict resolution because terrorist demands are often radical and
inflexible. As result, Hewitt concludes that negotiating truces with terrorist
organizations is a "short-sighted" policy that, if the truce is extended, will benefit
terrorists by giving them the opportunity to rebuild strength.57
In assessing the efficacy of improving economic conditions, Hewitt notes that
there is considerable evidence to suggest a connection between poverty and
violence.58 Economic conditions were a significant cause of violence in three of
five cases studied.59 Measuring the effect of specific government policies to
improve economic conditions is difficult because only in Northern Ireland was any
affirmative attempt to improve conditions made, and because it is always difficult
to tie specific governmental policies to economic effects. But Hewitt does
compare general economic conditions to violence rates. 60 Counter-intuitively, his
results show that there is no significant link between poor economic conditions and
terrorism, and terrorist activity may in fact be higher during good economic times.
Hewitt therefore concludes that general improvements in economic conditions
should not be expected to decrease rates of terrorism. 61 However, Hewitt does
argue that improving conditions before terrorist campaigns begin may prevent
violence before it starts, and that improving the condition of specific groups may
help reduce violence.62
In assessing the effect of reforms on terrorism, Hewitt notes that if terrorism
is the result of grievances, addressing those grievances should reduce violence.63
However, measuring the effect of reforms may be difficult because often reforms
occur in phases. Hewitt therefore breaks down "reforms" into two phases: (1)
ending the old regime, and (2) establishing new institutions. Based on this
analysis, Hewitt concludes that concessions made by governments "from a position
of weakness" will likely increase violence in the short term during the creation of
new institutions. It is only after several years that violence rates will begin to
decline. 64
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id. at 40-41.
58. Id. at 43.
59. Id. at 43-46. Northern Ireland, Italy, and Uruguay. Hewitt argues that economic conditions
were not depressed in either Cyprus or Spain, and notes that Basque (home to the ETA) was one of
richest regions of the latter.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id. at 47.
62. Id. at 43-47.
63. Id. at 47.
64. Id. at 54.
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Collective punishments were only undertaken in one of the cases in Hewitt's
study (Cyprus), and even there, they were used sparingly. The effect of collective
punishments is complicated because the level of generality upon which the
punishment is based may affect the deterrent effect of the punishment. Punishing a
large area assumes an equal distribution of terrorists within that area (which was
untrue in the case of Cyprus). Punishing a smaller area will reduce terrorism from
that area, but may simply shift it to other areas. Taking these considerations into
account, however, Hewitt concludes that collective punishments do result in a
generalized decline in terrorist activity.65  But this decline was a mere 1.7
percent.66 Collective punishments are a significant aspect of this study, and it is
important to note that even if this decline were applicable to other situations, the
small size of the decline calls into question the benefits of collective punishment as
compared to the human rights implications. In addition, the effect of collective
punishments declines with each successive punishment.67
Emergency or anti-terrorist legislation was undertaken in each case in
Hewitt's study. Hewitt examines six types of legislation in his study: (1) firearms
control; (2) requiring the population to carry identity cards; (3) increasing
investigatory powers of security forces (allowing searches of homes, arresting
people without charge); (4) the establishment of special courts and procedures; (5)
draconian penalties for terrorist offences; (6) the restriction of political rights such
as free speech or assembly. 68  Hewitt concludes that such legislation has no
discernable impact on violence.69 However, he does concede the impact may be
difficult to ascertain, most importantly because while legislation may grant certain
powers, the use of these powers by the executive will determine their effect.70
Finally, Hewitt studies two ways in which the use of security forces may
decrease terrorism. First, military forces may engage in patrols, mass searches,
and counterinsurgency tactics.7' These tactics lead to no decline in violence rates.
They are in fact highly correlated with increases in violence, though Hewitt argues
that this may be because an increase in violence causes increased patrols, rather
than the reverse.72 The second tactic that security forces may take is to arrest terror
suspects. Hewitt finds a significant relationship between arrests and decreases in
violence.73
Like Hewitt, Crelinsten and Schmid engage in cross-national study of
counterterrorist policies. Their study compares counterterrorist policies in eight
European countries: the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Austria. Crelinsten and Schmid's study differs from
65. Id. at 55-60.
66. Id. at 59.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 35.
69. Id. at 66-67.
70. Id. at 67.
71. Id. at 82-84.
72. Id. at 86.
73. Id.
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Hewitt's in two ways. First, Crelinsten and Schmid do not attempt empirical
assessment of each country's approach, instead relying on descriptions and
qualitative assessments of experts from each country.74 In addition, Crelinsten and
Schmid are concerned with analyzing counterterrorist policies through the lens of
both effectiveness and democratic acceptability.75
Crelinsten and Schmid ultimately do not create a set of "best practices," but
rather discern a set of trends for counterterrorist policies. They first place
counterterrorist policies into two categories: conciliatory, meaning either
negotiation, or reform; and repressive (criminal justice and military).76 Other axes
of classification discussed by Crelinsten and Schmid are short-term versus long
term responses, the proactiveness of responses, and whether the action deals with
the coercive (i.e. violent) capabilities or political capabilities (i.e., ability to gain
attention and support) of terrorists.77 Finally, Crelinsten and Schmid differentiate
between "domestic" and "international" responses to terrorism.
78
By comparing counterterrorist policies of different countries, Crelinsten and
Schmid discern several trends. First, the authors observe that while
counterterrorist policies in the 1970s emphasized the use of criminal justice
("legal-repressive") mechanisms and international legal instruments, there has
been a modem trend towards the use of the military because of weaknesses in the
criminal justice model.79 This trend is demonstrated by the Reagan administration
during the 1980s, which culminated in the bombing of Tripoli in April 1986.80
Second, in comparing the criminal justice and war models through the lens of
democratic acceptability, Crelinsten and Schmid note that, counterintuitively, it is
through the criminal justice model that Western countries have shifted away from
democratic acceptability. 81  This is due to common measures adopted in the
criminal justice model, including special legislation, the creation of special courts,
rules of evidence or procedure, and increased police powers. One particularly
common power is a prolonged ability to detain suspects without charge and
without access to counsel. In addition, it is in the domestic response to terrorism
that the movement away from democratic principles has been most evident.
82
Finally, Crelinsten and Schmid suggest two changes to counterterrorist policy.
First, they suggest the adoption of a definition of terrorism as the "peacetime
74. Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten, Editor's Introduction: Western Responses to
Terrorism, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 4-5 [hereinafter Editor's Intro].
75. Id. at 5.
76. Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five
Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 309 [hereinafter
Twenty-Five Year Balance].
77. Id. at 310.
78. Id. at 312.
79. Id. at 332-35.
80. Id. at 315-16.
81. Id. at 334.
82. Id. at 335.
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equivalent of war crimes." 83 Schmid argues that while such a definition would be
under-inclusive, it is more likely to achieve consensus because there is a consensus
on the definition of war crimes.84 Moreover, such a definition would reflect the
criminality of terrorism while acknowledging its political dimension." Second,
Crelinsten and Schmid suggest increased emphasis on addressing the political
capabilities of terrorist groups rather then simply their violent activities.8 6 In
practical terms, this means more emphasis on delegitimation of terrorists as
opposed to a singular focus on preventing terrorist acts. Crelinsten and Schmid
argue that such methods may enable governments to find new ways of addressing
terrorism which are more compatible with a democratic framework.
87
Charters (1994) examines counterterrorist policies in six countries: the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Israel, and the United States.88 Like Crelinsten
and Schmid, Charters engages in a comparative study of counterterrorist policies
using assessments from authors from each country examined.8 9 However, rather
than discerning trends in policies like Crelinsten and Schmid, Charters' tends to
focus predominantly on the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist
policies. 90
Charters first observes that while terrorism is not by itself a threat to
democracy, it does pose several threats to the democratic systems.91  Most
importantly, Charters notes that in most countries, terrorist activity was met with
public desire and government acquiescence in harsher counterterrorist policies that
undermine democratic values.92  The threat of domestic terrorism was a
particularly strong inducement to such policies. Only in the United States, for
example, were severe measures favored for use outside the country, presumably
because the threat to the United States remained overseas for the most part.
93
Next, Charters measures the effectiveness of several counterterrorist tactics
relevant to his study. First, he notes that negotiation was generally an ineffective
strategy because terrorists generally regarded deals as temporary ploys, not
permanent prohibitions on the use of force.94 Second, Charters notes that every
country introduced some form of target hardening (decreasing access to targets) as
counterterrorist tactic, but it was generally introduced as a reaction to attack rather
83. Id. at 336.
84. Schmid, supra note 28, at 11-12.
85. Editor's Intro, supra note 74, at 336.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 337.
88. David A. Charters, THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTY IN SIX COUNTRIES, supra note 23, at I.
89. Id. at 1-2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 212.
92. Id. at 212-13.
93. See id. at 13. Most laws passed by Congress, for example, dealt with federal authority
overseas.
94. Id. at 215.
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than as a proactive measure. 95 Charters argues that target-hardening may have
some deterrent effect, but its real value may lie on its psychological benefits.
96
Most importantly, however, target hardening demonstrates an important point:
democratic societies cannot both provide total security and maintain the openness
requisite to democracy.97 Third, Charters argues that although military reprisals
lead to some attrition in terrorist ranks, it was generally an ineffective deterrent to
terrorist activity, often leading to increased hostility.98 As a result, Charters argues
that the role of the military should be limited to hostage rescue operations which
are morally defensible, defined, and can be conducted within a constitutional
framework. 99
As for the civil liberties implications of counterterrorist policies, Charters
argues that there was no "wholesale rush to restrict freedoms" despite rhetoric
about the need to "stamp out terrorism."' 100  Charters does note several
infringements common to counterterrorist measures, including: expanded search
and arrest powers, increased periods of detention, proscription of terrorist
organizations, and expanded deportation of powers.'0  However, given the
apparent resilience of democracies in the face of terrorism, and the success in
countering terrorist attacks, Charters argues that effectiveness and liberty are
compatible (though, as noted earlier, total eradication is impossible while
maintaining democratic openness). 0 2 Charters, like Heymann, concludes that the
greatest threat comes from public reaction to the threat, not the threat itself.' 3
Fear reduction measures (such as crisis management) may therefore be some of the
most important counterterrorist measures a government should take.' 4
Finally Yonah Alexander (2002) compares counterterrorist policy in ten
countries: the United States, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Spain, the U.K., Israel,
Turkey, India, and Japan. 105 Like prior studies, Alexander relies on assessments of
policymakers in each country, with the specific intention of offering a
"comprehensive 'best practices' strategy."' 1 6  However, Alexander's study is
unique in that the individual assessments and his findings are informed by the
September 11 attacks.
Alexander divides his conclusions into two areas. First, Alexander argues
that the political and legal dynamic, reflecting the government policies vis-a-vis
95. Id. at218.
96. Id. at 219.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 219-20.
99. Id. at 220.
100. Id. at 221.
101. See id. at 222.
102. See id. at 223.
103. Id. at 224.
104. Id. at 224.
105. Yonah Alexander, Introduction to COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES,
supra note 12, at 2 [hereinafter Introduction].
106. Id..
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terrorism is crucial to explaining the success or failure of policies.10 7 He argues
that positive political environment is critical to a successful counterterrorist
policy. 08 For example, Peru was successful in its counterterrorist campaign
because the military did not substantially "interfere with the lives of the people,"
and in fact, with them, forged constructive ties. 1' 9 Alexander also argues that
Turkey's changing of its criminal procedure laws to comport with international
human rights norms aided its counterterrorist policy. 10
Second, Alexander notes several "best practices" which aid counterterrorist
policy. Alexander first notes the importance of intelligence to operational success
in counterterrorism."' Next, Alexander argues for a limited military role in
counterterrorist policy, and like Charters, cites hostage rescue as the archetypal
military role in counterterrorism." 2 Finally, citing success in Northern Ireland, but
failure in the Spanish and Israeli cases, Alexander cites "mixed results" for
negotiation with terrorist groups."
3
C. Models of Counterterrorist Policy
As noted earlier, Crelinsten and Schmid, in describing "repressive" models of
counterterrorist policy, distinguish between the "criminal justice" and "war"
models." 4 Repressive models stand in contrast to "conciliatory" models, which
seek to prevent terrorism either through negotiation or reform. Conciliatory
models change the rational calculation of terrorism by addressing grievances.
They prevent violence by reducing the benefits, thereby altering the calculus of the
terrorists' cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, repressive models seek to prevent
violence by either punishing terrorists for their acts, or physically preventing them
acting in the first place (for example by destroying a terrorist base), thereby
increasing the cost of terrorist acts.
The purpose of this section is to compare three models of a repressive
counterterrorist policy: the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and the
war model. I will first discuss the key characteristics, foreign and domestic, of
each model. Next, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each model.
Third, I will compare each model based on three variables: accountability,
collectivity, and timing. Accountability (open or secret) refers to the extent to
which state's preventative activities are open to public scrutiny. Collectivity
(individual or group) refers to the specificity of a state's counterterrorist policy,
i.e., the extent to which a state's counterterrorist policy is directed at large groups,
as opposed to being directed at individuals (or organizations) who are suspected of
being terrorists. By timing, I mean whether a policy is exclusively reactive, or
107. Yonah Alexander, Conclusion to COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES,
supra note 12, at 390 [hereinafter Conclusion].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 391.
111. Id. at 391.
112. See id. .
113. Id. at 391-92.
114. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 309.
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whether proactive measures are utilized by the government.
Three caveats should be mentioned at this point. First, the three models are
not mutually exclusive. There is, for example, a widespread consensus on the
importance of intelligence, regardless of the approach of a government S, and it
seems that every government will have to use force to some extent. These models
are therefore not meant to be exhaustive set of options available to states
employing them, but rather are merely analytical tools for understanding the
implications of policies and legislation adopted. Second, there are options
available to governments (for example, training hostage rescue specialists) that this
analysis is not concerned with because they have no civil liberties implications, nor
do they reflect choices being made among the models discussed. Finally, the
descriptions of the models below (and later the classification of the different
countries counterterrorist policies) will be functional in nature. For example, the
use of special operations personnel or undercover law enforcement agents may
come under the intelligence model, even though they technically may be military
or police units, if their use is more akin to the intelligence model when analyzed
based on the axes discussed above. The functions and implications of the activity
or policy are more important than its official classification.
Criminal Justice
The criminal justice model refers to a model in which terrorism is primarily
treated as a crime, and "the onus of response is placed upon criminal prosecution
and punishment within the rule of law."'" 6 The criminal justice model therefore
prevents terrorism in the same manner as any other crime-by deterring would be
terrorists through the threat of punishment, by communicating society's
condemnation of the act, and detaining terrorists, thereby preventing them from
committing further acts of terrorism. The paradigmatic use of the criminal justice
model will involve the capture and prosecution of a suspect after a terrorist act.
With regard to collectivity, therefore, the criminal justice model focuses on
individuals rather than groups. In addition, the rule of law in liberal democracies
depends on the public trials, which makes the criminal justice model open on the
accountability axis. Finally, since criminal statutes generally have an act
requirement, the criminal justice model will depend on the prosecution after the
fact, making it reactive as opposed to proactive.
17
Since almost all terrorist acts would be criminal regardless of motivation,"
I8
the domestic security features of the criminal justice model resemble standard
security in a liberal democratic state. Such features include clearly defined
115. David A. Charters, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Sources, Methods, Process, and Problems,
in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 18, at 227.
116. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333.
117. See A. Stuart Farson, Criminal Intelligence vs. Security Intelligence: A Reevaluation of the
Police Role in the Response to Terrorism, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
supra note 18, at 193 (noting that law enforcement is generally reactive in nature because an
investigation only begins after there is cause to believe a crime has been committed).
118. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 69-70.
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criminal statutes, a police force which investigates breaches of the law, and
punishment after individualized determination of guilt in a public trial. Beyond
these default features, a state applying a criminal justice model may supplement its
legal system with mechanisms designed specifically for the terrorist threat. For
example, a state may enhance penalties if a crime is deemed to be a terrorist act." 9
A state may also change rules of evidence and procedure in terrorist trials, or
create special courts for dealing with terrorism.120  Finally, a state may create
"advocacy crimes" which criminalize advocacy of violence, 12 1 or criminalize
membership in certain organizations. 1
22
The international aspects of the criminal justice model are limited. First, a
state employing a criminal justice model may increase cooperation with foreign
law enforcement agencies to aid in the capture and extradition of terrorist
suspects123 Second, the criminal justice model will involve cooperation among
countries to disrupt terrorists' access to finances by criminalizing the financial
support of terrorist groups (this of course can also occur at the domestic level).
Finally, the criminal justice model may involve the use of sanctions against states
which do not cooperate in counterterrorist efforts. While this last example does
not intuitively seem like "criminal justice" (and is also collective in nature), this
strategy is commonly discussed in conjunction with the criminalization of
terrorism. 24 In addition, the use of sanctions is more compatible with the rule of
law than the use of force inherent to the intelligence and war models.
The criminal justice model has several advantages. First, the criminalization
of terrorism communicates moral condemnation. Though this effect may be
negligible in many instances, in marginal cases such moral condemnation ought to
deter some terrorism. This effect can be amplified by the legitimacy of the
government criminalizing the act. Second, the prosecution of terrorists pursuant to
criminal statutes is less subject to political preferences, and is therefore more
consistent with the rule of law that is essential to democracy. 25 For example, the
prosecution of a terrorist pursuant to a pre-existing criminal statute, as opposed to
assassination based on determinations made by executive officials, is less
vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. In addition, the criminalization of terrorism is
an implicitly less violent solution, and is therefore more consistent with democratic
values. Both of these in turn increase legitimacy of the state, and consequently the
moral condemnation of criminalization. Third, the openness of the criminal justice
system increases the legitimacy of the criminal justice model, and makes it less
prone to abuses of human rights. 126 Finally, Hewitt notes that the prosecution of
119. See HEwlrT, supra note 54, at 63.
120. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 334; see also, HEYMANN supra note 14, at 122.
121. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 111; HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 106.
122. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 99; HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 108-09.
123. See WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 113.
124. See, e.g., STANSFIELD TURNER, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 234 (1991); Philip C. Wilcox,
Jr., United States, in COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 46.
125. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 115.
126. But see Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333-34. Crelinsten & Schmid argue that
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terrorists has had a significant impact on the reduction of violence. 27 However, it
is unclear whether this is merely the result of the incapacitation of the individual
terrorist, in which case incapacitation outside the criminal justice framework ought
to have the same effect.
The criminal justice model has several drawbacks. First, terrorism as defined
here is different from ordinary crime. 128 Terrorism is more organized than most
criminal activities, making punishment more difficult. This leads to a decreased
deterrent effect for the punishment relative to other crimes. In addition, since
terrorists are politically motivated, people are more likely to be sympathetic to
their cause than in the case of profit-motivated organized crime. This may
translate to greater resources, access to recruits, and increased difficulty in
detaining suspects because they can seek shelter among sympathetic groups.
Terrorism also arouses greater public fear than other organized crime, and the
stakes may be significantly higher.
129
Second, the use of criminal punishment to deter terrorism is hindered in
several ways. The deterrent effect of any criminal statute is of course hard to
measure. In addition, as I just mentioned, greater organization in the case of
terrorism leads to greater difficulty in capture, and can therefore lead to an under-
enforcement problem. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, in the case of suicide
terrorist attacks, it is impossible to increase penalties to increase deterrence.
30
Moreover, to the extent the squalid economic conditions are one of the causes of
terrorism, it is arguably impossible to increase deterrence in the case of non-
suicide terrorism as well.
Third, in the case of terrorism, it may be difficult to achieve the moral
condemnation which is essential to criminal enforcement because of popular
support that the terrorist's cause enjoys.1 31 The fourth problem with the criminal
justice model is almost the opposite: to the extent that moral condemnation is
achieved, the criminal justice model precludes later reconciliation with terrorists.
3 2
Finally, and perhaps the most significant, the criminal justice model tends to
be reactive in nature. Given the scale that modem terrorism might take, this may
make the criminal justice model simply irrelevant in combating the terrorist
threat. 1 33 Reactive forms of enforcement make sense in cases where the risk of
it is primarily via the criminal justice model that Western responses to terrorism have moved away from
democratic acceptability. However, under my model, a move away from democratic acceptability (for
example by reducing due process rights, would move a states response away from the criminal justice
model (because it is less accountable for example) and into one of the other models.
127. See HEWITT, supra note 54, at 86.
128. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 7.
129. Id. at 113.
130. Id. atxi.
131. Id. at 47.
132. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 36; but see WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 101 (arguing that
reconciliation and criminalization are not incompatible in that criminalization can be limited to those in
the terrorist groups who are unwilling to work toward peace).
133. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 154 (noting that the threat of terrorism using weapons of
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harm for each individual incident is small, and is repeated, because penalties and
enforcement techniques can be adjusted overtime to the optimal level. In contrast,
reactive enforcement is obsolete in large scale terrorist attacks, where the penalty
cannot be increased beyond punishment for a small attack. More importantly,
punishment may be irrelevant because, frankly, the damage is done.
In conclusion, the criminal justice model has the primary advantage of being
consistent with democratic values of openness and rule of law. It does, however,
have significant drawbacks, the most significant of which are the difficulty of
increasing deterrence and its predominantly reactive nature. It may therefore be an
effective tool to combat low yield terrorism where the actors are repeat players, but
it will be obsolete in efforts to combat high yield attacks.
Intelligence
The intelligence model involves the use of the intelligence apparatus of a state
as the primary mechanism of counterterrorist policy. Under this model, terrorism
is not viewed primarily as a criminal activity, but rather as a threat to the security
of the state. 34 Terrorists act in small organizations, and once this security issue is
recognized, policymakers need to know the capabilities, plans, and objectives of
these groups.13 5  The goal of intelligence investigations is therefore not
condemnation and punishment (and thus general deterrence) as in the case of the
law enforcement model, but rather to "acquire information which will allow those
with coercive capacity to prevent an undesirable outcome from taking place."'
' 36
The paradigmatic application of the intelligence model, therefore, is the use of
intelligence officers or informants to infiltrate an organization to gain information
about a group, and to then use that information to thwart an attack. 137 Like the law
enforcement model, therefore, the intelligence model focuses on individuals and
organizations rather than on collective populations. However, unlike the criminal
justice model the intelligence model tends to be preventive rather than reactive. 138
In addition to this paradigm several common counterterrorist policies can be
classified as part of an intelligence model. First, a state may expand the
investigatory powers of law enforcement beyond the investigation of criminal
activity. Typically, this will involve lower (or no) warrant requirements. 139 While
these searches may be conducted by law enforcement, I have classified them under
an intelligence model because they do not require a suspicion of a crime, but rather
a threat to security. 140  Closely connected to lower warrant requirements is the
mass destruction is qualitatively different than other forms of terrorism).
134. See FARSON, supra note 117, at 193.
135. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 105-06.
136. FARSON, supra note 117, at 222.
137. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 101.
138. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 129; FARSON, supra note 117, at 193.
139. See, e.g., HEWITT, supra note 54, at 62; HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 125-26 (noting
expansive search authority in Northern Ireland under amendments to the Emergency Provisions Act,
and in the United States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)).
140. In the case of FISA, a threat to security is in the form of foreign intelligence agents or
terrorists. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004).
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availability of involuntary confessions,"'4 the use of which would also tend to push
a state away from the criminal justice model towards an intelligence model. Lower
search requirements and the use of involuntary confessions reflect a key feature of
the intelligence model: the need to prevent violence, rather than merely punish it,
leads to more lenient rules than in the case of criminal investigation. 142 Both of
these features may be folded into a third intelligence model feature: the use of
domestic intelligence agencies rather than law enforcement for internal security.
143
Such agencies manifest the same notions as the lower warrant and confession
requirements: treating security and criminality as distinct problems with different
solutions. A fourth feature of the intelligence model is the use of deadly force
against specific targets.'44 Such force would of course occur outside the protection
of traditional notions of due process, and is therefore antithetical to the criminal
justice model.' 45 Finally, an intelligence model may involve the use of secret
tribunals to try terrorist suspects. Such tribunals may come under the auspices of
the military, but I have classified them under the intelligence model because of
their secretive nature and the specificity of their targets.
46
The primary advantage of the intelligence model is that it compensates for a
key weakness in the criminal justice model: that terrorism is a more difficult
problem than ordinary crime and therefore procedural rules should not constrain
counterterrorist policy. 47 At the same time, the intelligence model recognizes that
sub-state terrorism is also not best handled by conventional military forces. 148 In
addition, the proactive nature of the intelligence model makes it better suited than
the criminal justice model for dealing with rare and high yield terrorism. Finally,
proponents of targeted assassination under the intelligence model argue that it is
easier, less costly, and more certain than law enforcement.
149
There are several disadvantages to the intelligence model. The activities of
intelligence agencies are often secret. Not only are intelligence agencies given
expansive powers of search, and for taking confessions, they are also not limited in
what they can investigate (law enforcement are limited by the definitions of
crimes), and have no burden of proof for their findings. 50 In addition, the use of
targeted assassinations, while efficient, effectively allows for the punishment of
141. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 109.
142. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 129.
143. See HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 134-35.
144. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38; HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 115.
145. The use of deadly force in self-defense by law enforcement is qualitatively different than
targeted assassinations being discussed here.
146. When special courts are not secret and afford substantial procedural rights to defendants, they
may come under the criminal justice, rather than intelligence model. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note
14, at 122 (discussing procedures for the British "Diplock" courts which tried suspected terrorists in
Northern Ireland).
147. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333.
148. William V. Cowan, Intelligence, Rescue, Retaliation and Decision Making, in TERRORISM
AND POLITICS 5 (Barry Rubin ed., 1991).
149. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38.
150. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 138.
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individuals through executive, rather than judicial findings. Assassinations are
"lawless."'' Furthermore, even where the judiciary plays a role in the intelligence
model, it is in the form of secret courts which have the same accountability
problems. Such secrecy, while useful in counterterrorism policy, is antithetical to
democratic values. In short, because of a lack of openness and the potential for
arbitrary enforcement, the intelligence model undermines the rule of law.
15 2
War
The final model is the war model, under which counterterrorist policy relies
on the use of the military and retaliatory strikes rather than law enforcement or
intelligence operations. 153 Use of the war model increased during the 1980s
because of policymakers' increased attention to the problem of state-sponsored
terrorism. 15 4  The use of military force was therefore justified under the
international laws of self-defense. 155 The paradigmatic example of this model is
the use of the military against the government and population of another state in
response to a state's sponsorship or inaction vis-A-vis a terrorist organization. Like
the intelligence model, the war model views terrorism as a security problem rather
than a criminal one. But the distinguishing feature of the war model in comparison
to the criminal justice and the intelligence model is that it relieson the use of force
against large groups in order to achieve counterterrorist objectives. With regard to
accountability, the war model is mixed. While less accountable than the criminal
justice model (for which ultimate decision making occurs in the full light of public
accountability), the war model is inherently less secretive than the intelligence
model because the scope of the government's action (e.g., attacking a foreign
country) cannot occur without some public knowledge and therefore political
accountability. With regard to timing, the military model is also mixed. Military
retaliation is reactive, but recent U.S. policy in the area of pre-emptive strikes
indicates a move toward a proactive war model. In addition, since many of the
domestic measures I will discuss in the war model are preventative, I will classify
the war model as a proactive rather than reactive model.
Intuitively, in the international arena, the war model generally employs large
scale attacks against foreign states 156 in order to effectuate counterterrorist policy.
By definition these attacks lack precision and may involve significant collateral
151. DERSHOWrTZ, supra note 16, at 120.
152. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38.
153. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333. Crelinsten & Schmid argue that the use of
special forces also comes under the war model, but, as mentioned earlier, I treat such forces as part of
the intelligence model because their use indicates specific rather than collective targets.
154. Id. at 314.
155. See generally Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force By a State Against Terrorists in
Another Country, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL
CONTROL 243-66 (Henry H. Han ed. 1993) (discussing the international legal framework for the use of
force by states in response to terrorist attacks).
156. "Foreign state" is used loosely here to include areas under the control of organizations legally
distinct from the State employing the war model, such as the Occupied Territories in the Middle East, or
Jammu and Kashmir in South Asia.
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damage.157  Such attacks can serve several purposes. First, they can be used
preventatively to destabilize foreign governments that are considered terrorist
threats. Because we are only concerned with sub-state groups, the threat can come
from, and the response is directed against, states which sponsor terrorism, or
against states who may sell arms to terrorists (both of which were part of the
justification for the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003).58 Second,
military action can be used against a foreign state as retaliation for a terrorist attack
(as was the case in the U.S. led war against Afghanistan in the fall of 2001).159
In the domestic arena, the war model is less clear because war is generally
seen as an act taken by a state against another state. Based on the framework
developed earlier, several collective-preventative measures taken by states (in what
is sometimes called a "security model"' 60) can be considered part of the war
model. These measures include so called "target hardening" measures which seek
to prevent access to potential targets.16 ' A variation of this target hardening
measure is to generally restrict the freedom of movement, for example across sub-
national boundaries, or by requiring identification cards. 162 In addition, a state may
place severe restrictions on immigration in order to prevent terrorist infiltration.'
63
Finally, a state may engage in profiling, based on some "cheaply identifiable"
characteristics (such as ethnicity or country of origin) in order to facilitate the
prevention of attacks.164 These measures while on their face have little to do with
war, are similar to other aspects of the war model in that they apply tactics against
a set of persons which is larger than set of actual targets, because it is more
efficient to go after the larger set, and it is assumed that the larger set will include
the actual target. In other words, like collateral damage in war, these measures
force innocents to bear the costs of a policy because it is more efficient than being
precise. In addition, these measures resemble actual measures taken against
groups in times of war, such as the internment of Japanese-Americans in the
United States during World War II. As such, the inclusion of these domestic
measures in a "war" model is entirely appropriate.
There are several advantages to the war model. Like the intelligence model,
the availability of proactive measures affords the war model a significant
advantage over the criminal justice model. In addition, the (reactive) use of
157. Maurice Tugwell, Military and Paramilitary Measures, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES To
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 18, at 340.
158. Barton Gellman & Daffia Linzer, Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide, WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
2004, at Al.
159. William T. Baker & Mark L. Evans, The Year in Review 2001, U.S. NAVY'S NAVAL
AVIATION NEWS, July-Aug., 2002, at 1.
160. See Ronald D. Crelinsten & Iffet Ozut, Counterterrorism Policy in Fortress Europe:
Implications for Human Rights, in EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERRORISM: GOVERNMENTAL
POLICIES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 258 (Fernando Reinares ed. 2000).
161. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 92.
162. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 114-15.
163. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 92.
164. Symposium, Unobjectionable but Insufficient-Federal Initiatives in Response to the
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2002).
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military strength in retaliation for a terrorist attack is entirely consistent with both
moral "just war" requirements and international law. In this way, military
retaliation accomplishes the same general and specific deterrence, and
incapacitation, that the criminal justice model accomplishes.' 65  Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier, terrorism draws tremendous public attention relative to its actual
dangers. A terrorist act will be followed by tremendous public pressure on
governments to "react., 16 6 The use of military strength in response to a terrorist
attack satisfies this need, and therefore has a tremendous political advantage.
Arguably, such reaction may prevent retaliation by the public against minority
groups within the state by satiating the public's need for revenge. Finally, the war
model addresses a significant weakness in both the criminal justice and
intelligence models in that the deterrent effect is limited. Under both the criminal
justice and intelligence models, coercive action is limited to terrorists themselves.
The deterrent effect of retaliation is capped at the lives of the terrorists, and is
therefore limited since the punishment for killing one person is the same as for
killing one-hundred. In the case of suicide terrorists, the deterrent is non-existent.
The collectivity of the military models allows States to increase the penalty for a
terrorist act to include retaliation against states and civilians.
1 67
The war model has several disadvantages. First, like the intelligence model,
the main disadvantage of the war model is its effect on civil liberties. War creates
a sense of urgency and priority which belittles democracy.' 68 Moreover, domestic
aspects of the war model, such as profiling, are archetypal civil rights violations.
Many have also argued that policies such as profiling are not only unjust, they are
ineffective because of the risk of false positives, wasting resources, and because
profiling may cause security officials to ignore threats that don't fit their profile.' 69
Second, repressive policies such as profiling may anger minority groups,
leading to mistrust of government officials, decreasing the likelihood of
collaboration with minority groups in order to prevent attacks.' 70 This is part of a
broader theme of the war model: both on the domestic level, and the international
level, the war model angers target populations, and may lead to increased
terrorism171 Many have argued that often the purpose of terrorist attacks is to
provoke just such a response.'
72
165. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 68-69.
166. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 314.
167. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at xi.
168. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 114.
169. Chistopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/11, in THE WAR
ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 177-78 (Richard C. Leone & Greg
Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 99.
170. See, e.g., As'AD ABuKHALIL, BIN LADEN, ISLAM, AND AMERICA'S "WAR ON TERRORISM"
25-26 (2002).
171. Id. at 93; Heymann, supra note 14, at 100; Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 45; HEWITT, supra
note 54, at 86.
172. Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 317; D.P. SHARMA, COUNTERING TERRORISM 68
(1992).
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Third, the deterrent effect of the war model is also questionable. Heymann
notes that military strikes against foreign states may fail because the target state of
the retaliation may not have the capability to stop the terrorist, the strikes may
create united opposition against the retaliating state, and the state may continue to
support the group in secret. 73 Heymann therefore argues that a State is likely to
exaggerate the deterrent effect of its military strikes. 174  The same is true of
collective actions against populations rather than states. Some, such as Alan
Dershowitz, have argued in favor of collective punishments (such as the
destruction of Palestinian villages in response to terrorist attacks). 175 Such policies
are folly. As in the case of actions against states, collective action against groups
assumes that the groups can stop terrorists' acts (or that the terrorist cares about the
rest of the population). Moreover, the deterrent effect of destroying a village is
unclear. Assume that terrorists are rationale, and a government makes terrorists
aware of its collective punishment policy. Terrorists would take this danger into
account before deciding to attack. They would further not bank on their group not
being identified since terrorists often claim responsibility for their attacks. Assume
now that the terrorists do engage in an attack. Clearly, since they were aware of
the policy, and they did not assume they would not be caught, the destruction of a
village was not enough to deter the attack. 176  Now further assume that the
terrorists are contemplating a second attack, after a village has been destroyed.
What, now, is the deterrent effect of the collective punishment policy? The
terrorists now merely have less to fear because they have one less village to fear
destruction. In other words, after each successive attack, the terrorists' incentives
are the same, but their costs are decreasing. A state may of course increase the
collective penalty after each attack, but there is still a finite amount of punishment
a state can dole out. The deterrent effect of collective punishments such as these
would therefore decrease consistently after the first instance of punishment-a
point which is empirically verified by Hewitt, though it is unclear whether this is
the underlying reason.'
77
Finally, the war model makes international cooperation more difficult. War is
a political choice, and the war model implies terrorism is a political rather than
criminal act. 178  As such, international cooperation would require political
agreement, as opposed to the criminal act of terrorism for which international
cooperation would be easier.' 79 Second, war breeds mistrust in the international
173. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at 73.
174. Id.
175. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 176-77.
176. Of course, to counter this point by arguing that the terrorists may not be rational would
undermine the very notion of a deterrence theory to begin with, and would make collective punishments
an act of revenge.
177. See HEWITr, supra note 54, at 59.ee also Bryan Brophy-Baermann & John A.C. Conybeare,
Retaliating Against Terrorism: Rationale Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion,
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 196 (1994) (noting that rational expectations of retaliation to terrorist attacks will
undercut the deterrent effect of retaliation).
178. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 333.
179. Malcolm Anderson, Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation, in
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community, regardless of circumstance. Many in Europe, for example, fear that
after September 11, the United States is using the war against terrorism as an
excuse to pursue other foreign policy goals.1
8 0
To summarize, the war model, while possibly useful with regard to state
sponsored terrorism, and politically expedient, has significant drawbacks. Most
importantly, the war model has significant consequences for human rights,
domestically and internationally. These infringements breed support for terrorist
causes. Moreover, the deterrent effect of the war model is questionable. Finally,
the war model strains the possibility of international cooperation in counter
terrorist efforts.
D. Conclusion
There is always a tension between liberty and security. Current trends
indicate that terrorism is not a temporary phenomenon, but one that will continue
and perhaps increase in the future. As a result, the effect of counterterrorism
policies on civil liberties will be a substantial concern in coming years.
An understanding of the effect of counterterrorist policies on civil liberties
must begin with understanding what we mean by terrorism. A comprehensive
definition of terrorism, however, is difficult to derive. A definition which is under-
inclusive is vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy, as is an over-inclusive definition
which is enforced selectively. Moreover, standard definitions of terrorism may not
take into account the moral ambiguities involved when individuals choose to
engage in violence to achieve their goals. To argue that terrorism is wrong per se
is overly simplistic, and assumes a definition with which to begin. Perhaps
terrorism is always wrong, but if this is the case, a definition must include all
condemnable acts, and exclude acts which are not necessarily condemnable. To
this end, I have argued terrorism should be defined as political violence against a
democracy. Political violence against a democracy is unnecessary (and therefore
immoral given the costs) because of the ability to achieve political ends through
non-violent means. Moreover, there is less ambiguity in this definition because
defining a "democracy" is more objective than defining what political causes are
"worth" violent means and which are not.
In an effort to balance security and liberty, democracies have employed
various models of counterterrorist policy: the criminal justice model, the
intelligence model, and the war model. Each model treats terrorism as a different
type of problem, and the resulting policies can be analyzed based on three
variables: collectivity (how large to target group of the policy is relative to the
class of terrorists), accountability (how open the policies are to public scrutiny),
and timing (whether the model is predominantly reactive or proactive). These
variables reflect the security and liberty implications of each model. Table 1
EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERRORISM: GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, supra note 160, at 239-40.
180. Paul Gallis, European Counterterrorist Efforts Since September 11: Political Will and Diverse
Responses, in EUROPE AND COUNTERTERRORISM 36 (Kristin Archick ed., 2003).
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summarizes the characteristics of each model based on these variables. In the next
section, I will discuss the history and development of the counterterrorist policies
in the United States, Israel, and India paying attention to how the policies
employed by these countries reflect the choices they make between these models.
Model Key Features Collectivity Accountability Timing











War pre-emptive or Group Secret decision- proactive




Il. COMPARING APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM
Earlier, I discussed the criminal justice, intelligence, and war models of
counterterrorism. Each model reflects choices that a country makes about the
nature of the terrorist threat, the risk of harm, and choices of how to balance the
need for security with the desire for liberty. In addition, the models are not
mutually exclusive, nor do all of their features fit neatly into the variables of
accountability, collectivity, and timing. However, these models are a useful
analytical tool for categorizing a country's approach. In this section, I discuss the
counterterrorist policies of the United States, Israel, and India. I will begin each
analysis with a history of the conflicts underlying the terrorism. Next I will
discuss counterterrorist polices adopted by each country, including statutory
provisions. Finally, I will discuss any changes in each country's policy since the
attacks of September 11, 2001.
A. United States
In many ways, the United States is not a good case for studying
counterterrorist policy. The United States is different from the other examples in
this study in several ways, which affect the way its counterterrorist policies should
be viewed. First, although terrorist organizations have a specific set of grievances,
anti-American terrorism cannot be traced to a specific conflict in the same way that
the other cases in this study can. Terrorism in India is facet of various ethnic and
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regional conflicts. Anti-Israel terrorism is the result of either Israel's existence
(which upon creation, it is argued, forced Palestinians from their rightful lands), or
Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, depending on one's point of view. In
contrast, anti-American international terrorism is at best defined as the result of a
"clash of civilizations", a concept which was described by Samuel Huntington in
1996. 181 Under this view, anti-American terrorism is an assault against the West,
with America as its hegemon. A variation on this argument is that anti-American
terrorism is the result of globalization, with the United States as the leader in a
neo-liberal Westernization at the hands of multinational corporations. 182 But even
if one does not subscribe to this assessment, anti-American terrorism is the result
of a set of grievances that while definable, is best described as a vague notion of
"American foreign policy."' 83  The United States is the only country in this
analysis, therefore, where terrorism is not a facet of another discreet conflict.
Second, anti-American terrorism is unique because of the American role in world
politics. Because of American power, its counterterrorist policies play a
significant role in influencing the way other perceive U.S. counterterrorist
policies. American action sets precedent, thereby legitimating otherwise
unjustified acts.184 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, terrorism does not pose
the same threat to the state as does terrorism in India and Israel. In the case of
Israel, terrorist organizations such as Hamas have asserted that their objective is
not merely the end of a set of discrete Israeli policies, but rather then elimination of
Israel itself.185 In the case of India, while terrorist organizations have not sought
the destruction of the State, Indian government policies in Jammu and Kashmir are
the result of Indian fears about the destruction of secularism which is at the core of
Indian identity.' 86  In contrast, while terrorism is a threat to the safety of
Americans, few would argue that the State itself is threatened by anti-American
terrorism. Rather, in the case of the United States, the threat to the State comes not
from terrorism, but the response to terrorism.
History
Anti-American terrorism first became a concern of the U.S. government in the
1970s when terrorists began engaging in hijackings, assassinations, bombings, and
hostage takings aimed at U.S. interests.' 87 Between 1968 and 1986, the number of
181. See generally, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF THE WORLD ORDER (1996). See also DOUGLAS KELLNER, FROM 9/11 TO TERROR WAR: THE
DANGERS OF THE BUSH LEGACY 28 (2003).
182. See KELLNER, supra note 181, at 29; see also Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 329.
183. This should not however, be taken imply that the terrorists grievances are ill-defined or
illegitimate.
184. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 44.
185. See generally, Hamas, Charter, in ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST 54
(Barry Rubin & Judith Colp Rubin eds., 2002).
186. See SuMANTRA BOSE, KASHMIR: ROOTS OF CONFLICT, PATH TO PEACE, 8 (2003); see also
infra note 418 and accompanying text (noting that the secession of the Muslim majority Jammu and
Kashmir would be to concede that a secular India is not possible). The same argument can be extended
to separatists in other areas such as Punjab.
187. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 23.
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anti-American attacks increased from 54 to 139.188 However, as mentioned earlier,
unlike in the case of Israel and India, anti-American terrorism cannot be traced to a
discrete conflict. Rather is the result of a more vague policy orientation of the U.S.
government. Anti-American terrorism can be broken down into two categories:
domestic and foreign.
First, anti-American domestic terrorism generally refers to a wave of anti-
government terrorism that grew and then faded away in the 1990s. Such domestic
terrorist groups generally subscribed to extreme right-wing philosophies, and
sought to destroy the power of the federal government of the United States.'
89
These philosophies were interwoven with millennial fears and also involved white-
supremacist and isolationist ideologies. 190 In 1998, total membership in these
militias was estimated to be between ten and fifteen million, with 100,000 active
members.' 9' Public awareness of such groups peaked in the mid-1990s after the
bombing of the Alfred R. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City in
April, 1995.192 After an initial backlash against Arab-Americans, it was
discovered that the bombing was perpetrated by domestic terrorists who were
subsequently arrested and charged criminally. 193  Today, however, domestic
terrorism is seemingly an insignificant threat, because the events of September 11
have overshadowed the domestic terrorist threat. But while domestic terrorism is
of minor significance today, it does provide context for some of the legislation
discussed in this study, while also providing a useful point of comparison for
policies adopted since September 11.
Of more interest to this analysis is the history of foreign terrorism against the
United States. Such foreign terrorism has predominantly come from extremist
Islamist groups, who many argue are reacting to a history of intervention in the
affairs of the Muslim world. 194 First, as Kellner notes the United States intervened
in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and in the 1980s after the Soviet invasion.
195
After providing billions of dollars of support to the Afghan resistance, however,
the U.S. government under George H.W. Bush withdrew entirely from
Afghanistan, allowing a civil war to ensue that subsequently led to the rise of the
Taliban. 96 Second, U.S. tolerance for the authoritarian regime in Saudi Arabia in
pursuit of oil interests has caused significant Muslim anger at the United States. 197
Third, the role of the U.S. government in imposing sanctions against Iraq after the
1991 Gulf War, which subsequently led to a significant humanitarian crisis, has
188. Id. at 24.
189. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 14, at xxvii.
190. Id.; see also Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 32.
191. See HEYMANN, supra note 14, at xxvii.
192. See, e.g., John Kifner, Terror In Oklahoma City: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at
Al.
193. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Terror In Oklahoma: Arab Reaction; Bitterness Over Early Finger-
Pointing Toward the Middle East, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1995, at BIO.
194. Caleb Carr, A War on all Terrorism, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 1, 2004, at J-3.
195. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 118.
196. Id. at 31-33.
197. Id. at 37.
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also been cited as a cause of significant anti-American sentiment. 98 Fourth,
American support for Israel over the matter of Palestine is widely cited grievance
of terrorists groups which target the United States.' 99 While President George W.
Bush had refused to meet with Yasir Arafat,2° for example, Israel continued to
receive more foreign aid than all of sub-Saharan Africa. 20 1 Finally, some have
argued that U.S. inaction (or late action) in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Kashmir is
widely seen as the result of a hypocritical U.S. foreign policy which is indifferent
to the concerns of Muslims.
20 2
Islamist terrorist groups engaged in several acts of terrorism in the 1970s and
1980s. For example, 1979, revolutionaries seized the U.S. Embassy in Teheran
and took 52 diplomats hostage.20 3 Other incidents during the 1980s include the
bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983,204 the hijacking of the Achillo
Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1985,205 and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
over Scotland in 1988.206 Major incidents continued in the 1990s, including: the
first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993;207 the bombing of the Khobar
towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996;208 and the simultaneous bombings of U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar al Salaam, Tanzania in 1998.20  In October
2000, terrorists bombed the U.S.S. Cole while it was at port in Yemen.2 0 Finally,
on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four airliners over the United States and
crashed them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and outside Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.2 1i
198. ABUKHALIL, supra note 170, at 45.
199. Id. at 40.
200. Id. at 39.
201. Id. at 34. Since the passing of Yasir Arafat, the Bush Administration has made greater efforts
to work with the new elected Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas. See "Ariel Sharon Meets with
America's George Bush", The Economist, April 16, 2005.
202. See, e.g., Symposium: Islam, Muslims and Terrorism: Secret Evidence and Guilt by
Association, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. INT'L. L. 589 (2001).
203. John Kifner, Hostage Deal: Gap is Narrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1980, at A .
204. Thomas L. Friedman, Beirut Death Toll At 161 Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1983, at Al.
205. Robert D. McFadden, Terror In 1985: Brutal Attacks Tough Response, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1985, at Al.
206. Sheila Rule, Powerful Bomb Destroyed Pan Am Jet Over Scotland, British Investigation
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1988, at Al.
207. Robert D. McFadden, Explosion at the Twin Towers: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1993, at 1.
208. Philip Shenon, 23 U.S. Troops Die in Truck Bombing at Big Saudi Base, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
1996, at Al.
209. James C. McKinley Jr., Bombings in East Africa: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at
A].
210. John F. Bums & Steven Lee Myers, The Warship Explosion: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2000, at Al.
211. N.R. Kleinfield, U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers And Hit Pentagon in Day
of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
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Legislation
A complex array of statutes have governed U.S. counterterrorist policy.
Notably, through the 1970s and 1980s, Congress enacted a series of acts which
strengthened the ability of federal agencies to fight terrorism. In 1974, Congress
passed the 1984 Antihijacking Act and the Air Transportation Security Act which
gave the FAA authority over aircraft terrorism. 212 In 1984, Congress passed the
Act to Combat International Terrorism, giving the Department of Justice and the
Federal Buearu of Investigation (FBI) more direct authority to investigate and
prosecute those who commit crimes against Americans abroad.213 In addition, the
Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1986 made terrorist acts against Americans abroad a
federal crime, permitting arrest overseas for trial in U.S. courts.21 4
Congress also passed several acts which were designed to deal with the
problem of state sponsored terrorism. In 1979, Congress passed an amendment to
the Export Administration Act, "[which] call[ed] for the secretary of state to
annually designate states that consistently support terrorism. ' '215  This law,
combined with others, allowed the U.S. to impose sanctions against "state
sponsors" of terrorism. 216 The Anti-terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act
of 1989 prohibits arms exports to states designated as state sponsors of
terrorism.217 States designated as state sponsors of terrorism include Libya, Iran,
Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba.2" 8
With regard to investigation of terrorist organizations domestically, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), allows investigators to seek warrants
from a secret FISA court when the purpose of the warrant is to gather foreign
intelligence. 219  Unlike criminal warrants, which were governed by standards
promulgated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 220 FISA
warrants can be issued without probable cause of a crime as long as the
government can show probable cause that the primary purpose of the warrant is to
212. J. Brent Wilson, The United States' Response to International Terrorism, in TIHE DEADLY SIN
OF TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN SIX COUNTRIES, supra note 23, at
186.
213. Id.; see 1984 Act To Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706.
214. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 3071(a)-
(c), 100 Stat. 853.
215. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 29.
216. Id.
217. Wilson, supra note 212, at 187.
218. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATE SPONSORS OF TERORISM, available at
www.state.gov/s/ct/c1415 l.htm (last visited April 18, 2005).
219. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92 Stat. 1783.
220. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 2516, 2518(4)-
(5), 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994)).
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gather intelligence against a foreign power including foreign terrorist
organizations.22' Since its inception in 1978, this court has issued more than ten
thousand FISA warrants, and has denied only one.222
After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).223 The Act has several provisions
not directly related to counterterrorism policy, including provisions amending
habeas corpus procedures generally. 224  With respect to counterterrorist efforts,
AEDPA first had several provisions which were designed to discourage state
support of terrorist groups.225 For example, the statute establishes jurisdiction in
U.S. courts for civil suits against states that sponsor terrorism by creating an
exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity.22 6  In addition, the Act
prohibits military and other assistance to state sponsors of terrorism. 227 Second,
the Act requires the Secretary of State to designate certain groups as "Foreign
Terrorist Organizations" (FTOs).228 Among other things, such a designation
allows the government to freeze the assets 229 and criminalize support to such
organizations. 230  Third, the act provides for a procedure for removal, exclusion,
and denial of asylum to alien terrorists. 23 1 Finally, the act contains significant
criminal provisions related to counterterrorist efforts. These include the
221. The ability of the government to use FISA warrants against terrorist groups has substantially
increased via the USA-Patriot Act because FISA was amended to require a "significant" purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence rather than a primary purpose. See infra notes 267-276 and
accompanying text.
222. Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: Counterintelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at Al. The
lone denial occurred in a ruling made public in August 2002, where the court ruled that amendments to
FISA under the USA-Patriot Act were unconstitutional. This ruling was later overturned by a secrete
FISA appellate court in an ex parte proceeding. See generally, Ann Beeson, On the Home Front: A
Lawyer's Struggle to Defend Rights after 9/11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, supra note 169, at 307-
11 (discussing that the lone denial occurred in a ruling made public in August 2002, where the court
ruled that amendments to FISA under the USA-Patriot Act were unconstitutional. This ruling was later
overturned by a secret FISA appellate court in ex parte proceedings.)
223. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
[hereinafter AEDPA].
224. Id. §§ 101-108.
225. Id. §§ 310-330.
226. Id. § 221.
227. Id. §§ 325-327.
228. Id. § 302(a)(1).
229. Id. § 302(a)(2)(C).
230. Id. § 303(a)(1).
231. Id §§ 401, 411, 413-14.
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prohibition on providing assistance to FTOs, 232 engaging in financial transactions
with state sponsors of terrorism,233 criminal sanctions related to developing
biological weapons 234 and plastic explosives, 235 and a range of enhanced penalties
related to acts of or conspiracies to engage in terrorism.
236
Executive Action
While of course always present, use of the military and intelligence apparatus
in American counterterrorist efforts was limited through the 1990s. For example,
former President Richard Nixon employed a "collective security" approach which
relied on cooperation with other states to encourage extradition and prosecution of
suspects.237 The administrations of former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter followed a substantially similar approach,238 with the latter focusing
substantially on root causes of terrorism.239 The Reagan Administration focused
slightly more on a military approach, however, with CIA director William Casey
referring to international terrorism as a "war without borders."2 40 This policy most
notably included the bombing of Tripoli in 1986.241 Former President Ronald
Reagan also established a policy of pre-emptive military action. 242 Ultimately,
however, use of the military through the Reagan Administration was limited, with
former Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Nixon, and Carter launching no punitive
military attacks, while former Presidents Ford and Reagan launched only one
each.243
President William Jefferson Clinton Administration's use of force, while
greater, was also limited. After it was discovered that Iraqi intelligence officials
were responsible for an assassination attempt on President George H.W. Bush,
President Clinton launched missile attacks against Iraqi military installations.244
President Clinton launched another missile attack against Sudan after the 1998
embassy bombings.245
The emphasis of the Clinton administration in the 1990s was on the use of
legal mechanisms to deter terrorism. In describing U.S. counterterrorist policy, for
example, Phillip C. Wilcox Jr., former U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism
232. Id. § 303(a)(1).
233. Id. § 321(a).
234. Id. § 511.
235. Id. §§ 604, 605(c).
236. Id. §§ 701-704.
237. See Twenty-Five Year Balance, supra note 76, at 315; see also Wilson, supra note 212, at
183-84.
238. See Wilson, supra note 212, at 184-85.
239. See Twenty-Year Balance, supra note 76, at 315.
240. Id. at 316.
241. Id.
242. National Security Decision Directive 138 (Apr. 26, 1984); Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 44.
243. Turner, supra note 124, at 228.
244. Douglas Jehl, Iraqi Tells F.B.I. He Led Attempt to Kill Bush, US. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1993, at A 1; Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 44.
245. Steven Lee Myers, Bin Laden Plot Reported Against US. Sites in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1998, at A3; Wilcox, supra note 124, at 44-45.
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under the Clinton Administration argues that the seven pillars of U.S. policy
include a substantial focus on terrorism as a crime, the use of apprehension of
terrorists for deterrence, the use of diplomacy to bring terrorists to justice, and the
use of sanctions to isolate states that harbor terrorists. 246 For example, in 1997 the
Clinton Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which stated that
the United States will support counterterrorist efforts by increasing cooperation
with foreign governments and effectuating deterrence through arrest and criminal
prosecution.247 Notable prosecutions during the Clinton Administration include:
the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing, such as Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman248 and Ramsi Youssef, with the latter being prosecuted after
considerable efforts to arrest him in Pakistan; 249 and the indictment of fourteen
members of the Saudi Hizballah in June 1996 for the bombing of the Khobar
Towers.2 5 0  Finally, although FISA substantially lowered the burden of proof
required when investigators sought warrants intended to gather intelligence on
foreign terrorist organizations, the Clinton Administration continued to employ a
higher criminal standard when choosing to apply for those warrants. 251 Thus, even
when it was not required to do so, the Clinton Administration emphasized
counterterrorist efforts within traditional criminal justice principles.
Post - September 11 Developments
September 11 changed counterterrorist policies in many countries, and no
where is this more apparent in the United States. The scale of the attacks was
without precedent in the realm of sub-state terrorism, and occurred on American
soil. It was widely reported that the flights that crashed in Pennsylvania and into
the Pentagon were intended to crash into the Whitehouse and Capitol. 2  President
Bush spent most of the day flying to and from secure locations, and Vice President
Cheney subsequently resided in an undisclosed location so as to keep the President
and Vice President in separate places.2 " In short, the United States entered a crisis
mode from which in some ways it has yet to come out. Congress enacted several
pieces of legislation in the months following the attacks. These include: the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act;254 the Bioterrorism Response Act of
246. Wilcox, supra note 124, at 25.
247. PDD-39, June 21, 1999, in SUPERTERRORISM 21 1-13 (Yonah Alexander & Milton Hoenig
eds., 2001).
248. See Richard Bernstein, Bomb Trial Transcripts of Phone Calls Add Pieces to Evidence Pile,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, § 1 at 35.
249. James C. McKinley Jr., Bomb Plot, Chapter 3: Enter an Accused Master of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at BI.
250. Neil MacFarquhar, Package Bomb Kills American in Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001,
at A6.
251. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 12 (2000) [hereinafter Bremer Commission Report].
252. Roy Eccleston, Terrorists had Bush in Their Sights, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 14, 2001, at 3;
Anastasia Hendrix, Flight Delay Gave Passengers Time to Act, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 2001, at A3.
253. Mike Allen, Cheney's Vanishing Act Sparks Curiosity, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2001, at A4.
254. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(establishing the Transportation Security Administration within the Department of transportation and
providing for additional enhancements to transportation security).
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2001;255 the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002;256 the
Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2001 ;257 and the Victims of
Terrorism Relief Act of 200128 The most important piece of legislation, however,
was the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot).259 Due
to a fear of further attacks, the bill was considered on an accelerated timetable,
bypassing both the committee process and floor debate, and was ultimately passed
by wide margins (357-66 in the House and 98-1 in the Senate).26 °
USA Patriot has several components that are intended to improve the ability
of the domestic security apparatus to prevent further attacks. First, the Act
attempts to remove barriers to cooperation between the intelligence and law
enforcement communities. 261 Historically, due to legal and political barriers, law
enforcement and intelligence agencies in the United States did not sufficiently
cooperate in furthering counterterrorist efforts.262 While political barriers could
not be resolved legislatively, USA Patriot seeks to remove legal barriers to
cooperation by authorizing increased information sharing between agencies. 263 For
example, the Act modifies grand jury rules to allow disclosure of historically secret
grand jury testimony to federal officials without a court order.26 It also more
generally allows information sharing between law enforcement, intelligence,
immigration, and national security officials.265
Second, the Act has several provisions which increased the domestic
surveillance capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence officials. 266  For
example, the Act includes provisions which expanded the use of FISA to include
the use of pen registers, trap and trace devices, 267 and roving wiretaps. 268 These
255. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, §§ 101, 321-36, 116 Stat. 594 (providing for improvements to readiness levels for bioterrorist
threats, including training for emergency responders, and protection of the drug supply).
256. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §§ 201-
204, 301-309, 116 Stat. 543 (making miscellaneous improvements to information sharing between
federal agencies regarding visa applications).
257. Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat.
721 (implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings to
strengthen criminal laws relating to terrorist bombings and the financing of terrorism).
258. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, §§101-105 115 Stat. 2427
(amending the Internal Revenue code to provide tax relief for victims of the terrorist attacks against the
United States).
259. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter
Patriot Act].
260. See Michael T. McCarthy, The USA Patriot Act, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435,435 n.7 (2002).
261. Patriot Act § 203.
262. McCarthy, supra note 260, at 440.
263. Id. at 439.
264. Patriot Act §§ 203(a)(1)(C)(i)-(iii).
265. Id. at § 203(b).
266. Id. at §§ 201-202, 204, 206, 209, 214, 216-217, 225.
267. Id. § 214; McCarthy, supra note 2603, at 446 (explaining that pen registers and trap and trace
devices record the date time, and telephone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls, but not the content
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provisions are uncontroversial, however, because many of these capabilities were
already available for criminal investigations.269 Of greater controversy is the
expansion of the definition of pen registers, and trap and trace devices to include
devices which allow the tracking of e-mail and Internet usage. Civil libertarians
argue that this is a significant expansion in the government's surveillance
authority, which requires a significant faith in the government not to use such
information for improper purposes.27' Moreover, although the monitoring
authority was not extended to the "content" of an e-mail, "content" remained
undefined (for example in the case of e-mail subject lines).
272
The surveillance capabilities of the government were also substantially
increased through an expansion of the ability of investigators to obtain FISA
warrants.273 As discussed earlier, FISA authorized wiretaps where the purpose of
the tap was to obtain intelligence about a foreign power (including a terrorist
organization).274 USA Patriot changed the word "purpose" to "significant
purpose" in the FISA warrant requirement.275 As a result, the lower standards of
the FISA requirement could be applied where the government intended the
information to be used in a criminal investigation, as long as there was also a
11276On ctb"significant purpose" of gaining intelligence information. On October 31,2001,
Attorney General Ashcroft ruled that the government may also eavesdrop on phone
calls between lawyers and clients if there was "reasonable suspicion" to justify
such an action.277
Third, the Act also increases the surveillance capabilities of the government in
the area of financial transactions. Prior to September 11, international financing
and money laundering for terrorist networks was widely regarded as a significant
problem.278 To correct for this, USA Patriot requires banks to monitor and report
suspicious transactions.279 Such reports are to be shared by the Treasury
Department to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. 28 0 The Act also
2811
provides for government access to credit records without notification.
of the calls).
268. Patriot Act § 206; see McCarthy, supra note 260, at 445 (explaining that roving wiretaps
authorize wiretaps on any phone that a target may use, making individuals, not the equipment the object
of a warrant).
269. See McCarthy, supra note 260, at 445.
270. Patriot Act § 216(a)(3).
271. McCarthy, supra note 260, at 444-46.
272. Id. at 446.
273. Id. at 444-45.
274. Id. at 445.
275. Patriot Act § 218.
276. See generally Beeson, supra note 222, at 307-11 (noting that this provision of FISA was found
constitutional by an appellate FISA court in November 2002; it was the first time a FISA court opinion
'was released to the public).
277. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 101.
278. McCarthy, supra note 260, at 447.
279. Id. at 448.
280. Patriot Act § 358.
281. Id.
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Finally, USA Patriot greatly expands the ability of the government to detain
individuals who have not been convicted of criminal or immigration violations.
Under the AEDPA of 1996 legislation, the government was authorized to detain
and remove aliens convicted of certain crimes. 282  Where their home countries
would not accept them, these convicted persons were detained indefinitely.283
USA Patriot expands power of the government to detain non-citizens suspected of
terrorism for seven days, after which criminal or immigration charges must be
brought.284 However, since the 1996 legislation, indefinite detention is allowed
where the country of origin will not accept a detainee; in effect, USA Patriot
allows for the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism.
285
USA Patriot is only one facet of a greater move of the U.S. government away
from the democratic principles in counterterrorist efforts. While USA Patriot
allows for the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism where their
country of origin will not accept them, in several cases, the government has
exerted this authority in the case of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist activity.
For example, Yasser Hamdi is an American citizen who was captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan and is currently being detained in a military brig, having
been designated an "enemy combatant" by the government.2 86 In another case,
Jose Padilla (an American citizen born in Brooklyn), was arrested by federal
agents in May 2003 at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago.287 Padilla stands
accused of planning to detonate a "dirty bomb" on American soil. 288 The U.S.
government has held Padilla in solitary confinement, without trial and without
access to a lawyer.289 The case of Mr. Padilla demonstrates the worst fears of civil
libertarians: a citizen, born in the United States, accused of committing a crime in
the United States, and arrested on American soil, cannot avail himself of the
criminal justice system because the government accuses him of being a terrorist.
290
282. AEDPA §§ 422-423
283. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688-89 (2001).
284. Patriot Act § 412.
285. See McCarthy, supra note 260, at 449. The indefinite detention of those suspected of
terrorism is in fact exactly what the Bush Administration originally proposed under USA Patriot. See
Patriot Act § 412.
286. See Neil A. Lewis, Court Affirms Bush's Power to Detain Citizen as Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2003 at, A16. In July 2003, the Fourth Circuit held that Hamdi could not challenge his designation
as an enemy combatant. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The court stated that because a wartime president was due great
deference in conducting a fight against terrorism, courts should not question Hamdi's detention as a
result of his designation as an "enemy combatant." Id. at 463 n3. The Supreme Court subsequently
vacated and remanded the Fourth Circuit's opinion, holding that under Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), Hamdi was entitled to notice as to the factual basis for his designation as an enemy
combatant, and to rebut the Government's factual assertions.
287. See William Glaberson, Judges Question Detention ofAmerican, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003,
at A19.
288. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d. Cir. 2003).
289. Id. at 700.
290. In 2003, the Second Circuit held that the President's constitutional powers "do not extend to
the detention as an enemy combatant of an American citizen seized within the country away from a
zone of combat." Id. at 724. Furthermore, the court held that the detention of Padilla was in violation of
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Moreover, even in cases where criminal charges have been brought, the
government has indicated that where it is convenient, it is willing to move
prosecution outside the auspices of the criminal justice system. For example, Ali
Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari student, was charged with lying to the FBI and
credit card fraud. 291  Al-Marri was later designated an enemy combatant and
moved into military custody.292 This case represents the first time an individual
who originally faced criminal charges has been moved into enemy combatant
status.293 In the case of Zacarias Moussaoui the alleged "20th hijacker" in the
September 11 attacks, the U.S. government has indicated a willingness to move the
criminal prosecution to a military tribunal if the courts upheld the Moussaoui's
Sixth Amendment right to prepare a defense by speaking with suspected al-Qaeda
members being held by the government. 294 These examples are consistent with the
Bush administration policy, announced on November 13, 2001, that foreign
terrorists would be tried in military tribunals, rather than criminal courts.2 95 Such
tribunals would be made up of military officers and members of the executive
branch rather than an independent judiciary. Rules of evidence are substantially
relaxed, and the identity of witnesses hidden.296 No civilian judicial review is
available.297
Finally, the administration has used other executive rules to increase its ability
to detain persons in furtherance of its war on terror. For example, the executive
branch has wide discretion in the administration of immigration laws. Since
September 11, the U.S. government has used this discretion for the purposes of
interrogation or incapacitation; for example, by delaying hearings or deportations
for persons who have technically violated visa regulations.298 Another technique
involves the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals who are a part
the Non-Detention Act, which provides that, "no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by
the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." d.at 718. The Second Circuit specifically
rejected the argument that the Congress authorized the detention in its authorization of the use of force
following the September 11 attacks. Padilla, 352 U.S. at 724; see also Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)(hereinafter "AUMF"). The 4th Circuit,
however, used the AUMF to justify Hamdi's detention in light of the Non-Detention Act. Hamdi, 316
F.3d at 467-68; 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004). This position was subsequently adopted by the Supreme
Court in the Hamdi case. 124 S.Ct at 2640. In March 2005, a federal judge held that Mr. Padilla's
detention was not authorized by the AUMF, and order Mr. Padilla released. See Padilla v. Hanfi, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921 (February 28, 2004).




294. See Philip Shenon, U.S. to Appeal Ruling on 9/11 Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at
A28.
295. Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407, 1410 (2002). See
also Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 331 (noting the benefits of using military tribunals to try suspected al
Qaeda terrorists, and the legal basis for doing so).
296. Dickenson, supra note 295, at 1415.
297. Id. at 1417-18.
298. Id. at 1414.
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of a large and indefinite class of prospective grand jury witnesses.2 9 Both of these
techniques have been used to reach a broad class of individuals who may be
connected to terrorism, in order to reach a narrow class of individuals for whom
probable cause exists. Using these techniques, the Bush Administration had
arrested or detained over 1200 persons, mostly Muslim or Arab, by November
2001,300
Internationally, the policy of the U.S. government since the September 11
attacks has been to emphasize the proactive use of military force to deter and
prevent terrorist attacks.3 °1 With regard to the specific class of terrorists, the
Government has engaged in several actions which demonstrate a move away from
the use of law to prevent terrorism. First, as discussed already, President Bush
signed an executive order providing for the trial of terrorists in military
tribunals.30 2 In the case of combatants captured in Afghanistan, the United States
detained these combatants at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
30 3
These combatants were, according to the Bush Administration, "unlawful
combatants," occupying a gray area between laws-neither prisoners of war
protected by the Geneva Conventions, nor criminals subject to the benefits of the
U.S. criminal justice system.3 4 Second, the United States has captured terrorists
off the battlefield, via efforts on the part of the intelligence community along with
cooperation with foreign governments. For example, the United States captured
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, a top Al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan in March
2003.305 However, in contrast to terrorists captured in very similar circumstances
in the 1990s, such as Ramzi Youssef (participant in the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing), Mohammad remains in the custody of the intelligence community, and
has yet to be charged with a crime.306 Finally, in some cases, the United States has
engaged in a policy of targeted assassination of terrorists suspects. For example, in
November 2002, it was widely reported that a Predator drone had been used to
assassinate al Qaeda operatives in Yemen. 30 7 While prior to September 11 there
was a substantial debate within the U.S. government as to the merits of such
action, 308 apparently that debate was resolved in favor of assassination.
299. Id. The grand jury has historically been controlled by prosecutors with limited judicial
oversight. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
300. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 101.
301. See Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 57.
302. Dickinson, supra note 295, at 1410.
303. Id. at 1415.
304. KELLNER, supra note 181, at 178. See also Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-43
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
305. David Johnston, Raid on Feb. 13 Smoothed Way in Qaeda Arrest, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 4, 2003,
at Al.
306. Kamran Khan, Al-Qaida Strategist Arrested, ContraCostaTimes.com, (Mar. 2, 2003), at
http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/5300268.html.
307. David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by
Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16.
308. Wilcox Jr., supra note 124, at 38.
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More generally, the United States has declared a policy of pre-emptive
military strikes in order to deter future attacks. The administration first employed
a broad based military operation as part of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
President Bush's statement to the public on the day that war began made it clear
that this conduct was part of the "war on terror., 30 9  Later, the administration
announced the so called "Bush Doctrine" of pre-emptive military strikes on states
that pose an imminent threat to the United States.31 ° Subsequently, the United
States launched an invasion of Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. The
justifications for this pre-emptive war were varied. The administration discussed
Saddam Hussein's support for terrorist groups (though never specifically stating
that Saddam Hussein was connected to the September 11 attacks). 311  The
administration also discussed the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein, under
which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had been killed.312 Most notably, the
administration argued that the Iraqi regime had continuously tried to develop
weapons of mass destruction in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.313
Such weapons posed an "imminent risk" to American security because they could
be provided to terrorists targeting the United States. 314 Subsequent to the end of
major fighting in Iraq, the Bush Administration declared that Iraq was now the
"central front" in the war on terror (seemingly because international terrorists who
descended upon Iraq oppose the U.S. presence there).3t 5 Thus, while the
connection between Iraq and terrorism is debatable to many, the war in Iraq was
almost certainly a part of the U.S. government's "war on terror.",
316
B. Israel
Terrorism has plagued the territory that is today Israel since before the
creation of that State. Particularly after the September 11 attacks, Israeli policy is
viewed by many as a useful model for emulation.317 However, the Israeli terrorism
experience differs from the American experience in several ways. First, and most
importantly, unlike the United States, since its creation, counterterrorist policy has
been a critical aspect of Israel's security structure.3 8 This is because, unlike in
other countries, the object of many groups that target Israel is to destroy the state
309. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban
Military Installations in Afghanistan, (Oct. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011007-8.html.
310. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Sept. 17, 2002) at 15,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.





315. Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, 5 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/full.html.
316. Whether it should have been part of that war is, of course, another question.
317. Noemi Gal-Or, Countering Terrorism in Israel, in THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM, supra
note 23, at 146.
318. Id.
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itself.319 Second, while the United States has confronted issues of state sponsored
terrorism, the role of other Arab states in anti-Israel terror is particularly poignant.
Anti-Israel terror by Palestinian militants was often a low-cost proxy war being
waged by Arab states against Israel, in which Arab states could attack Israel, while
avoiding risking the lives of their own nationals. 320 Finally, while there is a steady
stream of attacks against both the United States and Israel, the United States has
not faced a situation comparable to the Intifada which rose in 1987, or more
recently the 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada.32' Many argue that such conditions resemble
insurrections, 322 or a war between two states, 3 23 rather than terrorist campaigns. As
a result, unlike in the American case, anti-Israel terrorism is merely a facet of a
wider conflict. These factors, and the geography of the Middle East itself, yield an
Israeli terrorist experience which is drastically different from that of the United
States.
Historjy
While anti-American terrorism is a response to globalization, or a set of
conditions believed to constitute American foreign policy, anti-Israeli terrorism
can be traced to a discrete issue, namely, the establishment of the state of Israel in
the Middle East. This grievance has since been expanded to include the allegedly
illegal occupation of Arab lands, and Israeli treatment of Palestinians under their
authority.324
After World War I, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was
entrusted to Great Britain.325  The British opened Palestine up to Jewish
immigration, the subsequent influx of whom led to periodic violence between to
326the two groups. After years of conflict, including violence perpetrated by
Jewish rebel groups such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Irgun gang) and the Lohamy
Heruth Israel (LEHI, or Stem Gang), the State of Israel was established on May
14, 1948.327 Immediately, members of the Arab league declared war on the newly
established Jewish state. 321 Conflicts followed in 1956-57, 1967, 1969-1970, 1972,
319. Id. at 145. An Al-Fatah publication, for example, argues that the "The liberation action is not
only the removal of an armed imperialist base, but more important - it is the destruction of a society."
Id. at 13-40 (citation omitted).
320. See Gary C. Gambill, The Balance of Terror: War by Other Means in the Contemporary
Middle East, 28 J. PALESTINE. STUD. 56, (1998). See also, Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 139.
321. See Al-Aqsa Intifada, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aqsa_Intifada (last modified Nov. 9,
2004) (offering a brief description of the term).
322. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 141.
323. Shlomo Gazit, Israel, in COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 12, at 256.
324. See Kleff, supra note 7, at 18.
325. See British Mandate of Palestine, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British-Mandate_of_Palestine (last modified Nov. 9, 2004) (offering a
brief explanation).
326. Id.
327. See generally TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS & POSSIBILITIES OF
LEGAL CONTROL 11-53 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
328. Matthew H. James, Keeping the Peace--British, Israeli, and Japanese Legislative Responses
to Terrorism, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 405, 428 (1997).
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and 1982.329
During the 1950s, Palestinians based in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan staged cross-
border attacks against Israel, which were met with Israeli military operations
against the host governments. 330  The Palestinian Liberation Organization was
founded in 1964, and during the subsequent decades, anti-Israeli terrorism, at the
hands of organizations such as Al-Fatah, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) became regular phenomena. 331  Attacks were directed both
internally and externally, most memorably involving the killing of eleven Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.332
The conflict was complicated by the Israeli occupation (after their victory
following a pre-emptive strike in the 1967 war), of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.333 From 1967 to
1974, the Labor government and its Defense minister Moshe Dayan, engaged in a
policy of limiting the Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories in order to curb
animosity towards the occupying force.334 However, with the rise of a government
of the right-wing Likud party in the late 1970s, this policy was reversed in favor of
increased visibility of the Israeli occupation. It included less attention paid to the
treatment of residents of the territories, and the creation of a policy of Israeli
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip, which involved expropriation of
uncultivated Arab lands in those territories. 335 These policies eventually
culminated in the first Intafada (popular uprising) in 1987.336
In the 1990s, beginning with talks in Madrid in 1991, a series of peace
agreements nurtured the hope of an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1993
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres from Israel and
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles (the Oslo
Agreement).337 This along with subsequent agreements such as Oslo I in 1994,
Oslo II in 1995, the Hebron agreement in 1995, the Wye River Memorandums of
1998 and 1999 established and implemented a framework for a lasting 
peace. 338
During this time, the Israeli Defence Ministry reported a greater than 90 percent
decline in terrorism in Israel and the Occupied Territories.33 In September 2000,
with peace talks at a critical juncture, Likud Knesset member Ariel Sharon visited
the Temple Mount, setting of the new Al-Aqsa Intafada.340 The peace talks were
329. Id.
330. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 140.
331. Id. at 141.
332. Gazit, supra note 323, at 231.
333. James, supra note 328, at 428 n123.
334. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 234.
335. Id. at 234-35.
336. Id. at 235.
337. CHASDI supra note 15, at 289.
338. Id. at 287.
339. Gazit, supra note 323, at 238. The number of attacks decline continuously from 3,142 in
1993, to 242 in 1999. The greatest decline was from 1994 (2198) to 1995 (560). Id.
340. See Things Fall Apart, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2000, at 29-30.
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subsequently tabled by Prime Minister Barak in October 2000.34 1  Sharon was
elected to Prime Minister in February 2001.342
Legislation
Like any country, Israel's Penal law is one mechanism to punish terrorism
when the act in and of itself would be criminal,343 and Israeli law permits the death
penalty in cases of terrorism. 344  In addition, unlike American law, Israeli law
makes failure to prevent a felony a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years
imprisonment.345 Such a statute allows for the prosecution of those who do not
directly participate in terrorist acts. Other provisions of the penal law also provide
Israeli courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction in the cases of crimes against
humanity, against the State of Israel, or against Israeli residents or national.346
The most significant legislation, however, is Israel's Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance, enacted in 1948.347 While terrorism is not defined in the Ordinance,
management or membership in a terrorist organization is punishable by
imprisonment up to 20 years or 5 years, respectively. 348 The act also criminalizes
support for a terrorist organization, such as providing money, resources or a place
for a meeting.349 Significantly, the act differs from U.S. law by making advocacy
on behalf of a terrorist organization or the possession of propaganda from a
terrorist organization, criminal offenses punishable by up to a 1000 pound fine and
three years imprisonment.350  A 1980 amendment to the Ordinance also makes
public displays of support, such as displaying a flag or slogan, a criminal act.3 5 1
Finally, the 1948 Ordinance granted broad authority to the military to enforce
many of its provisions.352 For example, the military was granted the authority to
confiscate any property of a terrorist organization,353 and to close down any facility
341. See id. at 31.
342. Sharon's Famous Victory, Barak's Crushing Defeat, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 47.
343. James, supra note 328, at 435.
344. Gazit, supra note, 323 at 250.
345. Penal Law, 1977, art.262, Laws of the State of Israel Article 262 states: "Every person who,
knowing that a person designs to commit a felony, fails to use all reasonable means to prevent the
commission or completion thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.
346. James, supra note 328, at 435-36.
347. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 76, (1948).
348. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, §§ 2, 3. Membership in a terrorist organization may be
presumed if a person is present "in a place serving a terrorist organization or its members as a place of
action, meeting or storage." § 9(b).
349. Id. §§ 4(d),(e).
350. Id. §§ 4(a)-(c). Such incitement offenses are extremely limited under U.S. law. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). (noting that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.")
351. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance Amendment, § 1, 1980, S.H. 187.
352. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, § 6(a).
353. Id. §§ 5(a)-(b).
VOL. 33:2
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
which services a terrorist organization or their members.354 Furthermore, offenses
under the statute were to be prosecuted by military tribunals,355 under the
procedures of military courts. 56 Judgments of the military tribunals were
reviewed by the Minister of Defense,357 but not subject to civilian judicial
review. 358 However, the military role was removed when these provisions were
repealed in the 1980 Amendments to the Ordinance.35 9
The final consideration for understanding Israeli anti-terrorist legislation is
the Proclamation on Law and Administration which was made at the time of Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and the, Gaza Strip. The Proclamation is a
continuation of the British Mandate Defense (Emergency) Regulations which were
enacted in 19 4 5 .
360 These regulations granted broad authority to the military to
detain and try suspected terrorists.361 In addition, to serve as a deterrent to a person
who would give shelter to terrorists, the military was given the authority to
demolish homes or dwellings of terrorists caught or killed.362 The legal obligations
in the occupied territories were complicated, however, given the concurrent
applications of Israeli, military, and local law.363 In practice, this led to two justice
systems based on the nationality of the accused, with Jewish Underground
terrorists being tried in Israeli courts, and others being tried in military tribunals.
36 4
Executive Action
The primary responsibility for Israeli counterterrorist policy is placed in one
of Israel's three intelligence services: the General Security Service (GSS, or
SHABAK), the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Branch, and the Mossad (Israeli
intelligence services).365 In addition to the measures discussed earlier, several
aspects of Israel's domestic security apparatus are worth mentioning here. First,
like in the United States, Israeli investigators have broader investigative
capabilities than are available in regular criminal investigations. For example,
Israel allowed for "investigative arrests" and prolonged interrogations in cases of
political violence. 366 Until recently, these measures were generally not available in
the United States. Moreover, Israel allows its intelligence agencies to act outside
the rules that generally restrict law enforcement personnel as long as the fruits of
their investigation are used by policynakers, rather than as evidence in criminal
354. Id. § 6(a).
355. Id. § 12(a).
356. Id. § 12(d).
357. Id. § 15(a).
358. Id. § 16.
359. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment), § 5, 1980, S.H. 187.
360. James, supra note 328, at 436.
361. Gazit, supra note 323, at 251.
362. Id. Israeli courts have ruled that such detention and demolitions are subject to judicial review.
See Heymann, supra note 26, at 95-96. In the U.S., the availability of judicial review for such
detentions is an open question. See e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
363. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 151.
364. Id.
365. Gazit, supra note 323, at 235.
366. HEYMANN, supra note 14, at I11.
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trials.367 This practice comports with U.S practice prior to September 11, but as
discussed earlier, under USA-Patriot, American investigators now operate under
relaxed rules, even if they intend the information to be used in criminal trials.
Related to this is the use of torture by Israeli intelligence officials. The GSS
took primary responsibility in internal security. While their operations were
generally secret, in 1987, their procedures came under scrutiny through an internal
government investigation that became known as the Landau Report. 368 Among
other things, the report found that the GSS had used force to extract information
and confessions from terrorist suspects. 369 The report also found that GSS officers,
with the assistance of military attorneys, had deliberately deceived judges when
suspects had claimed that their confessions were extracted by illegal means. 370 The
report ultimately legitimized psychological tactics, and moderate physical pressure
to extract information, but specifically prohibited torture.37' Israeli courts have
also banned the use of torture in investigations.372
The Israeli security apparatus is also subject to substantially less oversight
than in the American case. As already mentioned, oversight in the case of torture
was made difficult by GSS officers deliberately misleading judges about the use of
torture.373 In another case, in 1984, the government had actively covered up the
role of GSS officers in the killing of two terrorists in their custody.374 The
government took steps to censor press reports of the incident, and the subsequent
internal GSS investigation was classified.375  Eventually, GSS officers were
cleared by an internal disciplinary committee, despite the fact that they were guilty
of murder.376 After the Prime Minister was told of the events, he reprimanded the
officials for giving him information he did not want to hear.377 Eventually, after
the attorney general launched an investigation into the events, four senior GSS
officials were pardoned for their role.37 8  In contrast, in 1995, the CIA under
President Clinton fired two senior officials and reprimanded others after it was
discovered that one of their sources had been involved in the murder of a U.S.
citizen and the husband of another citizen.
379
367. Id. at 140.
368. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, P.D. 28.
369. Id. at 6-10.
370. See generally id. at 5-10.
371. Id. at 14.
372. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel (Sept. 6., 1999). The Supreme
Court of Israel held that the prohibition against torture is absolute under both Israeli and International
law, noting that there are few exceptions. However, the court did leave open the question whether
investigators subjected to criminal prosecution for torturing a suspect (in order to prevent the loss of
human life, as in the case of a "ticking bomb") may assert a necessity defense. See id. at 29-31, 39.
373. See generally, id. at 5-10.
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375. Id.
376. Id. at 118-19.
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Finally, internal counterterrorist measures have often led to a visible and large
scale security state in Israel. This policy has already been discussed in the context
of Likud policy in the Occupied Territories in the 1970s.380 The policy has also
included significant target hardening, such as the development of an extensive
security apparatus to protect air traffic to and from Israel.38' In situations where
Israel has found itself with insufficient information to thwart specific attacks, it has
often resorted to "lock-down" mechanisms, involving security screenings in public
places, and the limiting of the freedom of movement, especially the movement of
Palestinians to and from the Occupied Territories. 82 As a result of these measures,
it has been argued that these measures have turned the State of Israel into a
"garrison-police state. 38 3
Israel's counterterrorism policy in the occupied territories was developed and
is implemented primarily by the IDF.384 The policy has generally invoked the use
of maximum force, and involved three general principles:
1) Israeli territory must be sealed up against terrorists; 2) Israel will hit back at
the terrorists no matter where they are; and 3) neighboring and enemy states,
including their civilian populations, that host, tolerate on their soil, and shelter
anti-Israel terrorists cannot evade responsibility and escape being drawn into this
violent circle.
385
This policy manifested itself first in Jordan, where Israeli reprisals led to the
expulsion of Palestinian terrorists in 1970.386 Later retaliations against Syria led to
restrictions by the Syrian government on attacks by Palestinians from within Syria
or the Golan Heights. 387 Finally, after the inability of Lebanon to control attacks
from within its borders (due to civil war in that country), Israel invaded Lebanon in
1982.388 However, some have argued that while this military approach was
understandable in the first decades of Israel's existence (when terrorism was a part
of hostile relations with Arab states), it has been more the result of intuition and
389inertia than strategic calculation in recent years.
Recent Developments
As discussed earlier, in September 2000, a new Intafada erupted in the
380. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 234 and discussion, supra part III.B. "History".
381. Gazit, supra note 323, at 242.
382. Id. at 243.
383. CHASDI, supra note 15, at 288.
384. Combating Terrorism: How Five Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-85 (April 2000), at 16-17; see also Gal-Or, supra
note 317, at 147.
385. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 156.
386. Gazit, supra note 323, at 236. This event, known as "Black September," involved a
confrontation between the Jordanian Army and PLO militias, and included Syrian incursions into
Jordan with the assistance of PLO rebels. See id. at 416.n3.
387. Gazit, supra note 328, at 236.
388. See Why Did Israel Invade Lebanon in 1982?, PalestineFacts.com, (last visited Nov. 15,
2004), available at http.www.palestinefacts.com/pfL1967to1991lebanon198x_backgd.php.
389. Gal-Or, supra note 317, at 147.
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Occupied Territories after then Knesset member Ariel Sharon visited the Temple
Mount, angering the Arab population.3 9 0 This Al-Aqsa Intafada has changed the
nature of the threat faced by Israel, predominantly in scale. The new threat, it has
been argued, more closely resembles a war between states than a terrorist threat.39'
As a result of these events, peace negotiations ended in October 2000 and Sharon
was elected to Prime Minister in February 2001.392 The immediate effect of these
events from the security perspective is the reversion to the security state
apparatuses referred to earlier. For example, using the military, Israel has created a
large-scale defensive security system throughout the settlements, and
transportation routes to and from them, in the Occupied Territories.393 In addition,
the Israeli Defense Ministry, along with other agencies, has deployed large
numbers of security guards in public areas inside Israel.394
Given this escalation in the year prior, it would perhaps be understandable if
the events of September 11 did not significantly alter the situation in Israel.
Alternatively, decreased American pressure on Israel in light of its own
experiences, may have allowed for an escalation in the Israel. In other words, the
American government was less likely to criticize Israel for responding harshly to
terrorist attacks, either because (a) it substantively "understood" Israel's action; (b)
the American public would not tolerate criticism of Israel as a kindred victim of
terrorist attacks; (c) in light of the Bush Administration's "us/them" binary,
criticism of Israel would be viewed as "siding with the terrorists"; or (d) because
American pressure would have appeared hypocritical in light of America's
response to September 11.
There is some evidence of these escalations in the two years since September
11. For example, after a series of attacks in the spring of 2002, Israel launched one
of its most extensive forays into the Occupied Territories in years.395 The
incursion involved significant casualties on both sides, and included a siege on the
headquarters of Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat.396 The incursions
also involved a significant attack on a Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin, which
was surrounded by rumors of a massacre of up to 500 Palestinian civilians there.397
Ultimately, a United Nations investigation found that there had in fact been no
"massacre" - total casualties numbered 52, with civilian casualties of about 14-
20. 9  Additionally, in spring 2003 after a series of terrorist acts, Israel launched
air strikes against terrorist camps in Syria- the first time Israel forces had
attacked Syria in 30 years.399 Israel has also continued a policy of pre-emptive
390. See Things FallApart, supra note 340, at 29-30.
391. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 256.
392. See Sharon's Famous Victory, Barak's Crushing Defeat, supra note 342, at 47-48.
393. Gazit, supra note 323, at 256-57.
394. See id. at 257.
395. See After the Assault, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 43.
396. See id.
397. Naught for your comfort, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, at 11.
398. Id.
399. Israeli Frustration Versus Syrian Impotence, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 47.
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military strikes on the Occupied Territories in order to thwart potential terrorist
attacks.40 0 Finally, as an extension of its security state apparatus, in recent months,
the Israeli government finalized plans for a "security fence" to protect Israel
against terrorist attacks.40 1 While the Israeli government has argued that the fence
would keep out terrorists, the fence has been criticized as being a significant
infringement on Palestinian liberty and economic well-being.40 2 In addition, rather
than respecting pre-1967 borders, the fence expropriates large tracts of Arab land
in the Occupied Territories in order to fence in Jewish settlements there.40 3 In sum,
while September 11 did not change Israeli policy, a lack of pressure, combined
with distractions due to the American invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, have
allowed the Israeli government to escalate its responses to terrorist attacks against
Israel. 4°4
C. India
Although receiving less media attention in the United States than anti-
American and anti-Israeli terrorism, anti-Indian terrorism is one of the most
significant threats in the world today. With over one-hundred thousand casualties,
terrorism has taken more lives in India than any other country.405 This threat
exacerbates the seemingly intractable tensions between India and Pakistan, which
have fought three wars since the countries obtained independence in 1947. The
Indian government has repeatedly asserted that anti-Indian terrorism has been both
covertly and overtly supported by Pakistan.4° 6  As in the case of Israel and
Palestine, therefore, terrorist attacks against India have repeatedly subverted the
Indo-Pak peace process.40 7 With the presence of nuclear weapons in both India
and Pakistan, there is a significant threat that terrorist attacks in India may escalate
conflict between India and Pakistan, leading to the possibility of nuclear war on the
Indian sub-continent (a situation which occurred in late 2001 after terrorists
bombed the Indian parliament). 4 8 It is for this reason that President Clinton once
remarked that South Asia is "the most dangerous place on Earth."4° 9 An additional
consideration when thinking about terrorism in India is its relationship to broader
400. Greg Myre, Israelis Kill 3 Hamas Militants and a Young Boy in Ramallah, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2, 2003, at A8.
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tensions of Indian society. Unlike the predominantly external threat of terrorism in
the United States and Israel, terrorism in India is generally related to separatist
movements resulting from the significant ethnic and religious cleavages within
Indian society.410 These movements, India argues, is in tension with the secular
essence of Indian society. 411 As a result, the threat of terrorism is more than a
threat to human life-it is seen as a threat to the very core of the Indian identity.
History
The major threat of terrorism in India today is that within and related to the
disputed states of Kashmir and Jammu, discussed below. In addition, I will be
discussing terrorist activity related to separatist movements in the state of Punjab
in the 1980s. While this movement is no longer a significant threat in India, it was
the impetus for some of the anti-terrorist legislation discussed. The Punjabi case
also provides a useful point of comparison to current Indian policy.
412
Terrorism in Punjab is related to separatist intentions of Sikhs in Punjab.
Upon independence from Great Britain, India was partitioned into the majority
Hindu state of India and the majority Muslim state of Pakistan (East and West,
with East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh in 197 1).4 13 Smaller religious groups,
including the Sikhs, were not considered in this partition.41 4 As result, partition
resulted in approximately 2.5 million Sikhs being displaced from their homes in
West Punjab (today part of Pakistan). 415 The Indian constitution was also a cause
of significant grievances in the Sikh community because it defined Sikhism as part
of the Hindu religion.416 This clause was viewed as a threat to the separate Sikh
identity.417  In addition, the Indian central government was seen as placing
significant economic burdens on Sikhs, which included the expropriation of land,
the diversion of water, and a reduction in government investment in Punjab.418
After the dismissal of the government of Punjab in 1980, in which the Sikh party
Akali Dal held a majority, the movement turned to terrorism. 419 In 1984, following
series of escalating steps, including Akali Dal's preventing the shipping of Punjabi
wheat and withholding taxes to the central government, India deployed 100,000
troops in Punjab.42 ° In addition, in June, 1984, the Indian government launched
Operation Blue Star a large scale assault against alleged terrorists in Punjab, and
included an attack on the Golden Temple complex (a Sikh religious site), which
410. Marwah, supra note 405, at 301-02.
411. Id. at 311.
412. Although I will not discuss them specifically, additional terrorist movements in India-include
separatist movements in Northeast India (in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Tripura), and in South
India (in Tamil Nadu). Marwah, supra note 405, at 326.
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417. Jaskaran Kaur, A Judicial Blackout: Judicial Impunity for Disappearances in Punjab, India,
15 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 269, 270 (2002).
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the Indian government alleged was being used as the headquarters for the terrorist
movement. 421 In response, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was killed by her Sikh
bodyguard in October 1984.422
Following the death of Indira Gandhi, attempts were made at a political
solution to the problems in Punjab.423 On July 25, 1985 a peace accord was signed
by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali Dal president Harchand
Singh.424 However, after the Akali Dal came to power as a result of statewide
elections, the central government once again dismissed the state government in
1987.425 More violence followed, and the Indian government responded with a
second assault on the Golden Temple complex in 1988.426 This latter assault,
named Operation Black Thunder, was far more successful, however, and resulted
in no civilian deaths.427 Nevertheless, terrorist attacks continued into their worst
phase after Black Thunder, with nearly ten thousand persons killed from 1988 to
1992.428 In 1992, the Indian government revived the political process and held
statewide elections. This resulted in a significant decline in terrorist activity,
which ended for the most part by 1995.429
The rise and decline of terrorism related to Sikh separatism stands in stark
contrast to terrorism related to Jammu and Kashmir. The region, which has
significant strategic and symbolic value, has been the source of seemingly endless
hostilities between India and Pakistan, both of which claim the territory.430 The
dispute was caused by the undecided fate of Jammu and Kashmir at the time of
partition.43' While the Hindu states of India were partitioned into secular India, the
predominantly Muslim portion of the country was carved into the Islamic state of
Pakistan. However, the status of 562 princely states were left undecided.432 These
included Jammu and Kashmir, which had a predominantly Muslim population, but
a Hindu prince, Maharajah Hari Singh.433 Several states had Muslim rulers and
Hindu majorities as well, but the accession of these states, indeed most states, to
either India or Pakistan was uncontroversial due to territorial contiguity.434
Kashmir, however, shared borders with both India and Pakistan, though its ties to
Pakistan were arguably stronger.435 Before the final disposition of the state could
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be decided, violence broke out when Pakistani militants launched an incursion into
western Kashmir in October 1947.436 In an exchange that evidently foreshadowed
the language of the conflict decades later, the government of Kashmir protested,
arguing that Pakistan was supporting the militants, while Pakistan denied support,
arguing that the militants were responding to atrocities perpetrated against the
Muslim population in Kashmir.437 Maharajah Singh sought the assistance of India
in resisting the invasion, and in return, assented to Indian annexation of the
territory.
438
Since 1947, the status of Jammu and Kashmir has been contested by both
parties. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir during that time,
the most recent of which occurred in 1999 after Pakistan launched an incursion
into the Kargil region of the territory.439 In addition, since the late 1980s, Kashmiri
terrorist groups have committed almost continuous acts of violence against Indian
targets. 440 According to the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, from 1989 to 1999
terrorist incidents and Jammu and Kashmir averaged over 3700 incidents per year,
and resulting in an average of over 2100 deaths per year.44 1 Significant incidents
during this time included the kidnapping of the daughter of the Indian Home
Minister in December 1989,44 the kidnapping of Indian Oil Company executive K.
Doraiswamy in 1991,4 3 and the burning down of a Sufi Shrine in Srinigar in
December 1995.444 In 1996, parliamentary elections were revived in Kashmir, and
again in 1998 and 1999. The elections corresponded with some decrease in
violence, though the number of terrorist incidents remains high." 5
Legislation
With ethnic and social cleavages imposing strong pressures on the state, it is
unsurprising that the India has established a complicated legislative and
constitutional framework for dealing with terrorism. Prior to the recent Prevention
of Terrorism Act, enacted in 2002 (discussed later), the most significant anti-
terrorism legislation enacted by the Indian parliament was the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act.44 6  An additional consideration for
understanding the Indian response to terrorism is its preventative detention
legislation, most notably the National Security Act of 1980.447 The Indian design
436. Id. at 33.
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is draconian in comparison to the American, and reflects the fear of separatism and
communal pressures which are at the heart of the Indian state identity.
448
In 1987, in response to the situation in Punjab, the Indian parliament passed
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA).4 9  TADA is
similar to other counterterrorism laws in providing for definitions and punishments
for various terrorism related activities. First, TADA elaborately defines a terrorist
act to include various threats to life and property which is intended to "strike terror
in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or
to adversely affect harmony amongst different sections of the people. '45°
Interestingly, in addition to acts intended to strike fear, the TADA definition of
terrorist act also included acts intended to "overawe the Government. 'A 5 For both
types of acts, TADA provides for capital punishment if the act results in death or
up to life imprison for other acts. TADA also criminalizes conspiracies and
attempts to commit terrorist acts,452 as well as harboring or concealing a
terrorist, 453 or possessing property derived from terrorist acts.
454
In addition to these basic provisions, TADA also contained various
proscriptions which went beyond its counterparts in the United States. For
example, in addition to proscribing harboring or concealing terrorists, TADA also
criminalized advocating or abetting terrorist acts,455 the latter of which includes the
mere communication or association with terrorists. 456  In addition, TADA
proscribed membership in terrorist groups. Finally, TADA also proscribed various
"disruptive activities," which included not only acts that disrupt the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of India, but also acts which "question" such sovereignty or
territorial integrity, or "support any claim.., directly or indirectly... for the cession
of and part of India, or secession of any part of India from the Union.'A57 Any of
these advocacy crimes were punishable by up to life imprisonment.
TADA also provided for the creation of "Designated Courts" which had
exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of its provisions.458 These courts were
closed to the public, 459 and provided significantly diminished procedural
protections for suspected terrorists. For example, where the potential punishment
rity%20%27%26M%3Dl%26K%3D450%26U%3D1 [hereinafter NSA].
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was not more than three years, the court was authorized to conduct a "summary
trial," though it was free to recall witnesses or rehear a case where circumstances
warranted.4 6° In addition, TADA provided reduced evidentiary burdens in the
Designated Courts, for example, for confessions 46' and eyewitnesses
identifications. 462  Finally, TADA created a presumption of guilt in situations
where arms or explosives were found in the possession of the accused and were
similar to those used in the act, or the accused's fingerprints were found at the
scene or on arms or vehicles used in the act, or where the accused rendered "any
financial assistance to a person accused of or reasonably suspected of [a terrorist
act] ,,463
TADA did create some protections for the accused, including Miranda type
protections for confessions, 464 and the right to appeal. 465 But despite these nominal
protections, TADA was prone to substantial abuse by the Indian government, often
being applied in areas not afflicted by terrorism. 466  Faced with substantial
criticism, the Indian government allowed TADA to expire in 1995.467
In addition to laws such as TADA, the Indian constitution authorizes the
central government to provide for preventative detention in matters related to
foreign affairs, defense, or security. 468 Unlike in the United States, the Indian
preventative detention provisions could be employed without criminal charge.469
Since independence, the Indian parliament has enacted several statutes authorizing
preventative detention, the most recent of which is the National Security Act of
1980 (hereinafter "NSA"). 470 Under the NSA, the Indian Central government, or
any State government, may order the detention of an individual in order to prevent
him or her from acting in a manner "prejudicial to the [defense] of India, the
relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India. '4 7 1 The statute
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charge). In.the United States, preventative detentions have been held constitutional by the Supreme
Court where criminal charges have been filed. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Arguably, current U.S. government practices could be characterized as preventative detentions, even
though they are the result of immigration violations or material witness's warrants. However, the very
need for the U.S. government to provide such justifications demonstrates that difference between
American and Indian approaches.
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requires detention orders to meet with the same procedural requirements as a
warrant under the ordinary criminal procedure code.472 The statute sets a
maximum detention period of twelve months.473 Under the NSA, some procedural
protections exist for accused persons, though they are ultimately ineffective
safeguards. The detaining authority is required to inform the detainee of the cause
for the detention, 474 and of his or her rights under the constitution.4 75 In addition,
within three weeks of the date of detention, the detention must be reported to an
advisory board476 which is to rule as to whether there is sufficient cause to justify
the detention.477 However proceedings before the advisory board are informal,
with no formal fmdings or rules of evidence, and the accused has no right to
counsel or of confrontation.478 More generally, judicial deference to executive
authorities as to the existence of security risks substantially curtails protections for
detainees under the NSA.479
Executive Action
Beyond these legislative measures, India's counterterrorist policies have
tended to be dominated by its military and paramilitary apparatus. The belief that
Pakistan has both covertly and overtly supported anti-Indian terrorism most likely
form part of the explanation for this phenomenon. In addition, India's
constitutional structure, like the United States's, divides sovereign authority
between the State and Central governments. Law and order has traditionally been
a State issue.480 As a result, the Indian central government has treated terrorism
first as a law and order problem to be dealt with by State governments, and then,
upon deterioration, escalated the conflict by responding with military and
paramilitary forces.48 '
The Indian government's drastic measures in Punjab illustrate this approach
well. In response to the increasing militant violence in Punjab, the Indian Central
government took control of the State in imposed direct rule on the State in 1984.482
In addition, in June 1984, the Indian government launched the infamous
"Operation BlueStar," a wide spread assault on Punjabi militants.483  The
centerpiece of the Operation was an assault on the Golden Temple Complex at
Amritsar.484 The Indian government had alleged that the Golden Temple was
472. Id. § 4.
473. Id. § 13.
474. Jinks, supra note 468, at 336.
475. Id. at 337.
476. NSA § 10.
477. Id. § 11.
478. Jinks, supra note 468, at 335-36.
479. See id. at 329.
480. See Marwah, supra note 405, at 303.
481. Id.
482. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDIA: ARMS AND ABUSES IN INDIAN PUNJAB AND
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being used as a headquarters for Punjabi militants. 48 5 The operation also included
assaults on forty one other sites, and involved the use of seventy thousand troops,
the expulsion of foreign journalists, and the imposition of a statewide curfew.486 In
the end, the government reported the deaths of 493 terrorists and eighty-three army
personnel, although eyewitnesses reported between four thousand and eight
thousand persons killed.487 In addition, over six thousand persons were detained
following the assault, and several thousand more were arrested in operations
throughout Punjab in subsequent months.488
In subsequent years, significant abuses by Indian security forces continued. A
1994 Human Rights Watch report noted that security forces had engaged in
summary executions, and had been issued shoot-to-kill orders.489 In addition,
security forces had conducted mass round-ups and warrantless house-to-house
searches for suspected militants. 490 The use of torture was also condoned by
Indian officials, both as a means of extracting information, and as a form of
reprisal. 491 For example, after one attack on security forces, two hunderd persons
were detained and tortured near Kathunangal.492 Finally, "forced disappearances"
had been widespread in Punjab.493 In general, these policies were not only
tolerated, but encouraged by government officials in India.494 Since 1992, the
separatist violence has been in significant decline, which many believe is the result
of the resumption of political processes and state elections in Punjab.495 Others,
however, have noted continued impunity for human rights abuses there.496
In Kashmir, the response of the Indian government has been even more
severe. Just as in the case of Punjab, following the onset of separatist violence, the
Indian government imposed direct rule on Kashmir in January 1990.4 97 This was
followed by a steady escalation of the conflict between security forces and
militants. In January 1993, for example, nearly forty civilians were massacred
near Sopore by Indian Border Security forces.498 In addition, beginning in 1995,
the Indian government began arming and training local auxiliaries to supplement
485. Marwah, supra note 405, at 305.
486. Kaur, supra note 417, at 271.
487, Id.




492. Id. at 3.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. See, e.g., Marwah, supra note 405, at 310.
496. See generally Kaur, supra note 417 (noting the widespread occurrence of disappearances in
Punjab and impunity for government officials responsible).
497. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEHIND THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: ABUSES BY INDIAN SECURITY
FORCES AND MILITANTS CONTINUE (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/
[hereinafter Behind Kashmir].
498. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDIA'S SECRET ARMY IN KASHMIR: NEW PATTERNS OF ABUSE
EMERGE IN THE CONFLICT (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/campagns/kashmir/1996/
[hereinafter India's Secret Army].
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security forces. 499 Regarding these paramilitary units, a 1996 India Today article
noted, "[they have become the] centerpiece of the counterinsurgency operations in
the Valley... Used initially as intelligence sources-to help in flushing-out
operations-they are now also being used as "prowlers": they take part in the
security forces' armed encounters with militants .... 500 By 1999, nearly 400,000
security personnel were deployed by the Indian government in Kashmir. °1
Both military and paramilitary forces have been responsible for gross human
rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. As in the case of Punjab, these have
included extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, and torture. °2 Security
legislation for the area authorizes shoot-to-kill orders and the destruction of
property.5 3 In addition, there is a widespread incidence of rape of local women at
the hands of Indian security forces and paramilitary groups.5°4 Attacks against
human rights workers and journalists have also been documented.50 5 As in the




On October 24, 2001, just six weeks after the September 11 attacks, the
Indian government issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO). 507
Then, on March 27, 2002, the Indian parliament gave the ordinance permanent
effect by passing the highly controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002
(POTA) to replace the lapsed TADA.50 8 Counter intuitively given the timing of its
passage, POTA was significantly less drastic than TADA, perhaps reflecting the
deep seated criticism that TADA faced during its existence. POTA's basic
provisions were similar to TADA in the definitions of terrorist acts, the
criminalization of support for terrorism, and the proscription of the proceeds of
terrorist acts.5 9 The act also provides for the seizure of property connected to
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Like TADA, POTA establishes Special courts with exclusive jurisdiction to
try terrorist offenses and supplemental jurisdiction to try other offenses. 512 Like
the Courts under TADA, the POTA Courts have the authority to try certain
offenses in a summary fashion if the punishment does not exceed three years.5t 3
The requirements for confessions are similar to those in TADA.514 POTA also
places similar presumptions of guilt as under TADA.515 Finally, POTA gives some
protections to the accused, notably by allowing them to consult with counsel.516
Family must also be notified whenever someone is arrested under the Act.
517
POTA departs from TADA in establishing a procedure for the declaration of
terrorist organizations under the Act.518  Membership in such organization is
criminalized, as is providing support to such organizations. 519  The Act also
establishes a procedure for organizations wishing to challenge their status as
terrorist organizations.52 ° In addition, POTA is substantially different from TADA
in allowing for interception of electronic communications. Like the Patriot Act,
POTA is designed to expand the investigatory powers of the state to take into
account changing technology.52' POTA requires investigators to apply to a
Competent Authority, rather than a judicial officer, for a warrant to intercept
electronic communications if there is reason to believe a terrorist act will occur.
522
The dominant criticism of POTA is that, like TADA, it can be used to arrest
political opposition not engaged in terrorist acts.523 For example, the definition of
terrorist act includes intents not only to threaten the security, but also the "unity"
of India, and incorporates not only acts of violence but "any other means" which
"disrupt services. ' 524 In other words, POTA, if the government so chooses, could
be interpreted to proscribe acts of civil disobedience such as labor strikes. A
Human Rights Watch Report issued in March 2003 noted that POTA had in fact
been used against political opponents and religious minorities. 525  This has
included the arrest of leaders of various political parties not only in Kashmir, but in
the states of Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. 26
512. Id. §§ 23, 25.
513. Id. § 29(2).
514. Id. § 32.
515. Id. § 53.
516. Id. § 52(4). However, counsel does not have to be present at all times during interrogation. Id.
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Beyond legislative avenues, September 11 arguably escalated the scope of
India's counterterrorist efforts. The relationship between the September 11 attacks
and Indian counterterrorism efforts is complicated. At one level, many have long
argued that anti-Indian terrorism, especially as related to Kashmir, was part of a
broader Islamic militant movement which conducted attacks against the United
States. 527 The fact that many Kashmiri militants were supported by Pakistan and
were trained in Afghanistan seemed to lend credibility to this argument. Beyond
this, the political milieu of South Asia was drastically changed post-9/ 11. The
United States invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks was executed with
the support of the Pakistani government, angering Pakistani hardliners.52' Pakistan
currently continues to support U.S. counterterrorist efforts, for example, in
assisting in the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 529 To the extent that that the
government of Pakistan needs their support, it is safe to assume that an escalation
of the Kashmir conflict would be necessary to appease these hardliners. If
Pakistan, or elements of the Pakistani government, supports anti-Indian terrorism,
as the Indian government claims, there would be an increase in terrorism, and
countermeasures by the Indian government as a response to the American "war on
terror," and now, perhaps, the American invasion of Iraq.
Although perhaps not appropriately described as an escalation, in the year
after those attacks, two episodes demonstrated India's approach to
counterterrorism in the post-9/11 world. First, on December 13, 2001, terrorists
allegedly trained by Pakistan attacked the Indian parliament.53 ° India blamed
Pakistan, and in the weeks that followed, tensions between the two escalated as the
world feared a possible nuclear exchange.5 3 1 Crisis was averted when Pakistan
arrested leaders and followers of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, two
groups India blamed for the attacks.532 Just a few months later, however, this
scenario was repeated when militants in Kashmir attacked an Indian soldier and his
family on May 14, and then an Indian police station on May 30.533 While it is
arguably absurd to risk nuclear attack because of terrorist attacks, both episodes
reflect the reality of Indian counterterrorist efforts-India sees Kashmir related
terrorism as war by proxy. It responds in kind. At the very least, terrorism had
continued to prevent meaningful negotiations for peace because, like Israel, India
continued to argue that negotiations would not occur until acts of violence
ceased.534
527. See, e.g., Marwah, supra note 405, at 336.
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IV. CONCLUSION
After examining counterterrorism in the United States, Israel, and India, we
can attempt to classify each country's policies into one of the three models
discussed earlier, the criminal justice model, the intelligence model, and the war
model. As discussed earlier, each country's policies are categorized using three
variables of analysis which reflect important civil liberties and democratic values:
collectivity, accountability, and timing. Under the criminal justice model,
punishment is exacted in a manner which is most consistent with democratic
values; it is open, reactive, and individualized. The intelligence model is
individualized, secretive, and application tends to be preventative. Finally, the war
model is applied collectively, and application tends to be preventative and in
secret, though the more collectively it is applied, the less secretive the action taken
can be. Using the variables discussed, it is clear that each of these countries is
currently committed to a war model of counterterrorism. Such a model is
problematic, not only because of the civil liberties and human rights implications
of the model, but also because the approach has been combined with an
unwillingness of each government to address the underlying causes of terrorism.
The United States' commitment to the war model is of course demonstrated
by its execution of the "war on terror." First, the United States has engaged in
several policies which indicate a willingness to take a collectivist approach toward
counterterrorism rather than and individualized one. Domestically, using material
witness warrants and immigration laws, the U.S. government has detained over
twelve hundred persons who have not committed acts of terrorism. In addition, in
early 2004, the U.S. government began a program to photograph and fingerprint all
persons entering the country.535 While the merits and civil liberties implications of
this program are debatable, it is clear that the U.S. government is continuing to
expand the reach of its counterterrorist efforts. The program is also a paradigmatic
example of the "security" model, which is the domestic counterpart of the war
model. Internationally, this collectivist approach is demonstrated by the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq that the United States fought in the two years after the
September 11 attacks as part of its war on terror. These wars, as well as the Bush
administrations classification of the "axis of evil," and pressures placed on Syria
and Iran since September 11, demonstrate a more general willingness to hold states
responsible for terrorist attacks. As in the domestic examples, these policies reflect
a collectivist approach of the U.S. government, which is willing to take action
against large classes of persons in order to reach the smaller class of terrorists.
Second, the U.S. government has moved away from a reactive model and towards
a preventative model of counterterrorism. Domestically, the detention of persons
suspected of having ties to terrorism, rather than merely those who are suspected of
and Pakistan, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 27. 2004. Most recently, the establishment of a bus route
between Srinigar (the capitol of Indian held Kashmir) and Muzaffarabad (the capitol of Pakistani held
Kashmir) gave parties on both sides renewed optimism for a negotiated settlement. See "All Aboard?;
India and Pakistan", The Economist, February 19, 2005.
535. Abby Goodnough & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Institutes Fingerprinting at Entry Points, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at Al.
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committing terrorist acts, is a quintessential preventive act. In addition, the USA
Patriot Act expanded the surveillance powers of the government to allow it to use
FISA to obtain warrants for pen registers and trap and trace devices (including the
ability to monitor e-mail), as well as to obtain roving wiretaps. Like detentions,
these efforts reflect an increased emphasis on preventing attacks rather than
punishing those guilty of committing acts. Internationally, the Bush
Administration has engaged in targeted assassinations at the individual level, and
preemptive strikes at the collective level-as in Iraq. All of these events indicate a
move away from reactive efforts towards a preemptive model of counterterrorism.
Finally, U.S. policy is becoming increasingly less transparent and accountable.
For example, as discussed, USA Patriot expanded the use of the secret FISA court
to obtain warrants in counterterrorist efforts. In addition, the U.S. government has
indicated a decreased willingness to use an open criminal justice system for those
it accuses of terrorist acts. Rather, as in the cases of Yasser Hamdi, Jose Padilla,
and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, the government has opted for secret military
tribunals, and it has indicated its willingness to do so in the case of Zacarias
Moussaoui. In cases such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and those captured in
Afghanistan, it has avoided criminal charges entirely. In sum, the current U.S.
policy, with its increasing secrecy and its emphasis on collective prevention, has
unabashedly moved towards a war model of counterterrorism.
Israeli policy also clearly tracks the war model under the relevant variables.
First, Israel's collectivist approach is demonstrated by various policies, including
target hardening and lock-down mechanisms, security screenings in public places,
limitations on the freedom of movement, and the development of the so called
security fence in the Occupied Territories. In addition, in the Occupied Territories,
Israeli military action in the Occupied Territories, (such as those that were
undertaken in the spring of 2002), and statutes such as those allowing for the
demolition of homes, reflect similar collectivist tendencies in Israeli policy. Israeli
military action against Jordan, Lebanon, and most recently against Syria, reflect
similar tendencies. Second, Israeli policy has tended to be less transparent and
accountable. Primary domestic counterterrorism responsibility falls on one of its
three intelligence services, the General Security Services, the Israeli Defense
Forces Intelligence Branch, and the Mossad. These agencies have resorted to
torture in order to obtain information, and have generally been subject to less
oversight than their American counterparts. Moreover, like the United States,
Israel has tended to rely on military tribunals rather than open courts in cases of
terrorism (at least in the case of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories). Finally,
like current U.S. policy, the Israeli policies, such as preventative detention and
target assassinations, reflect an increased emphasis on preventative action rather
than the reactive enforcement of the criminal justice model.
India, perhaps more than any of the other the countries in this study, has
consistently followed a war model of counterterrorism. First, with respect to
collectivity, in both Punjab and Kashmir, India deployed massive numbers of
troops in order to counter insurgencies there. In Punjab, the infamous Operation
Blue Star involved not only the deployment of large numbers of troops, but the
killing and detention of vast numbers of persons. While not on the same scale,
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similar widespread searches and roundups of militants continued for years
afterwards. In Kashmir, the Indian army or its surrogates have engaged in
widespread retaliation against civilians. In addition, India continues to hold
Pakistan responsible for Kashmir related terrorism. India, therefore, like the U.S.
and Israel, does not treat terrorism as the act of individuals, but rather a
justification for action against large-population groups. Second, India's use of
secret tribunals in the case of terrorism, like in the United States and Israel,
increases the secrecy of Indian counterterrorist policies. This combined with the
massive human rights violations, including torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings,
reflect the minimal accountability and transparency in Indian counterterrorism.
Finally, Indian preventative detention laws reflect a strong willingness to employ
preventative rather than reactive measures in punishing terrorism. In sum, India,
like Israel, and the United States since September 11, has resorted to large scale
collective actions in order to repel counterterrorist efforts. This, combined with its
aggressive use of preventative detention laws and secret tribunals, places India
squarely within the war model of counterterrorism.
That the "war" language has been adopted by the United States and other
countries since September 11 should come as no surprise. But the language of war
could simply be a rhetorical device, or a means of rallying national efforts toward a
common objective, as in the case of a "war" on poverty. Applying the variables of
collectivity, accountability and timing, however, it becomes clear that the "war on
terror" is not simply rhetoric, it is a move away from open and individualized
justice, toward secretive government action which employs group punishment.
This has significant civil liberties and human rights implications. By being
employed against large groups rather than individuals, and in a preventative rather
than reactive manner, the war model essentially exacts punishment against
innocent parties. In other words, the war model takes actions against large groups
because it is more efficient than expending resources toward directing punishment
with precision. Innocent parties become the collateral damage in a war on terror.
Moreover, the political expediency of the war model and its collateral damage is
disturbing-rather than simply being more efficient, the war model may in fact be
a form of displaced anger. Victims of human rights abuses in Kashmir, for
example, noted that the Indian Army (or their surrogates) engages in human rights
abuses against the local population when it is unable to locate terrorist suspects.
536
This presents an interesting parallel to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the spring of
2003. Even if it was indeed part of the "war on terror," the invasion of Iraq was
arguably also simply a result of the Bush Administration's inability to catch top al-
Qaeda operatives such as Usama bin Laden. The response of the Indian army and
the U.S. government is the same-the scale is only larger because the scope of the
conflict is larger.
In addition, the rhetorical usefulness of the war terminology diverts attention
from the severe problems associated with the war model. As Heymann notes, war
requires a massive reallocation of resources, an understanding of tremendous costs
536. Behind Kashmir, supra note 497.
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to be borne, and, among them, limitations on civil rights.537 The increased
accountability which results from the scale of the war model is therefore undercut
by the willingness of the public to defer to the State in times of war. The
countervailing principle which justifies such costs is the determination of exigency
and the limited time frame of the conflict. However, the pre-conditions of
terrorism, in contrast to the pre-conditions of paradigmatic war, are neither exigent
nor temporary.538 In India for example, the National Security Act, authorizing
preventative detentions, was justified on the grounds that:
The anti-social and anti- national elements including secessionist communal and
pro-caste elements and also other elements that adversely influence and affect
the services essential to the community pose a grave challenge to the lawful
authority and sometimes even hold the society to ransom.
53 9
However, these conditions do not reflect extenuating circumstances calling
for extreme measures, they are the description of India's long-term political
condition.540 Similarly, Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and the American "war on
terror" are the result of long term conditions in the Middle East and other parts of
the Islamic world. In short, "'war' is neither a persuasive description of the
situation we face nor an adequate statement of our objectives."' 541
Indeed, an analysis of these long term conditions is precisely what is missing
from each of the models discussed in this study. As discussed earlier, the criminal
justice, intelligence, and war models are "repressive" models which seek to
prevent terrorism through ex ante or ex post deterrence. An alternative approach
would be to employ "conciliatory" models which call for negotiation with
terrorists or reform in order to end violence. By addressing the root causes of
terrorism, conciliation decreases the incentives of actors to engage in terrorism. In
India for example, after political reforms were instituted in Punjab, deaths from
terrorism declined from 2,586 in 1991, to sixty-eight from 1993-98.542 Similar
declines were seen in anti-Israeli terrorism during the implementation of the Oslo
Accords, during which time the Israeli Defence Ministry reported a greater than 90
percent decline in the terrorism in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
543
Unfortunately, the pattern in the West over the past few decades has been to
pay less and less attention to the root causes of terrorism, such as oppressive
conditions and poverty. Examining root causes has been viewed by some as
appeasement of terrorism. Moreover, some have argued that looking at root causes
of terrorism is inappropriate because the "the vast majority" of the world's
repressed and poor people do not resort to terrorism.544 Such analyses lead to
537. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 20.
538. Id.at 21.
539. Jinks, supra note 469, at 339.
540. Id. at 340.
541. HEYMANN, supra note 26, at 19.
542. Marwah, supra note 405, at 306.
543. See Gazit, supra note 323, at 238 (noting a decline from 3,142 in 1993, to 242 in 1999).
544. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16, at 2.
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faulty policy. First, even though not all persons in oppressive and impoverished
conditions resort to terrorism, it does not follow that improving conditions would
not lead to a decline in terrorism. Moreover, it is also true that not all persons who
live in poverty or lack opportunity resort to conventional criminal activity. But it
is readily apparent that we can reduce criminal activity by improving economic
conditions and opportunity for persons living in poverty. Such an argument would
never be construed as "appeasing" criminals or providing incentive for criminal
activity. Nor would it be attacked as unpatriotic.
Second, a stated policy of non-negotiation or non-reform effectively allows
terrorists to control policy. Assume, for example, the Israeli government states a
policy of not negotiating with the Palestinian Authority (PA) until anti-Israeli
terrorism stops. This position allows terrorist groups to exploit conditions to their
best advantage. If they want negotiations to occur, they can cease terrorist acts; if
they want negotiations to fail, they can engage in more terrorism. A policy of "we
will not negotiate with terrorists" in order to prevent "rewarding" terrorists,
assumes that negotiations are what the terrorist group wants. But as many have
noted, terrorists often engage violence in order to prevent negotiation and
encourage repressive policies which turn people against the target state.545 In other
words, adopting a repressive "war" model may be giving terrorists exactly what
they want. Governments should not condition the examination of root causes on
the end of terrorism; they should look at root causes in spite of terror in order to
end the violence. Such a position puts governments in control of policy, rather
than terrorists.
Indeed, of the countries in this study, the U.S. government should be the most
inclined to examine the root causes of terrorism, rather than employing the war
mentality is has adopted to combat terrorism. As many have noted, while terrorists
engage in anti-American violence for a variety of reasons, there is a seemingly
endless supply of recruits to anti-American causes due to a variety of U.S. policies.
These have included: 1) support for repressive regimes in the Middle East,
including Saudi Arabia, 2) unconditional U.S. support for Israel, and 3)
indifference to the plight of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Balkans. The
war on terror, including the invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, has given more
ammunition to the anti-American cause. Unlike in the cases of Israel and India, for
whom reconciliation would require "giving something up" in terms of land, the
United States does not have to give anything up in order to examine its policies.
The change required of the United States by conciliation is simply what the United
States should have been doing all along: examining the consequences of its foreign
policy on innocent populations. Unfortunately, in the 2 years since the September
11 attacks, the United States has adopted a position that addressing underlying
concerns is incompatible with maintaining strength in the "war on terror."
This paper has not been an attempt to develop a set of "best practices" for
counterterrorism. I have attempted to compare counterterrorist strategies in the
United States, Israel, and India through the lens of three models. The criminal
545. SHARMA, supra note 172, at 68; see also Gazit, supra note 323, at 228.
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justice model treats terrorism as essentially a criminal justice problem. It relies on
the criminal processes and punishment in order to deter terrorist activity. In
contrast, the intelligence model treats terrorism as a security problem. It seeks to
prevent terrorism as through direct prevention rather than punishment. But while
its lack of procedural safeguards aids in the prevention of terrorism, they also raise
significant civil liberties concerns. Finally, like the intelligence model, the war
model treats terrorism as a security problem. But unlike the intelligence model,
counterterrorism is achieved through action against large groups of people in order
to achieve either prevention or punishment. The key feature of the war model is
that by acting against groups, application of the war model allows governments to
avoid both the procedural safeguards of the criminal justice model and costs of
precision associated with the intelligence model. But both of these characteristics
raise substantial civil liberties and human rights concerns. Both terrorists and
innocents face punishment without procedural safeguards. Through the axes of
analysis developed in this paper-collectivity, accountability, and timing-it is
clear that all three countries have adopted a war model of counterterrorism. In the
United States, this approach has worked in conjunction with an unwillingness to
address the underlying causes of terrorism. But regardless of the moral
implications of terrorism, an unwillingness to deal with root causes simply leads to
bad policy. Thus, while the merits of the approaches of each country will continue
to be debated, their costs cannot be ignored. Of course, no one approach is
adequate, but terrorism has and will be a long term political problem-it stands to
reason that it will require long term political solutions.
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LAUGH, AND THE WHOLE WORLD... SCOWLS AT You?:




Though copyright protection in the United States is derived from the First
Article of the Constitution and is governed by statutes enacted by Congress under
that grant of power,' its limitations have more ambiguous origins. Often
dichotomized as internal and external,2 copyright limitations attempt to craft a
compromise between the financial incentive to create, which is secured by granting
authors the exclusive right to profit from their work, and the First Amendment free
speech rights of others to comment on, disseminate, and otherwise use these
copyrighted works. 3 Internal limitations, such as the idea-expression dichotomy
and the requirement that works be original and in a fixed medium, derive from the
Copyright Clause itself and define what can be protected.4 External limitations,
including those incorporated into copyright legislation, are imposed by other areas
of law and policy and immunize from liability uses that would otherwise be
considered infringements. 5
. B.A., Loyola College in Maryland (1997); M.A. (Philosophy), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2001);
J.D., Brooklyn Law School (2004). This Article was awarded first prize at Brooklyn Law School in the
65th Annual Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition sponsored by the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP). The Author would like to extend special thanks to
Professor Sammuel Munimba of Brooklyn Law School for his comments and suggestions on the
research and drafting of this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, etseq.
2. For a discussion of the "internal" and "external" restraints on copyright and their relation to
the First Amendment, see generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
3. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). See also Melville
B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 240 (2001).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.").
5. See Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust,
87 MiNN. L. REV. 1871, 1911 n.232 (2003).
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One such external limitation is the fair use doctrine. In the United States, fair
use is attributed to free speech principles found in the First Amendment 6 and,
despite its recent codification in the Copyright Act, remains a common law
equitable doctrine that judges apply on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.7
Consequently, the types of uses protected are not specifically named or
enumerated, but are instead determined by considering several factors. While some
types of fair use are rather well recognized, others remain controversial.8 Recently,
the status of parody as a fair use has been the subject of much controversy, both
domestically and abroad.9
The European Community ("EC") has, on at least two occasions, expressed
concern that the United States' fair use doctrine immunizes from liability uses that
unjustifiably infringe authors' rights.' ° The EC has specifically argued that the
exception made for parodies under the fair use doctrine is not confined to "special
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder,"" as required by
international agreements on copyright law. 12 While the United States has defended
the fair use doctrine and its protection of parodies as complying with such
agreements, some commentators have noted that, in doing so, the United States has
relied on a "less than accurate depiction of the fair use doctrine and how it operates
in domestic courts. '"13  Commentators have further concluded that the fair use
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (holding that
"copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations," including the fair use doctrine). It
should be noted that the fact that the fair use doctrine is said to derive from the First Amendment and
stands as an external limitation to copyright throws into question the oft-quoted remark, questioned
further infra at Part III, that copyright is the "engine of free speech." If this were really so, then all the
free speech protection necessary would be built in to the Copyright Clause itself and fair use would be a
superfluous doctrine. As this Article attempts to show, far from superfluous, fair use is indispensable.
7. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (noting that "fair use
remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act" and further,
that even after the passage of the 1976 Act, "[t]he task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for
the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis."). See also Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
8. See e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, I J. IN'tELL. PROP. L. 49, 51 (1993)
("Fair use has historically served as a flexible and adaptable mechanism for balancing the interests of
copyright owners, their competitors or potential competitors, and the public to fulfill the larger purposes
of copyright law which have traditionally been understood to be promoting the production and
dissemination of knowledge.").
9. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75, 116-17 (2000).
10. See Council for TRIPs, Review of Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights - Replies to
Questions Posed to the United States by Brazil, the European Communities and Their Member States,
Australia and Korea, Oct. 30, 1996, WTO Doc. IP/QIUSA/I [hereinafter Review of Legislation].
11. Id. § IV, Replies to Questions Posed by the European Communities and Their Member States,
Question 1.
12. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods 33 I.L.M. 81, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 13 [hereinafter TRIPs].
13. Okediji, supra note 9, at 117.
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protections afforded to parodies in the United States would not survive a direct
challenge under Article 13 of the General Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs").
14
This Article argues that while there is certainly some variance between the
exceptions to copyright protection recognized in the United States and those
recognized by the international community, the particular charges the EC has
leveled at the United States are unwarranted and their concerns misplaced. This
Article further argues that, at least as it has been enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), the fair use doctrine regarding parodic uses
does not conflict with the legitimate interests enshrined in TRIPs. What it does
provide, and what may seem foreign to some in the international community, is
traditional free speech protections. These protections prohibit copyright owners
from removing from the public discourse speech that adversely affects the value of
their property only to the extent that it is critical of that property. Such protection
is necessary to ensure that the "marketplace of ideas" remains open and
competitive, that copyright law continues to balance the financial incentives of
authors to create and the rights of others to comment, and that copyright does not
revert to its nefarious origins as a form of censorship.' 5
Part I will survey the current state of fair use in the United States, with
particular attention to exceptions made for parodic works. Part II will explore the
treatment of copyright exceptions under TRIPs. It will also review the specific
criticisms the EC has raised concerning the United States' fair use doctrine,
particularly with regard to parody, and evaluate the defenses the United States has
offered in response. This section will also suggest that the United States'
responses were unnecessarily evasive, and that the protection of parodic works
could have been defended on the merits.
Part III will show that the use of copyright to "horizontally" censor works-
that is, to remove from the public discourse works that are critical of the copyright
holder's property-is not a "normal exploitation" and does not protect a
"legitimate interest," as those terms are defined under TRIPs.16 This argument will
be further buttressed by reviewing two United States Court of Appeals copyright
cases decided since the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the status
of parody under the fair use doctrine. Part IV will conclude by observing that
recent developments in EC copyright law suggest that something like a free speech
exception to copyright may be emerging. While it is too early to know what form
such an exception will take, it would be surprising if it did not protect uses that
harm the original only by criticizing it, just as the fair use doctrine in the United
States does today.
14. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 9, at 117; Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope, and Longingfor the
Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2003).
15. Okediji, supra note 9, at 82.
16. See TRIPs, supra note 12, art. 13.
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I. FAIR USE AND PARODY IN THE UNITED STATES
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether a rap parody of Roy Orbison's song "Pretty Woman" was an infringement
of the copyright in that song.17 The defendants conceded that their use of the song
was an infringement; however, they argued that the use was a parody and
therefore, protected as a fair use of the original.18 To decide if the rap version was
in fact such a fair use, the Court looked to the four factors which the Copyright Act
requires be considered in determining fair use.19 However, the Court also made
clear that these factors should not be treated as establishing bright-line rules;
indeed, despite its codification in the Copyright Act, fair use essentially remains an
equitable doctrine, informed by free speech principles and decided on a case-by-
case basis. 20 Consequently, the Court emphatically rejected the analysis of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had held that a finding under the first
factor, ("purpose and character") that the use was commercial in nature was nearly
dispositive in its determination that the parody was not a fair use.2' The Court of
Appeals relied on language in the Supreme Court's previous decision in Sony
Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., indicating that "every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively... unfair ... ,22 Observing that
such a presumption would "swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107" of the Copyright Act,23 the Supreme Court reiterated
that no such presumption was created by Sony; a work's commercial nature is only
24one element of the first factor inquiry into the use's purpose and character.
The Court of Appeals' erroneous prioritization of the commercial nature
inquiry also affected its analysis of the fourth statutory factor, "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work., 25 The Court of
Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises to conclude that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use. 26 The Court of Appeals went on to reason that
because the use was wholly commercial, they could "presume that a likelihood of
future harm to Acuff-Rose exist[ed]. 27
17. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994).
18. Id. at 574.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004) ("(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.").
20. A cuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577.
21. Id. at 584.
22. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
23. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 584.
24. Id.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2004).
26. Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
27. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (citing Acuff-Rose Music v.
Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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The Supreme Court noted that the language from Sony on which the Court of
Appeals relied concerned commercial uses that were verbatim duplications of the
original.28 In such circumstances, it is reasonable to presume that this duplicative
use will act as a market replacement for the original, and thus will harm the market
for the original. However, this is not the case where, as in Acuff-Rose, the use is
transformative. 29 "The central purpose of [the first factor inquiry] is to see...
whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects.., or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.,, 30 In the latter case, "the parody and the
original usually serve different market functions," and so harm must be proven, not
presumed.3 ' The Court was clear that this does not mean that parody will never
harm the market for the original (or, as is more likely, for derivative works);
indeed, the Court remanded the case for further evidence to be heard specifically
on whether the market for derivative works had been harmed by the parody. 2
This distinction is extremely important for the present discussion. The
Court's holding excluded from consideration under the fourth factor any harm to
the market caused merely by the parodic work's critical nature. It likened such
harm to that which might be inflicted by a scathing book review or other criticism
of a work.33 Indeed, the distinction between "potentially remediable displacement
and unremediable disparagement is reflected in the rule that there is no protectible
derivative market for criticism., 34 Such critical uses unquestionably fall under the
fair use exception. To hold otherwise would be to allow copyright holders to use
their property rights to quell criticism and unfavorable commentary about their
works.
Equally important for this discussion is the Court's treatment of its previous
determination in Harper & Row that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use., 35 While the Court, in Acuff-Rose, quoted this
language in its procedural history of the case,36 it never evaluated this position in
its specific discussion of the fourth factor. This silence left open the question of
whether the fourth factor actually took priority over the others. Commentary has
suggested that the Court's analysis in Acuff-Rose actually elevated the first factor,
the purpose and character of the use, over the others and diminished the
importance of the fourth factor, the degree to which the use harms the market for
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted).
31. Id. at 591 (citing Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act Into
a Juggling Act, in ASCAP, COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOsIuM, No. 34, p. 23 (1987)).
32. Id. at 594.
33. Id. at 591-92.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
36. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
37. Id. at 590-94.
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the original.38 Evidence for this theory can be found in the degree to which the
Court diminished the role of market harm, in the Court's insistence that this factor
be considered along with and balanced against the other factors, 39 and the Court's
treatment of the transformative nature of the use as counterbalancing the
commercial nature of the use.4 ° While it is true that the transformative nature of
the use did affect the Court's determination that market harm needed to be proven,
the claim that this elevated the first element above the others goes too far. Had the
use been a verbatim commercial use, market harm would have been presumed,
giving rise to the appearance that the fourth, not the first, factor had carried the
day. Instead, it seems fair to say that no one of the factors enjoys dispositive or
even controlling power in all cases. True to the Supreme Court's repeated
insistence that fair use be determined on a "case-by-case" basis, 41 the factor that
proves most important will depend on the type of use in question.
For parodic works, however, it does appear that the analysis will center on the
fourth factor. If a parody usurps the market for the original or derivatives thereof,
that parody is less likely to be deemed a fair use.42 If the parody does not usurp the
market, but harms the original only by lampooning it, the use will likely be
considered fair. The failure to make this essential distinction is at the root of the
EC's discontent with the United States' fair use exception for parodies; it is to this
discontent that we now tuM.
43
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RECEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Article 13 of TRIPs provides that "Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder."44 This provision has been construed to incorporate
38. See generally Elizabeth Troup Timkovich, The New Significance of the Four Fair Use Factors
as Applied to Parody: Interpreting the Court's Analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61 (2003).
39. Id. at 69 (noting that the fourth factor "varies with the strength of the other factors").
40. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
41. Id. at 581.
42. Id. at 592.
43. It should also be noted that the second factor, the nature of the work, is rarely given much
attention, especially in parody cases, and is likewise largely ignored in the present Article. See, e.g.,
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 1175 (spending only one paragraph on the factor and noting that this factor is
not likely to be much help in "separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case,
since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works."). See also Dr. Suess Enters.,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F. 3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the factor in only
one paragraph and observing, "While this factor typically has not been terribly significant in the overall
fair use balancing, the creativity, imagination and originality embodied in the [copyrighted work at
issue] and its central character tilts the scales against fair use."). We will return to the decision in Dr.
Suess below, infra Part III. On the other hand, the third factor, the "amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," has played an important role in fair use
decisions. However, it is also largely ignored in the present discussion, as it is subsumed in the
discussion of market competition, i.e., whether the parody competes with the copyrighted work.
44. TRIPs, supra note 12, art. 13 (emphasis added).
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and subsume the exceptions granted in the Berne Convention,4 5 and therefore
represents the controlling language for disputes regarding exceptions under
international copyright law.46 This discussion of the United States' fair use
doctrine will, therefore, focus on U.S. conformity with these provisions.
There have been two major challenges to the United States' fair use doctrine
under international copyright law. In 1996, the World Trade Organization
("WTO") submitted the copyright laws of the United States to a Review of
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights ("Review of Legislation") in order to
ensure that they were compliant with TRIPs.47 While many of the questions
presented to the United States concerned recent amendments to the United States
Copyright Act (the "Copyright Act") affecting the right of performance, the EC
questioned how treatment of parody as a fair use exception to copyright (as the
Supreme Court had done in Acuff-Rose) could be squared with Article 13 of
TRIPs.48 Then, in 2000, a Panel was convened by the Dispute Settlement Body of
the WTO to hear a complaint brought by the EC against the United States
regarding Section 106 of the Copyright Act.49 While that Section does not address
parody, the dispute did give the Panel the opportunity to interpret for the first time
the terms of Article 13, which governs exceptions to copyright protection. The
WTO Panel discussion will, therefore, be useful in predicting how such a panel
would decide an outright challenge to the fair use exception for parody.
A. The Review of Legislation
While other nations posed questions regarding various aspects of recent
amendments to the Copyright Act, the EC asked the United States how the fair use
doctrine, codified at Section 107 of the Act, complies with the provisions of TRIPs
Article 13, particularly with regard to "a 'parody' that diminishes the value of a
work." 50 The EC's question seems to imply that any use that would diminish the
value of the work for any reason would be impermissible under TRIPs. This,
however, is not the case. Article 13 provides that "[m]embers shall confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder." 5' Thus, there may be cases which do
diminish the value of the work but which do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder. The specific meaning of the terms of Article 13, and how it would
treat such cases, will be addressed below with respect to the Panel Report.
In response to the EC's question, the United States argued that fair use
45. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DSI60/R (June 15, 2000), paras. 6.92-6.96, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WTO
Panel Report].
46. Id.
47. Review of Legislation, supra note 10.
48. Id. § iv.
49. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45.
50. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
51. TRIPs, supra note 12, art. 13 (emphasis added).
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"embodies essentially the same goals as Article 13" and that the doctrine protects
only "those types of uses which do not interfere with the copyright owner's normal
exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice his or her rights." 52 Echoing
the Supreme Court's decision in Acuff-Rose, the United States offered the example
of a scathing book review, which certainly may diminish the value of the work, but
would not infringe the copyright unless it "substitute[d] for purchases of the book
in the marketplace. 53 After delineating the four factors that courts will consider in
determining a fair use, the United States asserted that "[tihe Supreme Court has
stated that the fourth factor, which specifically focuses on the impact of potential
market exploitation of the work, is the most important" and cited to the Court's
decision in Harper & Row.54  It went on to note that other factors may be
considered as well, allowing for flexibility and case-by-case analyses.55
As noted above, the Acuff-Rose Court did not address whether the fourth
factor was in fact the most important. 6 While the United States' representation of
this issue is therefore not exactly inaccurate, it could be considered misleading,
especially if one follows either the argument that in Acuff-Rose it was the first
factor that carried the day or that no factor is controlling in all cases.57 Instead of
being evasive, the United States could have argued that TRIPs, by the plain
language of Article 13, does not forbid any exception that would "diminish the
value of the work," but instead lays out a three-part test for deciding if a use is
impermissible.5 8 While the fourth factor addresses market harm, the other factors,
and particularly the first factor's consideration of whether the use is
transformative, act to guard against such unreasonable market uses. Were Article
13 to forbid all value-diminishing uses, as the EC would have it, this would serve
to quell all but "flattering commentary or benign parody," as the United States did
eventually retort.5 9
Regarding parody specifically, the United States asserted that not all parodies
are protected by fair use; only "true parody" which targets and comments on the
copyrighted work (as opposed to satire, which only uses the copyrighted work as a
vehicle to comment on some other target
6") will be afforded this protection.
61
Further, even a true parody will not be deemed to be a fair use if the fourth factor
weighs against it, that is, if the parody "replaces any desire to exploit the copyright
work., 62 The EC was less than satisfied with this response, fearing that because a
parody could use a greater part of a copyrighted work than a simple review; such a




56. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-94 (1994).
57. See Timkovich, supra note 38, at 68; see discussion Part I, supra.
58. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
59. Id.
60. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580 n.14.
61. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
62. Id.
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use could conflict with the "normal exploitation of the work. 63 The United States'
reply was, again, simply that the fourth factor would weigh against such a use.
64
Inexplicably, although the United States addressed both sides of the harm
issue, it never explicitly made the distinction made in Acuff-Rose between harming
the market for the copyrighted work (or derivatives thereof) by simply criticizing
the work and harming the market by usurping it.65 Indeed, the United States
adopted the language first used by the EC as to whether a parody would "replace
any desire to exploit the copyright work." 66 This language is not used anywhere in
Article 13 and serves only to conflate this important distinction. Indeed, the
scathing book review would certainly quell, if not extinguish, the "desire to
exploit," but this use would fall within Article 13. The United States' response
therefore appeared evasive and less truthful than it could have been had it made
this distinction, one that the Supreme Court had already made in Acuff-Rose and
that the WTO Panel itself would make just four years later.
B. The Panel Report
In 2000, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body convened a Panel to hear a
complaint brought by the EC against the United States regarding Section 106 of
the Copyright Act.67 Recent amendments had created exceptions to the exclusive
right of performance to allow certain businesses to perform copyrighted works
publicly. The United States argued in response to the complaint that such uses are,
in fact, covered under the exceptions of TRIPs Article 13. While the use at issue
was not one of parody, the Panel Report is the only occasion the WTO has had
thus far to construe the meaning of Article 13. By reviewing the arguments and
decision in this dispute, one can glean some indication as to how the WTO would
settle a dispute concerning parodic fair use, such as was the subject of the Review
of Legislation.
The Panel broke the Article 13 provisions into three distinct tests: the
exception must (1) be confined to certain special cases; (2) not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work; and (3) not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder.68 We will deal with each condition in turn.
1. "Confined to certain special cases "
Regarding the first condition, the Panel concluded that for an exception to be
"confined to certain special cases," it should be "clearly defined" and "narrow in
its scope and reach." 69 In so finding, the Panel rejected arguments put forth by the
EC that the "certain special cases" should also serve a "special purpose., 70 The
Panel agreed with the U.S. response that TRIPs does not require or even allow the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
66. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
67. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, paras. 1.1-1.8.
68. Id. para. 6.97.
69. Id. paras. 6.112-13.
70. Id. paras. 6.102,6.105.
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Panel to pass judgment on the legitimacy of domestic policy objectives "in light of
[each country's] own history and national priorities.,, 71 Further, the Panel found
that although the exception must be "clearly defined," there is "no need to identify
explicitly each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply.,
72
Considering what these findings would mean for a challenge to the United
States' fair use exceptions for parodic works, two main points overlap. First, it
should be comforting to the United States that the Panel will not pass judgment on
the legitimacy of the policy underlying the exception. Fair use generally, and
parody in particular, rely on free speech principles, and it would be unfortunate
indeed if the United States was called upon to justify free speech to the Panel and
other member states that do not have such a tradition in their domestic laws.
However, one could argue that when judges review a particular use, the more
attenuated the relationship between the parody and the targeted work, the stronger
the likelihood of an infringement. 73 In Acuff-Rose, the Court defined parody as a
"commentary" on the targeted work and found that the use at issue there
"reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to
some degree. 74 The determination of whether a use does comment or criticize
enough to be considered a parody thus appears to be an almost aesthetic and
potentially political judgment. This alone may cause worry regarding the potential
for censorship.75 However, if this judgment were then reviewable by a WTO Panel
which could further determine if the work was "critical enough," the specter of
international censorship would be hard to avoid.76
Second, it is important to evaluate the argument that parody is not "clearly
defined" enough to comport with the first condition. The Court in Acuff-Rose
implied that a parody, which targets the original work, could be protected under
fair use while a satire, which uses the work as a vehicle to criticize some other
work, genre or society at large, would not be protected.77 While this distinction
between use as a "target" and use as a "weapon" creates the illusion of a clear
definition of what parodies would be protected, it is a dubious distinction at best.
Though satire does tend to use the original work as a weapon to criticize some
other target, the weapon rarely survives unscathed; it too will be lampooned, if
only by association. 7' A further justification offered for this distinction is that
71. Id. paras. 6.106, 6.112.
72. Id. para. 6.108.
73. Ellen Gredley & Spyros Maniatis, Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody
and its Treatment in Copyright, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 343 (1997).
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
75. This topic will be discussed in greater detail below, see infra at Part IlI.
76. Furthermore, unfavorable treatment by the WTO with regard to such deeply-held values could
increase the risk of "regime-shifting," that is, the United States' moving the issue into an institution
where a more favorable result is more likely. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional
Theory ofInternational Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679, 724 n.139 (2003) (discussing "regime shifting").
77. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 581, nn. 14-15. See also Michael Rushton, Copyright and Freedom of
Expression: An Economic Analysis, in COPYRIGHT IN THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIEs 58 (Ruth Towse ed.,
2002).
78. Jason M. Vogel, The Cat in the Hat's Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit's Narrowing of the
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while the parodist can justify his or her use of the original work (it being necessary
to conjure up the work in order to criticize it), the satirist uses the work merely as a
weapon. It is thus argued that because the satirist chooses this weapon from
amongst many possible others, there is no justification for using this one in
particular.79
This argument is unsustainable for at least three reasons. First, there may be
cases where there is simply no other satisfactory weapon.80 To imply otherwise,
that is, to suggest that the artist should use some other work, is to dictate the
creative process to the artist, a practice in which neither judges nor plaintiffs
should involve themselves. 8' Second, if every owner of a potential 'weapon' has
this excuse, no satire will ever be authored.82 Finally, because the proposed use
will almost invariably reflect poorly on the 'weapon' as well, it is unlikely that any
copyright owner would allow for it.
83
The discretion afforded to judges in deciding what qualifies as a parody is
therefore of some concern in relation to parodic fair uses under Article 13."
However, this concern only follows from the belief that we have a "fair use regime
based on the parody/satire dichotomy." 85  In fact, this is an entirely false
dichotomy. The mere categorization of a work as a parody does not automatically
qualify it as a fair use. 86 The Acuff-Rose Court specifically held that "parody, like
any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case
by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law."87
Therefore, the only point of concern in deciding whether parody is "clearly
defined" for the purposes of Article 13 will be the fact that there is no real way to
predict how judges will interpret the specific facts of each and every case.
However, the Panel explicitly held that there was "no need to identify explicitly
each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply. 88 Further,
the unpredictability of judges is inherent in the judicial process, and though it may
be a point of concern, it is certainly no basis for ruling that this particular doctrine
fails to comport with the "clearly defined" standard. It is therefore suggested that
the fair use exception for parody ought to survive the first standard.
Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr. Suess Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 313 (1998).
79. Gredley & Maniatis, supra note 73, at 343.
80. Id.
81. Vogel, supra note 78, at 312-313.
82. Id. at 313.
83. Id. at 314.
84. Id. at 313 ("Thus, an essential weakness of the a fair use regime based on the parody/satire
dichotomy is that, by defining parody broadly or narrowly, courts can subjectively accord or deny fair
use to an alleged parodic work.").
85. Id.
86. Id. at 288-290.
87. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
88. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, para. 6.108.
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2. "Not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work"
The Panel next interpreted what constitutes "normal exploitation" for
purposes of the second standard of Article 13. The Panel first noted that the
"normal exploitation" of a work could not mean the full use of all exclusive rights
conferred, since this would leave Article 13 "devoid of meaning. ' '89 Thus, the
Panel decided that "normal" use is not full use but instead has an empirical aspect
and a normative (or dynamic) aspect. 90 Regarding the empirical aspect, the Panel
accepted the United States' suggestion that the inquiry look to "whether there are
areas of the market in which the copyright owner would ordinarily expect to
exploit the work, but which are not available for exploitation because of this
exemption."91 Regarding the normative or dynamic aspect, the Panel suggested a
forward-looking formulation that should consider "forms of exploitation which,
with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire considerable
economic or practical importance.' 92
However, the Panel also made clear that "not every use of a work, which in
principle is covered by the scope of exclusive rights and involves commercial gain,
necessarily conflicts with a normal exploitation of that work., 93 All together, the
Panel thus held that a use conflicts with a normal exploitation of a copyrighted
work if it "enter[s] into economic competition with the ways that right holders
normally extract economic value from that right to the work (i.e., the copyright)
and thereby deprive[s] them of significant or tangible commercial gains., 94 It is
important to note that the deprivation of commercial gains must be a consequence
of the challenged work competing with the copyrighted work. This explicitly
rejects the EC's position in the Review of Legislation that any use which
"replace[s] any desire to exploit the copyright work" violates Article 13. The
Panel's language indicates that not every use that would replace the desire to
exploit (and therefore deprive the owner of significant or tangible commercial
gains) would violate Article 13, but only those which do so through competition.
Mirroring the observation in Acuff-Rose that "parody and the original usually serve
different market functions," 96 the Panel seems to have concluded that only when
the parody usurps the market for the original work would there be a conflict with
this provision of Article 13. Indeed, ceteris paribus, it is also only in such a case
that it would run afoul of fair use in the United States.
89. Id. para. 6.167.
90. Id. para. 6.166.
91. Id. paras. 6.177, 6.178.
92. Id. para. 6.180.
93. Id. para. 6.182.
94. Id. para. 6.183 (emphasis added).
95. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
96. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (citing Bisceglia, Parody and
Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act Into a Juggling Act, COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP),
No. 34, p. 23 (1987)).
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3. "Not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder"
The Panel then set to interpreting the final standard of Article 13. Since the
parties and the Panel agreed that a copyright owner exercising his or her rights for
economic gain would be a "legitimate interest," the Panel centered its investigation
on the question of what degree of prejudice would be unreasonable.97 Considering
the importance of this factor, the Panel gave it comparably short shrift.98 It rather
summarily concluded that "prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holders
reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the
potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner." 99 In so
doing, it left open several issues, not the least of which was when a loss of income
becomes unreasonable. Essentially, the Panel reduced "legitimate interest" to
"income," which in itself raises questions, 1' ° and shifted the "reasonableness"
standard from the prejudice to the loss of income. In fact, the Panel's analysis of
the controversy in front of it did little to answer this question. It only decided that
it would consider the present and potential market conditions that may affect the
copyright holder's income. 10 1 A parody's effect on the market for the original will
be considered, but it is difficult to predict what level of effect would be necessary
to find an infringement.
10 2
To summarize the holdings of the Panel Report, a use will fall within the
exceptions of Article 13 if the use falls within a clearly defined category, does not
enter into competition with the copyrighted work, and does not cause unreasonable
loss of income to the owner of the copyrighted work. 10 3 It should be noted that that
the latter two clauses could become redundant with regard to parody. If an
infringing parodic work does not compete with the copyrighted work, no loss of
income, however great, could be considered unreasonable. This conclusion is
borne out by the familiar "scathing book review" standard: it is possible that a
review could be so devastating that income would drop off to nothing. Yet, this
would not, under the second factor, be an infringement. Therefore, the three
standards collapse into two, at least for parody. The exception must be clearly
defined and it must not protect uses that cause unreasonable loss of income to the
owner of the copyrighted work through competition. Thus phrased, the central
97. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, para. 6.226.
98. Id. paras. 6.226, 6.227.
99. Id. para. 6.229.
100. For example, is the Panel implying that an author's interests in her work are solely financial
and do not include reputational or moral rights, and thereby embracing the American utilitarian view of
copyright instead of the European natural rights view? These competing views are discussed infra at
Part IV, but whether the Panel is in fact making such a choice is an open question outside the scope of
the present article but properly and hopefully the subject of further scholarship.
101. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, paras. 6.236, 6.249.
102. Id. It might also be observed that interpretations of what is "reasonable," which would depend
greatly on the facts of particular disputes, including, e.g., the type of works in question and relevant
market conditions, would cause no less uncertainty or unpredictability than would the determination of
whether a parody is a fair use in the United States. It is therefore doubtful that this reasonableness
standard would survive the Panel's own "clearly defined" standard if the four-part fair use inquiry in the
United States would not, as the EC had suggested. See discussion, supra at II.B. 1.
103. Id. para. 7.1.
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question becomes: When is a use competition and when is it criticism? The
answer would be decisive in a Panel review of the U.S. fair use doctrine. It is to
that question we now turn.
III. HORIZONTAL EFFECT, PRIVATE CENSORSHIP AND FREE SPEECH
The relationship between copyright law and free speech in the United States
has been the subject of much scholarly debate for many years.'10 4 While the official
position has been that the two live together harmoniously, with copyright being the
"engine of free expression,"10 5 many have noted that there is often more tension
than the official "no-conflict narrative" admits. 10 6 Considering copyright's origin
as a means of censorship,'0 7 there has been concern that the disturbing
phenomenon known as the "horizontal effect"' 8 is really a new means of
censorship, albeit in a privately administered form. 0 9 If copyright holders are able
to use their rights to keep expression out of the public discourse solely because it is
critical of their work, this will be a means of censorship as effective, if less wide
ranging, as was the English Stationer's Guild."0
For example, in the case of Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the holder
of the copyright in the novel and movie Gone With The Wind sued to enjoin the
publication of a novel titled, The Wind Done Gone, which was a parody based on
and using many of the characters, plot, and setting of the original work."' The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to issue an injunction, finding
that any harm could be addressed by monetary damages and that "it appear[ed] a
viable fair use defense [was] available."'" 2 In so doing, the court had occasion to
review the four fair use factors provided in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
Regarding market harm, the court was persuaded by evidence proffered that
"demonstrate[d] why [The Wind Done Gone was] unlikely to displace sales of
[Gone With the Wind]."'"l 3 Essential in coming to this conclusion was the court's
reiteration of the Acuff-Rose Court's observation that:
104. For a history of this relationship and an argument that there is less harmony in the relationship
than is traditionally found, seePamela Samuelson, Copyright, Commodification, and Censorship: Past
as Prologue - But to What Future?, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 63 (Niva Elkin-Koren
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002). See also Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free
Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233 (2003).
105. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
106. Michael D. Bimhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1275, 1280 (2003) (noting recent challenges to the "no-conflict narrative").
107. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the
Public Domain Part 1,18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 193, 236 (1993).
108. Michael D. Birnhack, Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom of
Expression under the Human Rights Act, 14 ENT. L.R. 2003, 24 [hereinafter, Bimhack, Acknowledging
the Conflict] (questioning the horizontal effect in the context of private rights of action under the United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950).
109. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
110. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 323 (2003).
111. SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
112. Id. at 1277.
113. Id. at 1275.
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[t]he only harm to [derivative markets] that need concern us... is the harm of
market substitution. The fact that a parody may impair the market for derivative
uses by the very effectiveness of its critical commentary is no more relevant
under copyright than the like threat to the original market." 4
Interestingly, in determining that the derivative market would not likely be
harmed, the court noted that while the owners of the Gone With the Wind copyright
forbade licensees from making any reference to homosexuality, The Wind Done
Gone cast Rhett Butler, one of the main characters, as a homosexual." 5 This made
it certain that the parody and any licensed derivatives of the original would "serve
different market functions."'" 6 In a speech given shortly after the decision in
SunTrust, Joseph Beck, lead counsel for the parodist, noted that the copyright
holder had not objected to dozens of other parodies made of Gone With the Wind,
because those had been flattering and had "reinforce[d] the iconographic stature of
Gone With the Wind. [The Wind Done Gone] does not reinforce the iconographic
stature of Gone With the Wind, and that is why it was attacked."
'" 7
This case points out the danger that copyright, rather than being the "engine
of free expression," could revert to a means of private censorship. Copyright
owners could use their exclusive rights to silence voices that are critical of their
work. Both the Supreme Court and the WTO Panel have decided to guard against
such abuse by allowing fair use of copyrighted material without permission so long
as that use does not cause harm to the market for the original or derivatives thereof
through competition.' 1s
However, the formulation of permissible exceptions that the EC presented in
the Review of Legislation and in front of the WTO Panel, which would forbid any
use that "replace[s] any desire to exploit the copyright work," would not be able to
discriminate between prohibited harm through competition and immunized harm
through criticism." 9 In the case of The Wind Done Gone, profits from sales and
derivatives of Gone With the Wind would be diminished if the parody created a
popular backlash against the latter's glorification of Southern plantation society.
However, this should not be the type of harm against which copyright can be used
to protect an author. To do so would be to allow the private censorship that
copyright is supposed to avoid.'
20
A good example of how the failure to make this distinction can result in
private censorship is Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Book USA, Inc.'2' The
owners of the copyright in The Cat in the Hat sued to enjoin the publication of The
Cat NOT in the Hat!, a book which retold the story of the O.J. Simpson double
114. Id. at 1274 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994)).
115. Id. at 1271 n.26.
116. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
117. Joseph Beck, Flexibility in Parody of Copyrighted Material, 10 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 3, 13
(2002).
118. SeeAcuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590; Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV..
119. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
120. SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1263.
121. Dr. Suess Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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homicide trial using the style of the copyrighted work. 122 Working its way through
the Section 107 factors, the court found that the use was not a protected fair use,
and therefore allowed the injunction.
123
Regarding the first factor, the court found that the work was not sufficiently
transformative because it adopted the copyrighted work's style only "'to get
attention' and maybe even 'to avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh.""124 Furthermore, the court found that the use was not in fact a parody, but
only a satire, using the copyrighted work as a weapon against an external target:
the O.J. Simpson trial. 25 Because the court found that the commentary had no
"critical bearing on the substance or style" of the copyrighted work, 126 under the
distinction made in Acuff-Rose, this would indeed appear to be a satire. The book
uses the comical and farcical setting of The Cat In The Hat to imply that the 0. J.
Simpson trial was also comical and farcical. It is true that The Cat In The Hat was
not targeted, but was rather used as a weapon. It is also true that "the good will" of
The Cat In The Hat may suffer from the association with the double homicide.
However, being cast in a less-than-appealing light is no basis for claiming
copyright infringement: it was not sufficient in Harper & Row and it should not
have been sufficient here. This is apparent in light of the court's fourth factor
analysis.
The court observed that in weighing the fourth factor they should consider
both "the extent of market harm caused by the publication and distribution of The
Cat NOT in the Hat! and whether its unrestricted and widespread dissemination
would hurt the potential market for the original and derivatives of The Cat In The
Hat.'' 127 Instead of relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Acuff-Rose, where
the distinction between harm by usurpation and harm by criticism was made
explicit, 128 the Ninth Circuit inexplicably chose to rely on language from a non-
binding, pre-Acuff-Rose, Second Circuit decision which characterized the fourth
factor inquiry as:
[Striking a balance] between the benefit the public will derive if the use is
permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is
denied. The less adverse effect that an alleged infringing use has on the
copyright owner's expectation of gain, the less public benefit need be shown to
justify the use.
129
This analysis not only flies in the face of the binding, subsequent Supreme
Court decision in Acuff-Rose, it also substantially echoes the position of the EC in
122. Id. at 1396.
123. Id. at 1403.
124. Id. at 1401 (citing Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1403.
128. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (upholding the "distinction
between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement").
129. Dr. Suess Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1403 (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
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the Review of Legislation and Panel Report. Specifically, the discussion is only of
the "adverse effect" on the copyright owner's "expected gain," without any
distinction made as to how this adverse effect comes about.' 30 To return to our
tired example of the scathing book review, this analysis would find infringement if
the review caused sales to drop off unless the review had some overwhelming
public benefit. While the merits of such a policy could be debated, it is enough to
observe that this balancing test appears nowhere in the Supreme Court's decisions
on fair use and does not represent the applicable law on the issue.
Further, it is from this analysis and without any evidence of actual market
conditions that the court summarily concluded that because the use was
"nontransformative, and admittedly commercial... market substitution is at least
more certain, and market harm may be more readily inferred.' 13' However, the
court's own analysis seems contradictory. First, if the only harm is to the "good
will and reputation," and this harm stems from the bad light in which the work is
cast, this would be no grounds for denying fair use. 132 The harm would have to
come from competition with the original, and so we can assume that the "adverse
effect" mentioned above 133 must derive from that competition. However, if the
parodic use is such that it would harm the original merely by association, how
could it also be maintained that the parody would compete with the original or
derivatives thereof? Would not this be a case where the parody and the original
almost certainly "serve different market functions?"'' 34 Further, if the use is so
harmful to the original, can we be expected to believe there is a derivative market
for it that the copyright holder would have exploited but which is being usurped by
the parody? Certainly, a court should at least require evidence of such a rare'
situation should one be alleged to exist.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's analysis flies in the face of the Supreme Court's
decision in Acuff-Rose, undercuts the very policy behind the fair use protection of
parody, and has not gone uncriticized.' 35 In fact, it has not been followed or cited
as controlling authority by a single court in the six years since it was decided. For
our purposes, it is important as an illustration of the EC's vision of what
exceptions would be allowed under Article 13. By conflating injury through
competition with injury through criticism, the court, as would the EC, allows
copyright holders to censor unfavorable uses of their work solely because they are
unfavorable. While the Ninth Circuit's decision can be dismissed as an improper
exercise of judicial power, the EC's contention is more perplexing, especially in
light of recent developments in the EC and scholarship about its own copyright
laws.
130. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403.
131. Id.
132. Compare id. with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (upholding the
"distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement").
133. Dr. Suess, 109 F.3d at 1403.
134. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
135. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 78, at 318.
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IV. COPYRIGHT IN THE EC: A MOVEMENT TOWARD FREE EXPRESSION?
In the United Kingdom, courts are unlikely to decide that a work infringes a
copyright unless a substantial part of the work was used and the injury is to more
than the owner's amour propre (i.e., there is economic injury). 36 Spanish law
explicitly exempts parody from infringement so long as there is no risk of
confusion and it "does not harm the original work or its author.' 37 Likewise, the
Netherlands allows parody when its aim is "humour and not competition."' 38 In
France, where authors' rights are historically strongest,139 parody, pastiche, and
caricature are put together in one exception that applies so long as the work is
humorous, does not cause confusion with the original, and does not aim to injure or
degrade the original author.
140
This brief survey shows that some degree of protection for parodic uses is
already fairly common in EC member states. However, these protections are based
exclusively on internal limitations in copyright law, that is, specific statutory
limitations written into the copyright laws themselves; 14 1 no external limits to
copyright have traditionally been recognized. This is in sharp contrast to the
United States where internal limitations are provided by statute but external
limitations, such as the fair use exception for parody, even when codified are
essentially left to the courts to shape. 142  Of course the resistance to external
exceptions in Europe is fairly unsurprising. Europeans have historically
considered copyright an "unrestricted natural right"'143 which codified the "sacred
bond" between the author and his or her work.'"4 The primacy given to authors'
rights (also called moral rights) has kept them above the fray and without external
limitation. However, recent developments suggest this may be changing.
In order to implement the copyright exception provisions of TRIPs, a
European Directive was recently issued which aimed to harmonize the copyright
laws of the various EC member states. 145 The Directive explicitly allows those
states to provide for exceptions to copyright for "caricature, parody or pastiche.' 46
In addition, recent scholarship demonstrates that European courts have begun
entertaining (if not yet allowing) citizens' invocation of the free expression
136. Gredley & Maniatis,, supra note 73, at 341-42.
137. Id. at 144 (citing L. Gimeno, A Parody of Songs, [1997] ENT. LR 18).
138. Rowling v. Uitgeverij Byblos BV, 12003] E.C.D.R. 23, 2003 WL 21729296 at *250.
139. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343,
357 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
140. Id. (citing M. ROSE, PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN AND POST-MODERN 92 (1993)).
141. Id., at 352.
142. Id. at 352-53.
143. Id. at 344.
144. Id. This is in sharp contrast to the "utilitarian" approach taken in the United States (and other
common law jurisdictions), where copyright is explicitly protected "to promote science and the useful
arts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also id. at 352.
145. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art.
5(3)(a), 2001 O.J. (L167).
146. Id. art. 5(3)(k).
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provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950147 ("ECHR") as
defenses to copyright infringement. 148 Although EC courts have not traditionally
recognized the horizontal application of fundamental rights, 149 this would allow
citizens to invoke such rights as defenses against the actions of other citizens as
well as those of the state.' 50 Such invocations would allow parodists and other
would-be infringers an external defense to infringement. 151
After studying several recent ECHR and EC member state court decisions, P.
Bernt Hugenholtz has suggested that:
[In the future,] freedom of expression arguments are likely to succeed against
copyright claims aimed at preventing political discourse, curtailing journalistic
or artistic freedoms, suppressing publication of government-produced
information or impeding other forms of 'public speech' ... The [European]
Court might also be willing to find national copyright laws in direct
contravention of Article 10 [of the ECHR] if they fail to provide exceptions for
uses such as parody.1
5 2
No case has yet been presented that has required an EC court to squarely
decide the status of parody under the ECHR, but if these predictions are accurate
and the general trend toward recognizing external limitations on copyright in the
EC continues, it would be surprising if the EC did not find some free speech
protections for parodic use. It would be even more surprising if, in so finding, the
EC did not adopt a doctrine not unlike the U.S. fair use doctrine, which they had
attacked under TRIPs. In fact, in light of the Panel's interpretation of the copyright
exception provisions of TRIPs, were the EC to refuse to allow for exceptions for
non-competitive parodies, it may well be the EC's laws that are challenged under
the same provisions. Further, in light of the historical resistance to external
limitations in the EC, codifying (that is, making into an internal exception) the
distinction between market harm by criticism and market harm by competition
may well be a good first step toward implementing free speech exceptions to
copyright in the EC.
CONCLUSION
As an illustration of the dangers involved in allowing copyright owners to use
their rights to quiet those that would be critical of their work, one copyright scholar
offers the case of the successful "international copyright campaign of the Church
of Scientology."'5 3 Suits brought in various jurisdictions worldwide attempted to
stop former members of the "Church" from disseminating its writings in an effort
to discredit it.'5 4 While each challenged use consisted of verbatim reproductions of
147. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
148. See Bimhack, Acknowledging the Conflict, supra note 108, at 30.
149. Hugenholtz, supra note 140, at 345.
150. Id.
151. See Birnhack, Acknowledging the Conflict, supra note 108, at 30.
152. Hugenholtz, supra note 140, at 362 (emphasis added).
153. Bimhack, Acknowledging the Conflict, supra note 108, at 30.
154. See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the works, the question of how the courts of various jurisdictions would have
decided the dispute had less of the work been used, though still in a manner which
was critical and aimed solely to discredit the "Church," remains unresolved. In
such cases, where free speech and copyright collide, recourse to or avoidance of
the competition/criticism dichotomy could be decisive.155 Copyright is meant to
protect the authors' and artists' economic interests in their works. However, this
policy is not furthered by allowing authors and artists to silence voices that are
critical of their works solely because such dissent may affect the popularity of
those works; quite to the contrary, in such a case, rather than being the engine of
free speech, copyright becomes, again, a tool of censorship.
155. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Vosper, 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (C.A. 1971) (Lord Denning, M.R.) (reasoning that
an injunction on the publication of a critical work that used passages of Scientology literature should be
removed by suggesting that in considering whether a use is an infringement or a "fair dealing," judges
should consider, et al, "the use made of [the original and the quoting work]. If they are used as a basis
for comment, criticism or review, that may be fair dealing. If they are used to convey the same
information as the author, for a rival purpose, that may be unfair.").
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